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Editor’s Introduction
Dictionary definitions of the term mishpachah are quite similar: a Jewish family
or social unit including close and distant relatives—sometimes also close friends.
Although such definitions—or better, descriptions—are justifiably inclusive,
even they fail to capture the diversity and vitality of real flesh-and-blood
Jewish families.
The studies collected in this volume, each by a different scholar working
in a different context, call attention to features of the Jewish family from a
wide variety of perspectives. They explore historical developments, contemporary trends, and future possibilities for Jewish families. In the process, they
identify both common and distinctive features in the makeup of, and expectations for, this basic building block of Jewish society and religion.
Jewish families, as messy as they are essential, have been part of Jewish life from the biblical era through the rabbinic period, from the advent of
modernity through the threshold of the future. We have not sought to cover
every aspect of the Jewish family from all cultural, social, historical, and theological eras. No single volume, however lengthy and weighty, can do that.
Rather, we have given essentially free rein to these scholars and researchers to write about what they know best. Moreover, we have allowed, in fact
encouraged, all authors to express themselves in the style in which they are
most comfortable and with the emphases they select as most valuable.
We do not apologize that the resultant collection is not comprehensive. We
would, however, be disappointed if readers come away with no new insights,
questions, or layers of appreciation for an institution that exhibits and embodies so many elements of Judaism’s rich and complex experience.
The thirteen papers collected here, all originating as oral presentations
at the 27th Annual Klutznick-Harris-Schwalb Symposium, divide chronologically into three groups: six deal primarily with the past, from the biblical period
through the nineteenth century; five center on aspects of the Jewish family today;
and two look to technological developments that are bound to become increasingly popular for Jews, as for many other groups, in the future. For the reader
of this volume, we present each paper under one of these chronological rubrics.
Susan Marks, New College of Florida, is the author of the first essay,
“Uncovering the Ongoing Parental Role in Education in the Rabbinic Period.”
Through it, she examines the family’s ongoing impact on the study of the
Torah in early rabbinic Judaism, particularly the father-son relationship.
In doing so, she pushes back against scholarly discussions emphasizing the
ix

significance of the disciple-mentor relationship and the Talmudic replacement
of the father with the sage, which thereby creates a new way to trace lineage.
While this is important, she argues against essentializing this aspect of rabbinic
Judaism at the expense of understanding the continued role played by the disciple’s parents. Marks focuses on the Babylonian Talmud tractates Hullin and
Berachot, especially their descriptions of the active role taken by the father in
educating his son concerning meal practices, on the one hand, and the topic
of sexual relations, on the other, with mixed reception.
Marks’s analysis attends to dynamics of ritual practice and lived religion
(in light of work by Pierre Bourdieu and others) to suggest that the questions of
the son’s relationship with the family in which he grew up is more complicated
than previous scholarship acknowledges. In examining these fraught encounters, this study reveals the depth of ongoing engagement with family and the
need to reexamine the nature of learning as rabbinic Judaism invents itself.
David Brodsky, Brooklyn College, follows with his study, “Mishnah Gittin: Family Relations as Metaphor for National Relations.” While the rest of
Mishnah Gittin lays out the laws of the commissioning, writing, and delivery
of the bill of divorce in a fairly orderly manner, the beginning, middle, and end
of the tractate stand out. Brodsky argues that the three work together to point
the reader to the central theme of the tractate, a theme that works simultaneously on the individual and national levels. By opening with the demarcation
of the boundaries between that which is in and outside of the land of Israel, the
tractate is pointing to divorce as an act that is marking the same boundaries on
the individual level.
The middle section of Mishnah Gittin explains why these boundaries
need to be established: originally [ba-rishonah] one ruling was made, but since
then things have not turned out the way they were intended, and a corrective
must be instated. For the sake of the public welfare, indeed for the sake of
peace, things cannot always remain as they were originally established. Sometimes a corrective is necessary. Here, divorce is precisely that corrective for the
marriage that is not working. The final mishnah clarifies that while divorce
was permitted by the School of Shammai only in cases of adultery (reading the
“unchaste matter [‘ervat davar]” of Deuteronomy 24:1 as truly unchaste [devar
‘ervah]), the School of Hillel and, later, Rabbi Akiva offered their own correctives, permitting it ultimately any time that the couple were not getting along.
This final mishnah of the tractate (9:10) points us even further to who
would seem to be intended here, as it contains one of the only parallels in all of
the Mishnah with the New Testament, with the School of Shammai’s position
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directly paralleling Jesus’s position in the Sermon on the Mount rather than in
opposition to Deuteronomy 24:1. Thus, in this nascent period for both Christianity and rabbinic Judaism, the two may have converged more than they
diverged, at least regarding the laws of divorce and their derivation from the
Bible. Mishnah Gittin, Brodsky proposes, is attempting to declare that there
was an earlier period [ba-rishonah] before the corrective was needed.
By using the national boundaries as a metaphor for individual boundaries vis-à-vis divorce, the redactor is reversing the prophetic use of divorce as
a metaphor for the nation and its ruptured relationship with God (Isa 50:1;
Jer 3:1–8; Mal 2:13–16). By linking the two, the redactor opens up the possibility of reading in both directions—of national boundaries as metaphor
for individual boundaries and as the marking of these personal boundaries as
metaphor for the nation. In this essay, Brodsky explores the implications of
that connection.
The first of two essays on the Hebrew Bible is “All in the Family: Ancient
Israelite and Judahite Families in Context” by Cynthia Shafer-Elliott, William
Jessup University. Historically, she observes, Syro-Palestinian archaeology and
biblical studies have focused on monumental places, people, material culture,
and the texts that reflect them. Major urban settlements contained palaces,
temples, and fortifications. The elite men who oversaw their administration
left no shortage of artifacts and texts for analysis.
However, a shift of interest into the daily lives of the average ancient Israelite has occurred. This shift recognizes that in order to understand the daily
life of ancient Israel and Judah, the focus needs to change from monumental
to minor, from the macro to the micro. In other words, more attention needs to
be given to the stage where daily life occurred—the home. This is exactly what
Schafer-Elliott accomplishes.
The home was (and indeed still is) the nucleus of the everyday. The home
was where the average ancient Israelite mishpachah [family] in both urban and
rural environments lived out their lives. The purpose of Schafer-Elliott’s contribution is to illustrate how the average ancient Israelite family lived within
its physical environment, the home, within the Iron Age. Utilizing household
archaeology and textual evidence from the Hebrew Bible, Schafer-Elliott’s
essay examines the typical Israelite household including its dwelling and its
members and their activities.
Charles David Isbell, Louisiana State University, has written the second
essay that features the Hebrew Bible: “Family Values and Biblical Courtship
and Marriage: Spanning the Time Barrier.” As he observes, the importance of
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family within the broader community of Judaism has its roots in some of the
most significant narratives in the book of Genesis. From the outset, marriage has
stood as the cornerstone of the biblical family. The politically motivated call for
a return to biblical marriage in modern America appears to be grounded in nonJewish ideas of marriage rather than in biblical narratives that actually describe
the customs of our ancestors. As is often the case, we are compelled to span the
difference between the Bible and the twenty-first century in this matter.
In the attempt to build a bridge from modernity back to the Bible,
Isbell raises three questions, each one leading to a clearer understanding of
the purpose(s) of family grounded in marriage: (1) When is a house a home?
(2) When does “son” or “daughter” mean more than a biological offspring?
(3) When are economic considerations important in biblical marriage?
Once these questions have been addressed, we are prepared to discuss
the ways in which marriage in the Bible might inform our modern minhagim
[customs] and values. Isbell’s investigation shows that the external customs of
biblical marriage and family life are not the crux of the matter, and frantic calls
for a return to biblical marriage based on the facile linkage of modern practices
to a simplistic interpretation of the Bible merely obscure the real issues. Still,
biblical narratives that underscore appropriate partnerships capable of contributing to familial and societal stability can guide us to embrace enduring values
that are worth cherishing.
We may, Isbell argues, find it necessary to modernize, redefine, and even
reformulate the customs of marriage and the definition of “family,” and that
is as it should be, for each generation should be granted and must accept the
responsibility of such freedom of expression. But we need not abandon the goal
of marriages and families that are formed to serve the moral values of the larger
human community and built to endure because they consist of partners who
share a system of values and ideals that has stood the test of time.
Gail Labovitz, American Jewish University, moves us forward chronologically with her essay, “Presumptuous Halachah: On Determining the Status
of Relationships Outside Jewish Marriage.” She begins with this observation:
according to Jewish law and practice since at least the time of the Mishnah,
the legal basis for Jewish marriage is the act of kiddushin, in which a man
“acquires” a woman. Once this act is performed, the relationship is binding
and can be severed only by his giving her a divorce document.
Yet, Labovitz continues, even a cursory study of legal and other sources
suggests that Jewish men and women have long engaged in relationships involving sexual relations and/or long-term commitments to one another outside the
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rubric of kiddushin. Examples include cohabitation outside marriage, concubinage, marriage by rites of other religions (where the participants might be
forced converts to Christianity or Islam), and, in modernity, civil marriage.
Most recently, there have been some proposals toward new means of marriage beyond the gendered assumptions (and material harm for women) of kiddushin and the halachic divorce process. Significantly, halachic decisors have not
considered these relationships to be outside the purview of the Jewish legal system. Lebovitz traces this topic through Jewish legal literature with an eye toward
when, how, and why decisors have attempted to assimilate these relationships
into Jewish marriages or to dismiss them as beyond the bounds of the system.
Haim Sperber, Western Galilee College, looks at the nineteenth century
in his essay, “Agunot, Immigration, and Modernization, from 1857 to 1896.”
Through his research and analysis, he presents the agunot phenomenon in the
second half of the nineteenth century, especially in Eastern Europe.
In the first part of his essay, Sperber analyzes the phenomenon and its
main databases. In this part, he discusses the volume of the phenomenon and
different variations of agunot. Sperber also shows that the main databases—
the Jewish media and rabbinical sources—present two different narratives of the
phenomenon; he attempts to explain this.
The second half of Sperber’s essay analyzes the phenomenon and its
effect on the family institution in Jewish Eastern Europe. The discussion also
features a section on relations between the agunot issue and immigration and
changes in the role of rabbis in East European Jewish society.
Broadly speaking, the first six essays speak to the Jewish family as it
was. While the implications of such studies are clearly relevant today, their
emphasis was on the past. By contrast, the next five essays offer descriptions
and analyses of phenomena that characterize large numbers of Jews and their
families in the present.
The first essay in this section, “Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies
of DNA in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism,” is coauthored
by Sarah Imhoff, Indiana University, Bloomington, and Hillary Kaell, Concordia University. They begin with the observation that American Jews have
embraced their family trees. With rapid advances in the accessibility of both
genetic testing and Internet-enabled ancestry tracking, the potential for
“knowing” about oneself and one’s family has left the dusty archives and elite
laboratories and come into living rooms.
Imhoff and Kaell ask: why and how does family lineage and popular
DNA testing matter religiously?
xiii

Messianic Jewish congregations—conservative Christian congregations
that retain some Jewish practices alongside belief in Jesus as the Messiah—have
about twice as many gentile believers as they do believers of Jewish descent.
However, only ethnic Jews are considered to be directly descended from the
tribes of Israel—and thus part of the lineage of Jesus himself. As Imhoff and
Kaell discover, one result of this imbalance is an ongoing discussion among
congregants about whether gentile believers do in fact have Jewish lineage.
They interpret their own stories of self through secular websites, such as
ancestry.com, and through those targeted specifically at non-Jews seeking Jewish roots (e.g., offering lists of Jewish names).
Jews, more traditionally defined, also use ancestry websites and DNA
testing to craft narratives for themselves and their families. These narratives,
drawing on the cultural importance of yichus [family background], often make
connections to Jewish peoplehood and even ancient Israelite priestly lineages.
Imhoff and Kaell’s research uses interviews, media analysis, and history to
show the differences and unexpected overlaps in these two groups’ theologically freighted stories of family.
The next essay is “Contemporary Modern Orthodox Guidance Books
on Marital Sexuality” by Evyatar Marienberg, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. In his research, Marienberg discovered that young women and
men who are about to be married in haredi [Ultra-Orthodox] communities
and in some Modern/National Orthodox circles are encouraged to have a few
meetings with a specialist on the matter, a person of the same sex whose role is
to instruct them about the marital act. In addition, he uncovered a wide range
of specialized books and booklets that are available to them. In recent years,
manuals were written also for, on the one hand, parents to help them explain
sexuality to their young children and, on the other hand, to older adults to
help them solve problems in their own sexual life. Schools are also slowly starting to realize that they need to deal with these issues as well, and a growing
number of curricula target this market. Marienberg’s essay examines several
Jewish Orthodox works of these quite various kinds published in Israel and in
the United States in the last few decades.
Often written for specific audiences—men, women, couples, UltraOrthodox, Modern Orthodox, Chasidim, Sephardim, Ashkenazim, students,
parents—these compositions present a broad view of the many ways sex is prescribed in today’s Jewish Orthodox world. As part of his analysis, Marienberg
found that some of these differences are related to historical and ideological
tendencies and some to concepts about the “correct” structure of a good Jewish
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family. Where relevant, he compares information gathered about oral guidance
with the content of these books. He also addresses possible implications of
these different prescriptions on the reality in bedrooms.
The next essay is “Challah from Abba: The Modern Jewish Father” by
Rabbi Joshua Brown of Omaha’s Temple Israel. Since its birth, Judaism has
been concerned with the effects of one generation’s actions upon another. The
rabbis understand not only that every generation is different but also that each
generation is dependent upon the ones that came before it and those to come
after it.
As Brown sees it, we are currently at a crossroads in gender roles in
America. As women increasingly move into being the dominant worker in
the American workforce, men are being asked, or at times forced by their family situation, to become the primary parent. This is a role that men have rarely
played in the history of parenting but one that Judaism knows well.
In his essay Brown looks at the modern father and the many challenges
he faces both at home and in his career as he strives to be an active parent. In
particular, Brown focuses on the challenges facing Jewish fathers in the twentyfirst century as informed by modern psychology and the potential benefits that
Jewish tradition has to offer them should they choose to accept the challenge.
Parenting also forms the subject of the next essay: “‘Jewish Education
Begins at Home’: Training Parents to Raise American Jewish Children after
World War II” by Joshua J. Furman, Rice University. During the post–World
War II baby boom, Americans increasingly turned to child-rearing authorities such as Benjamin Spock and Arnold Gesell for advice on how to raise
happy, healthy sons and daughters. As Furman notes, Jewish parents relied
on these same volumes, but they also used and learned from Jewish baby
books. These texts offered parents detailed information about the significance
and performance of Jewish birth ritual, advised readers on the process
of choosing meaningful English and Hebrew names for their newborn,
and allowed them to record important milestones in their child’s physical and
spiritual development.
In Furman’s analysis, authors of these texts endeavored to teach mothers
and fathers the knowledge and skills they would need to impart a strong sense
of Jewish identity to their children. At the same time, the aesthetic and substantive resemblance of these sources to those authored for a broad American
audience suggests an interest, on the part of both publishers and purchasers,
to render and receive information about Jewish child rearing in a thoroughly
contemporary format. This choice, Furman determines, reflects a broader
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desire on the part of most American Jews to blend seamlessly into American
life while simultaneously making some effort to maintain Jewish distinctiveness. This tension between modernity and tradition, between acculturation
and preservation, flows through the heart of postwar American Jewish childrearing literature.
The final essay in this section is by Jennifer Sartori, Northeastern University: “Modern Families: Multifaceted Identities in the Jewish Adoptive
Family.” In discussions of changes in the American Jewish family, attention
often focuses on the dramatic increase in the number of interfaith families. Yet
American Jewish families, like American families more broadly, are becoming
increasingly “multi” in other ways as well: multiracial, multicultural, multiethnic, multinational. In Sartori’s analysis, over the past several decades Jewish
adoptive families have been at the forefront of these changes. The general trend
in adoption toward adopting across boundaries of identity has been even more
pronounced in the American Jewish community, with disproportionately high
rates of transracial, transnational, and transcultural adoption.
Sartori’s analysis explores the ways Jewish adoptive families negotiate their
multiple identities. Although adoption experts today emphasize the need for
adoptees and their families to engage actively with the adoptees’ birth heritage
and/or families of origin, the Jewish community, concerned about continuity,
often seems to be pulling in the opposite direction, emphasizing the importance of a strong and exclusive Jewish identity for children. Important aspects
of Jewish identity—including ideas about race, ancestry, and genetics—may
also complicate adoptees’ sense of belonging within the Jewish community.
Despite these challenges, many Jewish adoptees and their families draw strength
from their diverse identities. The experiences of these families, as Sartori shows,
can shed valuable light on the growing number of Jews and other Americans
whose identities span religious, racial, and ethnic lines.
The first six essays, while set in earlier historical contexts, exhibit discernible links with the present. Likewise, the next five essays, set in the present, find their full significance only through their links with the past. The
final two essays, while pointing to the future, cannot be understood apart
from issues of technology in the present and questions of ethics that stretch
back into the past.
The first of these two essays—“The Jewish Perspective in Creating Human
Embryos Using Cloning Technologies”—is by John D. Loike, Columbia University. He begins with a discussion and analysis of recent scientific discoveries
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that have enhanced the capacity of scientists and clinicians to generate human
preimplanted embryos in the laboratory. These embryos can be transferred into
a woman’s uterus to allow the development of a healthy child.
Beginning in 2013, new technologies in the area of human cloning
could also be applied to human reproduction. Loike describes one such biotechnology, known as somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), which involves
fusing a blood or skin cell that contains all forty-six chromosomes of DNA
into an egg whose nuclear DNA has been removed. This reconstituted egg
can now be induced to divide and differentiate in the laboratory to generate
a four- to six-day-old human embryo that can be transplanted into a woman’s
uterus to gestate.
As Loike sees it, one potential clinical advantage of SCNT is the capacity to use nonsperm cells of infertile men to generate a healthy embryo. Yet
from a Jewish legal perspective, this technology raises many issues, such as
(a) Is human cloning permissible according to Jewish law? (b) What is the
status of fatherhood in an embryo generated by “fertilizing” an egg without
male sperm? (c) Is it permissible to use SCNT to clone a woman? As part of
his essay, Loike addresses these issues from a Jewish legal perspective.
This volume’s final essay, by Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, University of Dayton
Law School, is titled “Multiplying Motherhood: Gestational Surrogate Motherhood and Jewish Law.” As she relates, Jews are some of the most aggressive
users of assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Having children is both a
halachic [legal] obligation for observant Jews and a cultural tradition for many
Jews who do not live halachically observant lives.
According to Laufer-Ukeles, the push to reproduce among Jewish families comes from biblical commandments, a desire to re-create a Jewish population decimated by the Holocaust, cultural traditions that surround family life,
and demographic concerns about sustaining Jewish culture and cultural traditions. The use of ART to help couples who struggle to reproduce the Jewish
family is therefore a natural integration of tradition and transition in the use
of modern technology.
In her research, Laufer-Ukeles has determined that Jewish law largely
embraces ART with some reservations, particularly regarding artificial insemination by donor. Jewish families use ART in all its varieties with great and joyous success. But problems do arise for those who engage in the use of ART. In
particular, controversies have arisen regarding (1) when conversion is necessary
to sustain the Jewishness of children born of ART; (2) when ART should be
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allowed, given the importance of biologically based legal parenthood in Jewish
law as well as Jewish ethics that weigh against exploitation and commodification of surrogates and gametes; and (3) whether children born of ART could
potentially have a compromised legal status [mamzerut] that could prevent
them from marrying within the Jewish religion and thereby creating their own
Jewish families. Some potential problems can be solved relatively easily; others cannot. In this essay, Laufer-Ukeles discusses potential problems for those
using ART in the context of surrogacy, artificial insemination by donor, and
egg donation. She then considers what the Jewish community can and should
do to support the use of ART in creating Jewish families while avoiding ethical or legal pitfalls that can hurt ART participants or children born of ART.
Laufer-Ukeles’s essay has both theoretical and practical appeal, as many
in the Jewish community are faced with these dilemmas or may be unaware of
the potential consequences. Discussions of the meaning of the Jewish family
and the use of fertility treatments can be beneficial to a wide potential audience of scholars and laypeople alike.
While of necessity not doing full justice to the wealth of insights and
nuances that these essays contain, an editor such as myself does have a responsibility to provide some sort of summation. For this volume, I shall do so
simply by recalling some of the points that remain fixed in my mind:
1. The family has consistently played a major role in Judaism as experienced over countless generations in innumerable cultural and historical contexts.
2. The makeup of the Jewish family has typically gone beyond the
nuclear family to encompass a wide circle of relatives and nonrelatives. In real life, mishpachah is almost as likely to exclude some blood
relatives as it is to include those with no genetic connections.
3. The role of family members could on many occasions be expressed
in terms of a hierarchical flow chart, but even for traditional societies
these charts often mask rather than mirrored the way in which real
power and influence are wielded.
4. Jewish families have been, are, and almost certainly will continue to
be dynamic rather than static. To a considerable extent, this is due
to the fact that Jews, even the most traditional Jews, are innovators
whose respect for the past is typically balanced by recognition of the
realities of the present.
xviii

5. And finally (though in no particular order), Jewish families are different from others and are largely the same. For the most part, except
when living in forced (or self-imposed) isolation from others, Jews are
not immune to larger social and cultural influences, which they can
adopt, adept, or even on occasion initiate.
Leonard J. Greenspoon
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I. THE PAST

Uncovering the Ongoing Parental Role
in Education in the Rabbinic Period
Susan Marks
Parents today involve themselves in their children’s higher education in
myriad, often contradictory ways. On the one hand, privacy laws now insist
that eighteen-year-olds need not share college transcripts with their parents.
On the other hand, many students rely on their parents to pay a portion of
tuition, and twenty-first century “helicopter” parenting does not always end
at high school graduation. From this perspective, we might wonder why we
so often think of rabbinic disciples—many of whom were certainly younger
than today’s college students—as taught only by rabbis. Certainly, their
mothers and fathers could have continued to play formative roles. Identifying those ongoing educational functions of the rabbinic parent is the aim of
this essay.
Educating young adults is, almost by definition, a fraught affair. I happened upon a wonderful outside-the-classroom reminder of this at the newly
renovated Salvador Dalí Museum in St. Petersburg, Florida. The audio tour
first led us through Dalí’s early paintings and then narrated the end of his art
school career: he declined to take final exams because, he explained, none of
his teachers knew as much as he did. Teachers will likely join me in recalling a
student or two who felt that we had nothing new to teach them. Perhaps Dalí
was correct, albeit not particularly politic, in his self-assessment. (Whether the
self-satisfied students we have encountered could claim genius on the level of
Dalí’s I leave to our own recollections.) There is, of course, also another player
in this educational equation: the one paying the bills and looking out for the
future of the student and the family. Need I add that Dalí’s father blew up
at his son when he heard that his son withdrew? This is the relationship that
interests me. The analogous dynamic deeply hidden within rabbinic literature—whereby a parent offers guidance, which is then met with the child’s
acceptance or rejection—is ripe for dissection.
The historic focus on rabbi and disciple obscures the teaching relationship between father and son.1 Rhetorically, rabbis put their own importance
as teachers ahead of fathers, a high valuation that culminates in a prescription
requiring that if faced with such a dilemma, a disciple must redeem his teacher
from captivity before his father:
3

4

Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition

If his father and his teacher were each taken captive, he must first
ransom his teacher and afterwards ransom his father; but if his father
was also a Sage he must first ransom his father and afterward ransom
his teacher.2

Research into issues of redeeming captives examines the complexities of these
prescriptions;3 here I want us only to recognize this attempted sleight of hand,
which emphasizes that a father’s authority should have limits.4 When we look
behind this veil, the importance of the father can be appreciated.
Our sense of the significance of rabbis as educators owes something to
the fame of the rabbinic schools of Sura and Pumpaditha. Nevertheless, recent
research challenges the power of these so-called academies and the place of
formal education in the earliest rabbinic periods as discussed in the Mishnah
and talmudic literature.5 This research argues instead that teachers are taught
not in academies but rather in small circles of disciples. Extending this line
of interrogation, my research challenges us to consider another overlooked
relationship revealed by this new model of more intimate education: the relationship of the father and son, which continued despite rabbi-centric rhetoric.
Concerning the dietary matter of waiting between eating meat and milk,
one disciple invokes his father as a standard:
Said Mar ‘Ukba, “In this matter of [waiting between eating meat
and milk] I am lax compared with my father’s stringency [chala
bar chamra l’gabai abba]. For if my father were to eat meat now he
would not eat cheese until the very hour tomorrow, whereas I do
not eat [cheese] in the same meal but I do eat it in my next meal.”6

Is the son accepting the greater knowledge of the father or challenging its
appropriateness? Elsewhere also, these nuances have not been visible until the
salient question concerning the pedagogical relationship of father and son was
asked. Finding evidence that the son’s relationship to his father continues to
loom over his education requires a portrait of education capable of including
this complexity.
Analyzing education and considering ritual and lived religion, I argue,
reveals the ongoing, important, and ambivalent educational relationship
between parent and child, refining our understanding of transmission of ideas
in the rabbinic period. Our present examination of largely underappreciated
dynamics is in line with recent studies that have destabilized the image of
rabbinic education as formal, institutional instruction. If we also take into
account certain ideas that are well accepted in social theory but have not yet
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been applied to the study of education in the rabbinic era, we can come to a
more nuanced understanding of how the sons in these narratives might perceive their world. These critical advances enable us to see anew the father-son
relationships that have until now been hidden in plain sight.
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENERATIONAL SHIFTS
When the ninth century Babylonian rabbinic academies of Pumbedita and
Sura traced their own histories, they portrayed their institutions as dating
back to the third century and perhaps even earlier.7 That backdated pedigree
had been accepted until David Goodblatt spearheaded a recent move toward
historical skepticism about these early academies, a skepticism that appears
to be coalescing into a new consensus. A consideration of linguistic evidence
began the challenge: why should we translate “yeshiva” or metivta as “academy”
when other possibilities, such as “study session,” exist?8 The terms beit midrash
and bei rav, Hebrew and Aramaic, respectively, for “house of study,” appear
about five times as often as the terms “yeshiva” and metivta, so perhaps this
“academy” concept is not as foundational as has been assumed.9
The scholars examining early Jewish higher education argue persuasively
that by bracketing our own emotional investment in the image of the academy,
we come to recognize it as an anachronism. Study circles would have been
more fluid—powerful as long as a particular rabbi was teaching, and then at
some point students would move elsewhere. The resulting analytical framework has already led to insights about early Jewish and Christian education,
since the latter also seems to have not so immediately developed the formality
once assumed.10 This paradigm shift opens a great many questions concerning
how teachers related to their students, to one another, and to others—all are
matters of communication and of power.11
Given this focus on the more informal and direct dynamics between
teachers and students, it is not much of a leap to insert the question of how
parents figure into this picture. In the area of meal studies, where I have done
much of my research, Gil Klein has recently argued for the importance of
considering the banquet hall space as an important locus for halachic discussions.12 He insists that the meal itself functions not only as a setting for communal reflection but also as an interactive space for the making of halachic
decisions.13 Taken together, this suggests that we move our thinking from a
model of academies to multiple and porous households as a context for law
and, I would add, learning. Spilling over into mealtimes, this instruction was
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hardly the classroom-bound phenomenon that earlier critics might have retrojected onto rabbinic-era settings.
The model of the removed and ascendant academy is being supplanted
with more intimate alternatives. This is one step toward viewing the pedagogical relationship of father and son anew. Social science methodologies
that examine community change over time, such as discussions of cohort
replacement, provide additional steps, mapping the changing attitudes of
new generations.14 In considering rabbinic literature, we do not have a mass
of data, but these mathematically based methodologies do a service nonetheless: they reverse the landscape for us. They suggest that despite appearances
to the contrary, rabbinic emphasis on transmission of tradition is only part of
the story. They cause us to ask how rabbinic literature, as it conserves earlier
wisdom, presents these moments of change. The tensions in rabbinic texts
start to surface.
Of more help than simply revealing the underlying tensions, Pierre Bourdieu theorizes the self-reflexive aspect of acting from a differing point of view.
Bourdieu expects us to look at change, but he also insists on our examining the
structure that precedes this change as a prior moment. This is not, he explains,
the Lévi-Straussian “structure” but instead is a continually revised “structuring structure” that will serve as social context for actions that will, in turn,
restructure this context and so forth.15 In our case, these “symbolic struggles
over the perceptions of the social world” mean that students understand, act,
and develop social capital in a world that never overlaps entirely with that of
their parents or teachers.16 Our challenge becomes recognizing this disjuncture
or lack of overlap in the discrete points of view concealed or revealed when
fathers and sons contest each other’s ability to know and act.
RABBINIC FATHERS AND SONS
In recent years, a sugya, or talmudic grouping from the Babylonian Talmud
tractate Berachot, has received much attention because of the clues it offers
concerning rabbinic ideas about women, asceticism, and the construction
of gender.17 Despite this flurry of study, little attention has been paid to the
ongoing appearance of fathers in this set of narratives. As explained above,
researchers had expected education and learning to happen within the academy, so there was no need to examine these interactions as peculiar. Contrary
to this expectation, each example depicts a different fraught teaching and
learning relationship between father and son. I will examine these three cases
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out of order so as to consider the most successful, the scariest, and, only then,
the one with the most ambiguity.
Despite the fact that the father may send his son to a disciple circle, the
father is responsible for helping the son find a bride. As becomes apparent
below, this is a teachable moment. Or, in other words, the father persists in
teaching his son about other aspects of life, including the importance of getting married:
Later he was engaged in preparations for the marriage of his son into
the family of R. Jose b. Zimra. It was agreed that [the son] should
spend twelve years at the house of study [bei rav]. When the girl
was led before him he said to them, “Let it be six years.” When they
made her pass before him [a second time] he said, “I would rather
marry [her first] and then proceed [to the house of study].” He felt
abashed before his father, but the latter said to him, “My son, you
have the mind of your creator; for in Scripture it is written first, ‘You
will bring them and plant them,’ and later it is written, ‘And let them
make Me a sanctuary that I may dwell among them.’”18

The father arranges for the chosen bride to pass before his hesitant son. When
the son chooses marriage, he stands sheepishly before his father. And we do
see the power relationship: the father has a hold on his son, and the son has filial obligations. In this particular glimpse, the father teaches his son about this
balance of sexual relations and asceticism. His son does not know more than
his father; the son comes to recognize a truth that his father has understood.
Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s insights concerning struggles over perception help us
realize that the separate perspective he represents is not altogether absent: had
he (or someone like him) not perceived this question of marriage differently
and not thought that his need to go study trumped his need to marry, there
would be no purpose to telling the story.
The peaceful communication of father and son concerning the balance
of Torah and family characterizes the narrative. Toward the end of this sugya
we learn of a more violent clash. This father also presents his own opinion of
how to balance study and sexual activity:
R. Joseph the son of Raba [was] sent [by] his father to the house of
study to study before R. Joseph, and they arranged for him [to stay
there for] six years. Having been there three years and the eve of the
Day of Atonement approaching, he said, “I would go and see my
family.” When his father heard [of his premature arrival] he took
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up a weapon and went out to meet him. He said to him, “You have
remembered your whore!”
Another version: He said to him, “You have remembered your
dove!” They got involved in a quarrel and neither the one nor the
other ate of the last meal before the fast.19

Things became so tense between this father and son that they began Yom Kippur without a last meal. The weapon in the father’s hand certainly represents
a contest of power, but the narrative underscores the incomplete success of
the father’s argument. Aside from his need to resort to violence, the father’s
language itself seems to be uncomfortable for the talmudic compilers. An
additional angle is offered: some accounts read “dove” instead of “whore.”
Those hearing the story have even wondered whether both father and son miss
the meal because they are dead, each killing the other in the culmination of the
violence percolating throughout.20 Ultimately, whatever the outcome there
is no question here that the episode involves (a) an argument, (b) different
perspectives, and (c) teaching from father to son. Regardless of what learning
may occur, the father offers his son another perspective.
One more parental story appears in this sugya. In this narrative, the
father finds his son’s behavior as fantastic as the previous father found his son’s
opposition:
R. Hama b. Bisa went away [from home and] spent twelve years at
the house of study. When he returned he said, “I will not act as did
b. Hakina [surprising and thus scaring his wife to death].” He therefore
entered the [local] house of study and sent word to his house. Meanwhile his son, R. Oshaia, entered, sat down before him and addressed
to him a question on [one of the] subjects of study. [R. Hama,] seeing
how well versed he was in his studies, became very depressed. “Had
I been here,” he said, “I also could have had such a child.” When he
entered his house his son came in, whereupon he rose before him,
believing that [the other] wished to ask him some [further] legal
questions. His wife chuckled. “What father stands up before a son?!”
[As an epilogue to this story, since from Bisa to Hama to Oshaia is
the three generations,] Rami b. Hama applied to him [the following
scriptural text:] And a threefold cord is not quickly broken is a reference to R. Oshaia, son of R. Hama, son of Bisa.21

Here, the father, like the son in our earlier text, balances marriage and study.
He does wed first, but then he goes off to study before settling into his marital
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home. Upon his return, he encounters a model young man: one well educated
and respectful. We see him indulge in a private dream that this could be his
son, which turns out to be true on one level. But isn’t such a compliant son
still a fantasy, especially when the father has been absent? He encounters his
son twice, and they don’t argue! We have the modern language of those who
study adoption reminding us that he is only the biological father.
The wife of the absent father guffaws as he mistakenly rises before his
son, for this father is turning the expected roles upside down. It would be
appropriate to rise before a guest scholar but not before his own son.22 This
erroneous posture becomes a joke, as the text both reveals and calls into question the appropriateness of behavior between this father and this son. The son
has inadvertently assumed the father’s role of the one who commands honor,
thus transforming the relationship into a very different fantasy involving a
weak father and a usurping son. The text does not tell us how this pair will
move from the fantasy roles of father and son to a real relationship, but it does
reveal a disconnect. The epilogue celebrates Oshaia as the third generation, the
threefold cord that cannot be broken, but in doing so it may also be answering
a concern that the father’s absence has endangered this legacy.
The three texts above, situated in this single sugya, offer a range of
visions: a relationship between father and son that is productive of learning,
a relationship based only on biology that can serve as a fantasy for at least a
moment or two, and, in the final vignette, a father greeting his son with
violence. Despite the backdrop of students going off to study, the learning
relationship between father and son still exists, however successful or unsuccessful. In fact, this variety suggests the tenacity of this relationship despite
available alternatives. Because all the stories describe the encounters using the
third person, however, we don’t have the sons’ perspective on this learning.
That point of view resurfaces when we turn to the text examined briefly at the
beginning and its twin:
Said Mar ‘Ukba, “In this matter of [waiting between eating meat
and milk] I am lax compared with my father’s stringency [chala
bar chamra l’gabai abba]. For if my father were to eat meat now he
would not eat cheese until the very hour tomorrow, whereas I do
not eat [cheese] in the same meal but I do eat it in my next meal.”
Samuel said, “In this matter I am lax compared with my
father’s stringency [chala bar chamra l’gabai abba]. For my father
used to inspect his property twice a day, but I do so only once
a day.” Samuel here follows his maxim, for Samuel declared,
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“He who inspects his property daily will find a half-zuz coin [or
the equivalent as profit].”23

In these accounts we see two sons, each in the same position and each offering
an account of his personal practice. Each declares that his father is “stricter”
than he is about these matters of dining and accounting. Each son describes
his father’s practice and his own, neither denying what he learned from his
father nor following it exactly.
Ironically, despite the first-person presentation, ambiguity remains.
What does it mean when a son says that his father is “stricter”? A couple of
translations try to decide the issue: “I [the son] cannot hold a candle to my
father” or “I am as vinegar is to wine compared with my father,” working
to make it clear that the son envies the father and would, if he could, aspire to
such a pinnacle.24 But “stricter” does not always convey this nuance; it can
also mean mulish and stubborn. For whatever reason, each son has arrived at
a practice different from his father’s, even though he is aware of his father’s
position. Does the son know more? Bourdieu would remind us that the social
structure in which he operates differs from that of his father and will differ
again through the son’s acting within and through these structuring structures.
In this last case, the son’s actions diverge from his father’s actions because he,
the son, lives in a world that is wholly other.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING
This study is an early exploration of these questions of fathers and sons. It
has considered only a handful of examples and makes no claim that these are
necessarily representative of other rabbinic presentations of parenting. Nevertheless, all of these encounters between fathers and sons prove both significant
and ambiguous. The texts shows fathers who continue to teach their sons and
who stand as models for their sons even after the sons have gone to study with
other teachers. The texts also reveal sons who may or may not follow the guidance their fathers offer.
This picture complicates a son’s obligation to ransom his teacher first. In
their array, these fathers together reveal that while the rabbis may have aspirations of replacing fathers with teachers, we must not assume that we know
where one role leaves off and the other begins. This understanding urges us
to revisit, from a refreshed perspective, texts that advocate an exploration of
asceticism. Each young man who lives away from his wife and home also has
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a natal family with whom to contend. We understand these young men differently when we focus on the parent-child relationship. While some of the
fathers explored above certainly count as sages in their own right, they act here
as fathers. Further, the above struggles reveal the possibility of generational
change, since the son’s point of view must be different than that of his father
for such a contest to be required.
We would not have been able to observe either the involvement of the
fathers or the ambivalent responses of their sons if research into anachronistic
assumptions about the academies had not paved the way for conceiving more
intimate environments for learning. Similarly, even the vivid distance separating the house of study from the family home in some of these narratives
does not sever the household relationships. By following learning back to the
family, we witness aspects of family relationships too long overlooked. Just as
we can begin to glimpse sons framing their own lives in dialogue with their
fathers, attention to ritual and lived religion may have the power to reveal
other consequential aspects of household activities and relationships.
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Mishnah Gittin: Family Relations as Metaphor
for National Relations
David Brodsky
DIVORCE IN THE HEBREW BIBLE
The biblical heritage on divorce is brief and enigmatic.1 In the whole of the
Torah, only one passage in Deuteronomy discusses the topic at all, and even
that passage addresses a specific case, taking the general category for granted.
Deuteronomy 24:1–4 states:
1. When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her, it shall
be that if she does not find favor in his eyes because he found in her
some unchaste matter [‘ervat davar], and he wrote [ve-khatav] her a
writ of separation and put [ve-natan] it in her hand and sent her [veshilleh>ah] from his house,
2. and she went out from his house and was to another man,
3. and the latter man hated her and wrote her a writ of separation and
put it in her hand and sent her from his house, or if the latter man
who took her as a wife passed away,
4. her first husband who sent her away may not take her again to be
his wife after she has been defiled, for it is an abomination before
the Lord, and you shall not cause the land which the Lord your God
gave you as an inheritance to sin.2
Verses 1–3 are a long conditional case (protasis), with verse 4 being the conclusion (apodosis), the ruling regarding the case described in verses 1–3. The case
is that of a divorced wife who remarried and then was divorced or widowed by
her second husband. The ruling is that she is no longer free to remarry her first
husband. Such a union is described as an abomination and leading the land into
sin. I would concur with the medieval Jewish commentator Nahmanides that
the Deuteronomist is attempting to close a loophole. While the author allows
for divorce and remarriage, he (and I do assume a male, patriarchal voice here)
is against two men sharing a single wife, and he recognizes that divorce with
remarriage could be used to allow two men to share a wife, divorcing her as they
pass her back and forth between them. As Nahmanides explains, “The purpose
of this negative commandment is so that [men] should not exchange their wives
with one another, writing her a divorce document in the evening, and in the
15
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morning she returns to him” (Nahmanides on Deut 24:4). Closing this loophole, the Deuteronomist declares that once the divorcée has married another
man, she may never return to her first husband.3
The problem for those attempting to formulate a more general biblical/
rabbinic law of divorce (as the author of tractate Gittin of the Mishnah clearly
needs to do) is that they lack a biblical source that lays it out, since verses 1–3
are descriptive of this specific case rather than prescriptive of the general law.
That is, read this way, verses 1–3 do not define how divorce in general must
be conducted; they merely describe a specific case that the author wishes to
proscribe. They do not prescribe that a bill of divorce must be written and
given by the husband to the wife; they merely indicate that if said bill has
been given (which could be but one of many ways for a couple to divorce
legally) and if she then goes and marries another man and divorces him, she
may not return to her first husband.4
When read out of the context of verses 2–4, however, verse 1 can be
read prescriptively, with its own protasis and apodosis, simply by reading vavconjunctive as vav-consecutive:
A. When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her, it shall
be that if she does not find favor in his eyes because he found in her
some unchaste matter,
B. he shall write [ve-khatav] her a writ of separation and put [ve-natan]
it in her hand and send her [ve-shilleh>ah] from his house.
Section A therefore becomes the necessary condition for a generic divorce,
with section B the required action to be taken. It is this reading that seems
to motivate the rabbinic law of divorce delineated in this tractate. Thus, most
of Mishnah Gittin (a second to third century rabbinic code on the laws of
divorce) focuses on qualifying what constitutes the proper writing [ve-khatav]
and delivery [ve-natan be-yadah] of the divorce document, and Mishnah Gittin
9:10 debates what constitutes an “unchaste matter” [‘ervat davar] now required
for a divorce.
DIVORCE AT ELEPHANTINE: A PRE-RABBINIC
INTERPRETATION OF DEUTERONOMY?
While the later Rabbinic reading of Deuteronomy 24:1 permitted the man
alone to give the bill of divorce, the Jews of fifth century BCE Elephantine,
an island outpost along the Nile River in upper Egypt allowed both women
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and men to divorce the other party. Thus, a Jewish marriage contract found
in Elephantine dated to 449 BCE offers the following egalitarian pair of
provisos:
Tomorrow or [the] next day, should Anani stand up in an assembly
and say: “I hated Tamet my wife,” silver of hatre[d] is on his head.
He shall give Tamet silver, 7 shekels [2 q(uarters)]5 and all that she
brought in in her hand she shall take out, from straw to string.
Tomorrow or [the] next day, should Tamet stand up and say:
“I hated my husband Anani,” 2 q[uarters] silver of hatre[d] is on her
head. She shall give to Anani silver, 7 shekels and all that she brought
in in her hand she shall take out, from straw to string.6

This is a world away from the divorce law of the Mishnah some five hundred
to seven hundred years later.7 In Elephantine, divorce is not unilateral and a
written document is not required. Rather, either party may simply stand up
and say “I hate So-and-So my husband/wife” and pay a relatively small fine
(the Mishnah will later institute a much larger fine). Therefore, in fifth century BCE Elephantine it would seem that the Jewish community was either
ignoring Deuteronomy or reading Deuteronomy 24:1 as describing a specific
case rather than prescribing how to conduct a divorce, leaving the divorce process much more open than it would later become. How mainstream this practice was among Jews is unclear. For example, this is not the only practice of the
Elephantine community that seems to conflict with common Jewish readings of
Deuteronomy, leading us to question whether the Jews of Elephantine had Deuteronomy or chose to follow its proscriptions. Thus, for example, Deuteronomy
repeatedly ordains that various sacrifices shall be made “in the place that the
Lord shall choose” (Deut 12:14 and 18; 14:23; 15:20; and 16:2, 7, 11, 15,
and 16), which Jews have classically taken to refer to the Temple Mount in
Jerusalem, implying that sacrifices shall be offered in Jerusalem (and nowhere
else). Yet the Jews of Elephantine built a temple in their enclave in which they
offered sacrifices in seemingly flagrant violation of this commandment.8 Of
course, Deuteronomy never specifies where this place is that the Lord shall
choose, and indeed, not all descendants of the ancient Israelites have taken
it to refer to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem (or to refer to all sacrifices).
The Samaritans, descendants of remnants of the inhabitants of the Northern Kingdom, interpret those self-same verses as referring to Mt. Gerizim in
Samaria, outside of Shechem, and Onias IV, son of Onias III, the high priest
in Jerusalem, built a temple in Leontopolis in Egypt in which sacrifices were
offered from 154 BCE until its destruction in 73 CE (Josephus, Antiquities
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XIII, 62–73). Thus, not all Israelites and not all Jews seem to have interpreted these verses as limiting all sacrifices to Jerusalem, although that is
generally how those verses tend to be understood. So, while the Elephantine
community may simply be an aberrant community that either barely knew
or did not observe the laws of Deuteronomy, they may just as plausibly have
been rather mainstream for their time in their practice and simply had different interpretations of the relevant verses in Deuteronomy from those that
became prevalent later on.
THE MISHNAH
Returning to our topic of divorce, this leaves us unclear as to what Jewish
divorce practice was before the Mishnah.9 Nevertheless, what is clear is that
once the rabbis came to read Deuteronomy 24:1 as prescriptive rather than
descriptive, a Jewish divorce would now come with the requirement that the
husband (1) write a bill of divorce, which he must then (2) give to his wife.
Interestingly, with this stringency in place, the Mishnah spends most of its
time exploring the leniency of permitting him to designate others as his agent
for both tasks. Thus, most of the tractate is concerned with the details of how
the husband can designate agency for others to write the bill of divorce for him
and how and when his messenger may deliver the bill to his wife.
While this exegetical history helps explain both the Mishnah’s rulings
and its focus, it fails to explain the Mishnah’s organization. Rather than lead
us into or through these laws in a clear and organized fashion—starting with
the more general principles and working its way to the more technical details,
or beginning with the laws in Deuteronomy 24:1 and walking us through the
laws that ensue therefrom—the Mishnah begins by plunging into the highly
specific case of a bill of divorce that has been brought to Israel from outside
of the land, which immediately requires a detailed delineation of Israel’s
borders. Thus, the Mishnah opens by stating that “One who brings a divorce
document from the province of the sea10 must say, ‘it was written in front of
me and signed in front of me’” (Mishnah Gittin 1:1), which leads to R. Judah
defining “From Reqem to the east, and Reqem is like the east. From Ashkelon
to the south, and Ashkelon is like the south. From Akko to the north, and
Akko is like the north” (Mishnah Gittin 1:2)11—marking off the eastern,
southern, and northern borders of the land of Israel, with the western border
presumably marked off by the Mediterranean Sea.12 From a logical perspective, starting with this sub-subcategory of the law is a terrible place to begin. It
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assumes knowledge of the general category of bills of divorce and even assumes
knowledge that such bills may be sent by messenger, a caveat that is not intuitively obvious from the Bible. I would argue that this is not the product of
sloppiness or disorganization but instead is a concerted effort on the part of
the author to signal from the beginning that the purpose of this tractate is
much more than simply to delineate the laws of divorce.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MISHNAH IN LIGHT
OF SECOND TEMPLE LITERATURE
Scholars have shown that the Mishnah is a carefully structured text with
an organization that is not classically modern but nevertheless is carefully
planned.13 Second Temple and rabbinic period Jewish texts in general (particularly the works of Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha) often deftly signal the
central theme of the work through the framing of the text—that is, through
subtle references embedded in the opening and closing sections of the work.
Where the modern author will write an overt introductory and concluding
thesis statement, the late antique Jewish author may camouflage it. Thus,
for example, the Septuagint’s version of the book of Esther adds a prophetic
dream that Mordechai receives at the beginning of the story and then is
referenced again, envelope style, at the end, completely reframing the older
Hebrew story, which had conspicuously lacked any mention of God, as now
entirely God’s plan.
Indeed, often the theme is signaled to the reader in the beginning, middle, and end of each work. Thus, 2 Maccabees opens with a seemingly unrelated wish by the authors for the Jews of Egypt to whom they are writing that
God grant them “a heart to worship and do his will with a strong heart and a
willing spirit,” that he open their hearts “to his law and his commandments,
and may he bring peace,” and that he hear their prayers and be reconciled to
them and not forsake them in time of evil (2 Macc 1:3–5).14 While this letter
is technically just a formal greeting and is ostensibly unrelated to the story
that follows, it is the central theme of the text and the way that the author
wishes to (re)frame the story of the revolt: it is only through worshipping and
keeping God’s laws and commandments that God will have mercy on the Jewish people again and restore his Temple. This theme is reiterated in a crucial
martyrdom scene centrally located in the middle of the story in which—unlike
their predecessors at the beginning of the story who had brought God’s wrath
upon Israel for abandoning God’s ways—the martyrs now stay faithful to
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God’s commandments even at the cost of their own lives. As the youngest of
the seven sons admonishes the Seleucid king in 7:30–33:
I will not obey the king’s command, but I obey the command of the
law that was given to our ancestors through Moses. But you, who
have contrived all sorts of evil against the Hebrews, will certainly
not escape the hands of God. For we are suffering because of our
own sins. And if our living Lord is angry for a little while, to rebuke
and discipline us, he will again be reconciled with his own servants.

This crucial chapter acts as the turning point in the story, and it is immediately
followed by the Maccabees’s change in fortune, “for the wrath of the Lord
had turned to mercy” (2 Macc 8:5). Finally, in the last battle at the end of
the book, Judah Maccabee “stretched out his hands toward heaven and called
upon the Lord who works wonders; for he knew that it is not by arms, but as
the Lord decides, that he gains the victory for those who deserve it” (2 Macc
15:21). Together, the beginning, middle, and end of 2 Maccabees signal the
central theme of the text: God will protect those who obey his law and abandon those who abandon it.15
Let me offer one more brief example. The book of Jubilees, which coincidentally is divided into exactly fifty chapters (at least in the Ethiopic version,
the only complete extant version), matching the fifty years of the Jubilee, is
framed at its beginning and end by chapters that emphasize the importance of
the Sabbath. Thus, from its very opening and closing sections (chapters 2 and
50), the book of Jubilees emphasizes the importance of the Sabbath, which
is the culmination of the week of days, even as the book as a whole emphasizes
the Jubilee, which is the culmination of the week of weeks of years. Indeed,
in chapter 50, the author marks the giving of the book of Jubilees as following on the Jubilee of Jubilees since the opening of the book with the days of
Adam (and the first Sabbath). The framing of the book of Jubilees, opening
and closing with its central theme of the Sabbath and the week (of days/years),
seems striking.
What is less clear is whether the book of Jubilees also uses its center to
establish its theme. On the one hand, I do not believe that all ancient Jewish texts necessarily use the exact same structure, and therefore, perhaps we
should leave Jubilees as using its beginning and end (and not the middle) to
establish its central theme. On the other hand, it is possible that the central
chapter (25) is being used as well to help establish the core theme of the
book. If part of the purpose of keeping the Sabbath is to be holy, to be right
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with God, and to be allowed to dwell in the land thereby (as Jubilees puts it,
“the land will keep its Sabbaths when they dwell upon it” [Jub 50:3]),16 then
Rebecca’s exhortation of Jacob in chapter 25 not to marry the daughters of
the Canaanites and her subsequent blessing of Jacob—that he may follow in the
way of righteousness, multiply and inherit the land, and have “a blessed and
holy seed” (25:16–18)—may be no less central to the theme of the book than
its opening and closing sections on the Sabbath. It is through the keeping of
the Sabbath and through the separation from the ways of the Canaanites that
Israel, the seed of Jacob, follow in the path of righteousness and that they merit
to multiply and inherit the land and ultimately become a blessed and holy
seed. Thus, these three sections seem to be working together to establish the
central theme of the book.
Many more examples of this type of structure can be offered from the
literature of the Second Temple period, but these three should suffice for
the moment. The point is that late Second Temple period texts sometimes
(I would argue often) (1) signal their thesis in the beginning, middle, and end
of the text, and (2) they sometimes do so covertly through passages that at
first blush appear to be ancillary, such as in the greeting in the opening letter
of 2 Maccabees.
WHAT MISHNAH GITTIN’S STRUCTURE CAN TEACH US
ABOUT ITS MESSAGE
I would argue that the Mishnah should be read very much in context of this
relatively contemporary Second Temple period genre: at times signaling its
intent in the beginning, middle, and end of the tractate.17 I shall demonstrate
that Gittin is a prime example of this phenomenon. In Mishnah Gittin, the
beginning, middle, and end of the tractate are strikingly out of place where
they are found, drawing attention to themselves.18 The opening section, as we
have seen, addresses a bill of divorce that is brought from outside of the land of
Israel, forcing a discussion of the borders of Israel: what is in and what is out.
At the center of the tractate is a lengthy tangent about those rulings that were
made for the sake of the public welfare. While they begin with divorce-related
rulings, they quickly digress to list the numerous other rulings that were made
for these purposes, wandering from there to those rulings that were made for
the sake of peace, a related though separate category. The final mishnah of the
tractate has little to do with the mishnayot that precede it, though it is central
to the topic of divorce, delineating the three main rabbinic interpretations
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of Deuteronomy 24:1 and the conditions required for divorce. In fact, this
mishnah is so central to any delineation of the rabbinic law of divorce that
it is difficult to understand why the redactor of the tractate saved it until the
very end. It is one of only two places where the Mishnah makes any attempt
to connect its law back to this key biblical verse and the only place where the
Mishnah explains its ideology behind divorce. Ostensibly, the tractate should
have opened with this explanation before moving into the detailed laws rather
than the reverse.
While the rest of the tractate lays out the laws of the commissioning,
writing, and delivery of the bill of divorce in a fairly orderly manner, the beginning, middle, and end of the tractate stand out. I would argue that the three
work together to point the reader to the central theme of the tractate, a theme
that is simultaneously on the individual level and the national level. By opening with a marking of the boundaries between that which is inside and outside
of the land of Israel, I would suggest that the tractate is pointing to divorce
as an act that is marking the same boundaries on the individual level. The
middle section explains why these boundaries need to be established: originally
[ba-rishonah] one ruling was made, but since then circumstances have not
turned out the way they were intended, and a corrective must be instituted.
For the sake of the public welfare, indeed for the sake of peace, matters cannot
always remain as they were originally established. Sometimes a corrective is
necessary. Here, divorce is precisely that corrective for the marriage that is not
working. The final mishnah clarifies that while divorce was only permitted by
the School of Shammai in cases of adultery (reading the “unchaste matter
[‘ervat davar]” of Deuteronomy 24:1 as truly unchaste [devar ‘ervah]), the
School of Hillel and later Rabbi Akiva offered their own correctives, permitting it ultimately any time that the two were not getting along.
By using the national boundaries as a metaphor for individual boundaries vis-à-vis divorce, the redactor is reversing the prophetic use of divorce as a
metaphor for the nation and its ruptured relationship with God (Isa 50:1, Jer
3:1–8, and Mal 2:13–16). Yet by linking the two, the redactor opens up the
possibility of reading in both directions—of national boundaries as metaphor
for individual boundaries and as the marking of these personal boundaries as
metaphor for the nation.19 Indeed, most of the rulings “for the public welfare”
and “for the sake of peace” delineated in the epicenter of the tractate (from
Mishnah Gittin 4:2 to 5:9, one mishnah shy of two full chapters), which
have little if anything to do with divorce, point to the welfare of the nation
as a whole, culminating in the final mishnah of this central section, which
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addresses the issue of peace between members of the h>avurah [the rabbinic
community] and nonmembers of the h>avurah [the non-rabbinic community] and ultimately between Jews and gentiles (5:9). The importance of this
middle section cannot be overemphasized. It comprises more than one-fifth
of the tractate. It is placed smack in the middle of the tractate, and except for
one or two mishnayot used to segue into it, it has almost nothing ostensibly
to do with the topic of divorce. These very facts call attention to this section and force us to ask what its role is here. I would argue that it gives the
central theme to the tractate on several levels. Its theme is laws that originally
[ba-rishonah] were one way but then were changed “for the sake of the public
welfare” or “for the sake of peace.” While divorce is never mentioned as one of
these rules that was changed for the public welfare or for the sake of peace, it
is thematically the prime candidate.
In the Gospel of Mark (10:2–12, discussed in more detail below), Jesus
challenges the Pharisees (i.e., the predecessors to the rabbis) on the law of
divorce in Deuteronomy 24. Basing himself on the creation story (“male and
female he created them” [Gen 1:27] and “For this reason a man shall leave his
father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one
flesh” [Gen 2:24]), Jesus argues that two people whom God has joined, no
man should put asunder. The Damascus Document in the Dead Sea Scrolls
is only slightly more lenient. Interestingly, it too uses Genesis 1:27 to argue
against divorce (or, more accurately, against remarriage), stating, “[They] are
caught twice in fornication: by taking two wives in their lives, even though
the principle of creation is ‘male and female he created them’ (Gen 1:27).
And the ones who went into the ark ‘went in two by two into the ark’ (Gen
7:9).”20 As Lawrence Schiffman has argued, the addition of the words “in
their lives” implies something more than just a proscription against polygamy.
The additional words would seem to imply that a person should only marry
one person in their lifetimes. While this may not be a proscription against
divorce in general (the Temple Scroll [54:4], for example, acknowledges the
existence of divorcées without making an issue of it), it does seem to proscribe
remarriage by either party should the couple separate.21 Similarly, Paul prefers
that husbands and wives not separate (mē chōristhēnai; 1 Cor 7:10), but if
they do, he exhorts the woman to remain unmarried (menetō agamos; 1 Cor
7:11). Likewise, in Mark 10:2–12 (cf. Matt 9:3–9) Jesus is quoted as saying,
“Whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity [mē epi porneia], and marries another, commits adultery [moichatai]” (Matt 19:9).22 Thus, even as the
early Christian sect and the Dead Sea sectarians allowed for some couples to
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divorce (i.e., to separate, at least in cases of porneia), they seem to counter one
of the key elements of mishnaic divorce: that the wife (both parties, really) be
completely free to remarry (Mishnah Gittin 9:1–3).
I would argue that the Mishnah is subtly using the section on policies
that change for the sake of peace and for the public welfare as a way to respond
to Jews such as Paul, Jesus in the Gospels, and the Dead Sea sectarians, arguing
that indeed, originally marriage (and not divorce) was the correct law for the
divorcing couple, but their circumstances changed (they no longer get along),
and now a corrective is needed for the sake of peace, for the public welfare.
That is on the individual level. On the national level, I would argue that the
Mishnah is using this central theme coupled with the overriding theme of
the tractate to demarcate the people. Originally those boundaries were broader,
but for the sake of the public welfare the Mishnah is now marking who is in
and who is out. Thus, this section culminates with Mishnah Gittin 5:9, pointing to the groups who are outside the bounds of the rabbinic community:
A. A woman may lend her fellow, who is suspected when it comes to
sabbatical year produce, a nafah-sieve, a kevarah-sieve, a millstone,
or an oven; but she may not winnow or grind with her. The wife of
a Fellow may lend the wife of an ‘am ha’aretz [a Jew who is not a
member of the rabbinic fellowship]23 a nafah-sieve, a kevarah-sieve,
and she may winnow, grind, and sift with her; but, once she pours
water [on it], she may not touch it with her, because one may not
encourage those who commit sin.
B. And all of these they only said for the sake of peace.
C. One may encourage gentiles on the sabbatical year, but not Jews.
And one may inquire about their welfare for the sake of peace.
In ever widening circles, section A delineates relations first between properly
and not properly practicing rabbinic Jews, broadening to delineate relations
between rabbinic and non-rabbinic Jews. Section C finally widens to delineate
relations between Jews and gentiles, all for the sake of peace. I would argue
that it is not happenstance that the focal section of the tractate ends by prescribing rulings for the sake of peace between rabbinic and non-rabbinic Jews
and between Jews and gentiles, pointing to what I believe is the larger national
agenda of this tractate. The tractate opened by delineating what was in and
what was out of the land of Israel, and mishnah 5:9 points us to those who
are in and out, first of the h>avurah, the rabbinic community, and finally of the
people of Israel.
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The final mishnah of the tractate (9:10) points us even further to who
would seem to be one of the key groups intended here. That passage contains one of the only parallels in all of the Mishnah with the New Testament.
When the School of Shammai states that “A man should not divorce his wife
unless he found in her a matter of unchastity [devar ‘ervah], as it is said, ‘if he
found in her an unchaste matter [‘ervat davar]’ (Deut 24:1),” this directly parallels the position attributed to Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount: “I say to
you that whosoever divorces his wife, except for a matter of unchastity [logou
porneias], makes her an adulteress” (Matt 5:32; cf. Matt 19:9). While the
Gospel of Matthew sets this up as being in conflict with Deuteronomy 24:1
(Matt 5:31), the School of Shammai’s exegesis in the final mishnah of our
tractate demonstrates that this position was as easily derived from the verse
as it was in opposition to the verse. Indeed, the Greek logou porneias can be
read simultaneously as the direct equivalent of both the School of Shammai’s
Hebrew devar ‘ervah and the biblical ‘ervat davar, which the latter interprets
through the reversal of the construct (if we read according to the printed
edition of the Mishnah).24 In fact, while the parallel in the Gospel of Luke
(“Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and
whoever marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery”)25
lacks the exception regarding unchastity that connects the ruling both to
Deuteronomy 24:1 and the School of Shammai, it also lacks the claim that
Jesus stated this in opposition to the biblical law, leaving open the possibility
that the law was developed from rather than in opposition to Deuteronomy
24:1. Indeed, even in Mark 10:2–9 (and its parallel in Matt 19:3–9), Jesus
only counters the Pharisees’ plain reading of Deuteronomy 24:1 by explaining it (midrashically) in light of Genesis 1–2:
Some Pharisees came, and to test him they asked, “Is it lawful for
a man to divorce his wife?” He answered them, “What did Moses
command you?” They said, “Moses allowed a man to write a certificate of dismissal and to divorce her.” But Jesus said to them,
“Because of your hardness of heart he wrote this commandment for
you. But from the beginning of creation, ‘God made them male and
female’ (Gen 1:27). ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father
and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one
flesh’ (Gen 2:24). So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore
what God has joined together, let no one separate.”

Even here in Mark, the Pharisees’ position can be read in line with the School
of Hillel in Mishnah Gittin 9:10 (And the School of Hillel say, “Even if she
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ruined his dinner, as it says, ‘because he found in her an unseemly matter
[devar ‘ervah]’”26 [Deut 24:1]), and Jesus’s position could still be quite close
to that of the School of Shammai, making this conflict no greater than the
internal rabbinic debate. Thus, in this nascent period for both Christianity
and rabbinic Judaism, the two may have converged more than they diverged,
at least regarding the laws of divorce and their derivation from the Bible.27
CONCLUSION
What I would like to argue from the structure of the Mishnah is that
when we read the beginning, middle, and end of the tractate together, the
redactor would seem to be claiming that this period of commonality was
an earlier period [ba-rishonah], before the corrective was needed.28 When
these three key sections of the tractate are brought together, two pictures
thus form—one on the individual level and the other on the national. The
individual level is a case for divorce (contra the Mishnah’s contemporary
Christian interlocutors), basing it in the general position that sometimes
earlier rulings and transactions—even when made with the best of intentions—are flawed and need to be fixed, with the national level delineating
what and who is in and outside of the land and people of Israel. In other
words, this tractate would seem to be attempting to establish a parting of the
ways from non-rabbinic Jews (Christians among them), arguing that while
perhaps these non-rabbinic Jews and their positions were once considered
within the boundaries of Israel (as evidenced, for example, by Jesus’s position on divorce generally conforming with that of the School of Shammai),
a corrective is now needed for the sake of the public welfare: non-rabbinic
Jews, including Christians, ought henceforth to be considered outside the
bounds of Israel. Interestingly, even by using the dispute on the interpretation of Deuteronomy 24:1 as a way of both engaging non-rabbinic Jews and
Christians in the internal dialogue and simultaneously rejecting them as
outside the bounds of the community, Mishnah Gittin may be only further
continuing its uncanny likeness to the Gospels, especially the Gospels of
Mark and Matthew. Mishnah Gittin 9:10 and Mark 10:2–12 (and its parallel in Matt 19:3–12) use the dispute (between the Schools of Shammai and
Hillel and between the Pharisees and Jesus, respectively) on the context in
which to read Deuteronomy 24:1 as both the way of including Jesus and the
Pharisees/rabbis in the same exegetical world yet simultaneously as the way
to reject the Pharisees/Jesus as outside of acceptable exegesis and practice.
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In other words, both the Mishnah and the Gospel of Mark are using this
exegetical dispute as a way to demarcate their ideological community and to
reject the other as outside those bounds.
In 2003, Adam Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed edited an important
book that challenged the long-standing notion that Jews and Christians had
“parted ways” by the second century CE. In this iconic volume The Ways That
Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages,
they and a number of other scholars argue that Jews and Christians continued
to interact and intermingle and mutually to affect another long after the supposed “parting of the ways” in the first and second centuries.29 The present
essay does not attempt to answer whether Jews (rabbinic and non-rabbinic,
Christian and non-Christian) were interacting with one another in actu. How
the communities were behaving is beyond the scope of this essay. What this
essay does attempt to show is that in the late second and early third centuries,
the redactor of Mishnah Gittin attempted to use the theme of divorce as a way
of mapping out the boundaries of Israel both geographically and metaphorically, the land and the people.
And in this sense, the author should be seen as a parallel to his near
contemporary, Justin Martyr, whom Daniel Boyarin has argued was one of the
first to use the notion of heresy as a way of marking the ideological boundaries of his community.30 Boyarin has already argued that the Mishnah ought to
be read in light of Justin Martyr’s heresiology as itself attempting to mark its
ideological territory.31 I would here like to add Mishnah Gittin to the places
and ways in which the redactor of the Mishnah is attempting to create those
boundaries and separate the rabbinic community from non-rabbinic versions
of Judaism. Interestingly, Ishay Rosen-Zvi has argued that Mishnah Gittin
9:10 better reflects the ideology of the second century CE than that of the first
century, which it claims through its attributions to represent.32 This modification would make the ideology behind that Mishnah contemporary with Justin
Martyr and thus date it to precisely the time in which Boyarin has argued that
the notion of heresiology and attempts to bound communities based on ideology were developing among some Christians and rabbinic Jews.
One final comment: we should note that we are interpreting a text about
gender (divorce) as addressing the national and the political. Here, gender and
the marital couple are being used as a metaphor for the nation, and national
boundaries are being drawn through the description of marital boundaries. That is, gender is never merely gender, and the act of defining who is a
Jew is never genderless. What are traditionally seen as gender-related topics
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concurrently transcend gender. That is, in much of rabbinic literature, gender
is inextricably part and parcel of rabbinic ideologies and modes of thinking
that range far beyond what is traditionally considered a gender-related topic.
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Hebrew Bible and the Meaning of Sefer Keritut,” Tarbiz 78 (2009): 437–46 (Hebrew),
and Bernard S. Jackson, “The ‘Institutions’ of Marriage and Divorce in the Hebrew
Bible,” Journal of Semitic Studies 56 (2011): 221–51.
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All in the Family: Ancient Israelite
and Judahite Families in Context
Cynthia Shafer-Elliott
INTRODUCTION
Today we often hear about the decline of the modern family. Ask any politician and he or she will provide you with statistics on divorce, abuse, consumerism, and lack of parental involvement—just to name a few. However, when
we think of family, typically several images come to mind: we think of the
members of our own family, family meals and get-togethers, and the occasional conflicts that arise at them. We all have stories we could tell about the
last family holiday or dinner that ended in disaster, but we also think about
those moments when joy and sorrow are shared among related people who
care about each other.
Many disciplines study the family, and I am pleased to say that within
the fields of biblical studies and archaeology, the family has become a subject
of research. I have long been interested in the study of ancient Israelite and
Judahite families,1 but my academic curiosity about the subject grew with the
expansion of my own family. I found that considering the ancient Israelite
family not only aids in our understanding of ancient Israel and Judah but also
helps us appreciate our own family and its traditions more fully. The scope
of this essay is not to argue for or against any particular aspect of the ancient
family; rather, in this essay I describe the context of the ancient Israelite and
Judahite family. More specifically, I address who was considered part of the
family, how they lived, and what their daily lives consisted of. The sources used
for this discussion include textual descriptions from the Hebrew Bible and
archaeological remains viewed through the lens of household archaeology.2
DEFINING THE ANCIENT ISRAELITE FAMILY
Before a discussion of who was part of the ancient Israelite and Judahite family
can occur, the terminology used must be clarified. Within the Hebrew Bible,
there are several terms that denote various degrees of “family.” The largest
social group was the tribe [shebet, matte], while the smallest social group was
the bayit ‘ab or bayit ‘em, translated as “house of the father” or “house of the
mother.” The middle social group was the mishpachah, and this term is used
33
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in a variety of ways: in reference to nations or large social groups (e.g., Gen
10:5, 32; 12:3; Amos 3:2), as species of animals (Gen 8:19), and of Israel as
a whole (Amos 3:1), or separately as the northern kingdom of Israel and the
southern kingdom of Judah (Jer 33:24). However, most of the occurrences of
mishpachah within the Hebrew Bible indicate a clan or extended family (Exod
6:14, 25; Num 1:2).3 J. Blenkinsopp further defines mishpachah as “a group
of individual families or households forming a major unit of the tribe and
claiming common, unilineal descent from a real or fictitious ancestor.”4 Rarely
was a person considered an individual; rather, a person was considered in light
of who he or she was connected to—the group the person was a part of: the
person’s bayit ‘ab [or immediate family], mishpachah [extended family or clan],
and shebet [or tribe].
A second clarification regarding families in ancient Israel and Judah
also needs to be made. It is often thought that a household solely consists of
immediate family members who live together; however, anthropologists and
sociologists who study families in various geographical locations and chronological periods make a distinction between family and household. A family
is defined by kinship, descent, and marriage, while a household is defined
by coresidence and/or the sharing of domestic functions.5 In other words, a
family is a group of people who are related to each other either biologically
or through marriage, but they may or may not live together. A household is a
group of people who typically live and/or work together but may or may not
be related. For instance, an ancient Israelite household could include immediate and extended family members but also nonrelated members such as slaves,
guests, concubines, or hired workers. These same members of the household
could live together in the same house or compound, while others (such as a
hired worker) could live elsewhere but come to the household land to work.6
Ancient Israel and Judah practiced a social residence pattern that anthropologists refer to as “patrilocal.” Patrilocal residence is when a married couple
resides with or near the husband’s parents or household. In other words, a son
remains in his father’s household [bayit ‘ab] after reaching maturity and brings
his wife to live with his family after marriage. Conversely, when a daughter
marries she leaves her father’s house and resides within the household of her
husband’s father or household. Most Israelite marriages were endogamous,
which is the custom of marrying only within the limits of a local community,
clan, or tribe, as opposed to exogamy, which is the custom of marrying outside
the limits.7
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The nucleus of the Israelite family, the bayit ‘ab, could therefore be
defined as a household, since it included related and nonrelated members
who worked together and, more than likely, lived together. The mishpachah
[clan] would have consisted of several of these households living within close
proximity to each other, often forming their own village. Several clans that
claimed a common ancestor made up a tribe and lived within the boundaries
of their tribe’s geographical territory. An example of an Israelite household
can be found in Judges 17–21, where the household of Micah the Ephraimite
is mentioned. Within this narrative, Micah is the patriarch of the household
that includes his widowed mother, his sons, and more than likely their families
(17:2, 18:22). The household expands when Micah hires a young Levite to
serve as the household priest (17:10–12). The members of the household lived
in several dwellings surrounded by a boundary wall (18:14–16, 22). This narrative helps illustrate the Israelite and Judahite household and its members and
also introduces the second aspect of the household—the physical house itself.
THE ISRAELITE HOUSE
At present, who was part of the Israelite/Judahite household has been established, yet a description of what the houses may have looked like is just as
important to include when attempting to understand the ancient family.
Using archaeology to study the ancient household has become its own specialization called “household archaeology.” Even though the household is the
smallest and most common of the social groups, it is also the most plentiful.
There are three main aspects of the household to study: (1) the material aspect,
which consists of the dwelling, secondary buildings and features, areas where
household activities took place, and its possessions; (2) the social aspect, meaning the members of the household and their relationship to each other; and
(3) the behavioral aspect, which looks at the activities the household members
performed.8 Taking these aspects into consideration, household archaeology
can be characterized as the archaeological study of a household’s buildings,
possessions, and members and the activities they engaged in. Through this
investigation information regarding the activities and behaviors of the members of the household can be better understood, providing a more comprehensive picture of the daily life of the ancient Israelite and Judahite family.9 While
the social aspect of the household was discussed above, the material aspect
of the physicality of the house needs to be addressed.
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The Israelite/Judahite house itself has been extensively researched and
has no shortage of analysis. In the 1970s archaeologists began to notice that
the excavated houses from Israel’s Iron Age (ca. 1200–586 BCE; i.e., the
time of Israelite and Judahite kings) had a similar plan and common features.
The typical house had two floors and a flat roof. The first floor consisted
of a back broad room with one to three (oftentimes three) rooms running
perpendicular to it. The first floor had wood or stone pillars supporting the
second floor; these pillars often had short boundary walls between them to
help segregate space. Houses were small but still ranged in size depending on
whether the house was in an urban or rural environment.10 For this reason,
it is best to think of the Israelite house as being multifunctional, with several
household chores and activities taking place in the limited space available.
The first floor was used for a variety of domestic activities, including storage,
production (such as pottery making), food preparation and consumption,
and religious ritual. The second floor was the family’s sleeping quarters and
could also have been used for some light domestic activities, such as weaving. The flat roof of the house also served as a space in which to conduct
production chores, such as drying flax (Josh 2:6), or for sleeping in the hot
summer months.
What to call these houses is a matter of some debate. Some scholars
call them “the four-room house” because the floor plan typically includes
four rooms; other scholars call them “pillar houses,” since most of them
have pillars, while still others call them “the Israelite house.” It must be said,
however, that many of these houses had more or less than four rooms, and
some had no pillars (at least not found); similarly, it is difficult to say with
certainty if these houses were used only by the Israelites. What is known is
that this style of house was the popular form in ancient Israel/Judah during the Iron Age; thus, perhaps it is best to call it the Iron Age house until
proven otherwise.11
Regardless of what it is called, the basic features of the house during
the Iron Age are consistent and would include space to conduct a variety
of household activities. Household space on the bottom floor was multifunctional, with several household chores taking place in the limited space
available. Some of the common features of an Iron Age house include stone
floors, storage space, ovens, and courtyards. In many Iron Age houses, the
perpendicular side room closest to the front door contained a stone floor. It
has been argued that the location coupled with the stone flooring suggests
that this is where some of the smaller herd animals, such as sheep and goats,
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were stabled. The stone floor would have withstood the heavy trampling
of animal hooves and would also allow for easier cleanup.12 Households
were self-sufficient and needed space to store their grain, wine, and other
household goods. When Iron Age houses are excavated, large concentrations of storage jars are often found in the other side room and/or the back
broad room.13 Ovens used for cooking and baking, called tabun or tannur,
are often found in the central living space and in the outside courtyard.14 It
seems that most Iron Age houses had an open area or courtyard in front of
the house that was used as a communal space to conduct household chores,
especially in the hot summer months.
DAILY LIFE OF THE ANCIENT ISRAELITE
AND JUDAHITE FAMILY
The final aspect of studying households is the behavioral aspect, which looks at
the activities the household performed. The average ancient Israelite/Judahite
household was the basic economic unit; whether a family lived in the city or
the country, Israel and Judah consisted of agrarian communities where the
household was the nucleus of everyday life. The household economy evolved
from a simple subsistence level in the early Iron Age (ca. 1200–1000 BCE) to a
more complex system under the monarchy in the Iron II period (ca. 1000–586
BCE). In the early Iron Age, Israel’s household economics were agrarian and
pastoral in nature and were generally free from taxation by a dominating class.
However, with the establishment and evolution of the monarchy in the second
Iron Age, the economics of the Israelite household changed as well. The Israelite household was still predominantly agrarian and pastoral, but the monarchy
extracted surplus from households through taxation, unpaid labor, interest on
debt, and rental fees.15
The daily concern of most ancient people was survival, and ancient
Israel/Judah was no different. Subsistence economies rarely have the luxury
of gender roles. Gender roles refer to the socially constructed roles, behaviors,
activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men
and women.16 Each member of the ancient Israelite/Judahite household was
expected to participate in their survival, regardless of sex, age, or other differentials. C. Meyers writes that the survival of any group is dependent upon
three factors: procreation, protection, and production. The fertility of both
the household’s members and its land made the difference as to whether or
not that household survived. The procreation factor was predominated by
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female biological factors, such as menstruation, pregnancy, birth, lactation,
and weaning. Consequently, the procreation factor often fell under the female
domain and dictated that her daily household activities oftentimes occurred
within or near the dwelling. Similarly, the protection factor was managed by
the household males, more often the patriarch of the household whose role it
was to protect the members of the household, especially the females and children.17 Production was the factor that certainly joined the household together
in its daily activities, since all members of the household were required to participate. Production involved agriculture, animal husbandry, and the making
of various goods, such as pottery. Certain times of year, such as planting and
harvest, required that all able members of the household contribute. With that
said, during times of war the women of the household were required to bear
more of the production responsibilities.18
ROLES OF THE HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
The ancient Israelite/Judahite household was a subsistence economy; hence,
every member of it was important and vital to its survival. While this type of
economy may not have had so-called gender roles, certain household members
had more specific roles to perform: in particular, the role of the patriarch and
matriarch, who possessed the most power and authority within the household.
A brief look at these two important roles will further enhance our understanding of the Israelite/Judahite family and household.
THE PATRIARCH

The patriarch was the protector of the household. Employment of his authority included how the household would farm and herd and the power over life
and death within the household. Even though the patriarch had this seemingly
massive amount of power, his authority was not absolute; his authority was
primarily over his wives, sons, and daughters. Issues of life and death would
include officially adopting a baby into the household when it was born and
being the household judge in cases of dishonor and disobedience. For instance,
the commandment to “honor your father and mother” (Exod 20:12) may
seem like a quaint rule to teach children, but in reality the commandment
held more weight for adult children living within their household bayit ‘ab.
Children, even adult children and their families, were expected to obey their
patriarch and matriarch by participating in the farming and herding of the
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household property and by having children. If the child, even as an adult, is
unwilling to herd and farm as the patriarch dictates, it is the father’s role to
decide the outcome.19
Part of the patriarch’s role of protector over his children included determining when they were eligible for marriage. Marriage in ancient Israel and
Judah was more about political and economic issues and less about romance.
In fact, V. Matthews and D. Benjamin describe marriage as
a delicately negotiated covenant sealing a significant political or
economic contract [that] was designed to bring together two households that were willing to exchange substantial goods and services
with each other over a significant period of time. Marriage was more
a matter of business than pleasure.20

When the patriarch decided that it was time for his daughter to marry (most
likely soon after puberty), an arrangement was made typically within the household’s clan [mishpachah] or tribe [shevet]. These types of endogamous marriages
were intended to keep property within the clan or tribe. Given that ancient
Israel and Judah were patrilocal societies, marriage of a daughter signified the
loss of a contributing member of the household, which impacted its economy
greatly. Consequently, a mohar, or a betrothal gift in the form of money, goods,
land, or service from the groom’s bayit ‘ab, was given to the bride’s bayit ‘ab (Gen
34:8–17, Exod 22:16). Examples of bridal betrothal gifts in the Hebrew Bible
can be found in the narratives of Dinah and Shechem in Genesis 34:12, Michel
and David in 1 Samuel 18:25, and Gomer and Hosea in Hosea 3:2. Two of
the three narratives have the patriarch requesting the betrothal gift as a service
in the form of incapacitating the enemy (Dinah/Shechem and Michel/David),
but the third narrative in Hosea provides a more realistic gift in that Hosea paid
fifteen shekels of silver, a homer of barley, and a measure of wine (Hos 3:2).21
The bride’s household also gave a shillukhim, translated as a dowry or betrothal
gift to the household of the groom, also in the form of money, goods, or transferable land (1 Kgs 9:16). However, the shillukhim was also seen as a way to provide
security for the bride, who in theory maintained possession of it.22
THE MATRIARCH

The matriarch also possessed a great deal of authority within the household.
A large aspect of production includes the preparation of food, which took
place in the dwelling or its courtyard. As was mentioned earlier, because of
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women’s reproductive roles it was often necessary for them to conduct household chores closer to the dwelling. One of the more important tasks conducted
at the dwelling included the preparation of food and, consequently, was primarily under female control.
When Iron Age houses are excavated, artifacts such as cooking ovens,
pots, grinding stones and slabs, pestles and mortars, bowls, and storage jars
are found within the dwelling and its courtyard. The triad of the Israelite diet
included olives, grapes, and cereals. Olive oil was essential in cooking and
the lighting of lamps. Grapes were dried but, more important, were made
into wine. Since fermented beverages were safer to drink than stagnant water,
wine was an imperative foodstuff. However, it was the cultivation of cereals
that became the most important part of the Israelite diet, so much so that the
Hebrew word for bread, lechem, is synonymous with food. Cereals were used
for a morning porridge or daily bread. Processing grain into an edible form
involved a complex chain of activities: soaking, milling, and grinding grain
into flour that would be made into dough—a process that would occupy at
least two hours per day. Ovens are often found in a centralized location, which
would enable women to conduct other household chores and the sharing of
baking resources, such as the oven itself and dung used for fuel. A centralized
location and the sharing of ovens also encouraged social relationships and
cohesion among the group (Lev 26:26).23
The matriarch was in essence the manager of the household. She controlled the operations of the household, including the manufacture of such
goods as soap, pottery, baskets, cloth, and tools. One of her most important
tasks as the household manager was the authority over one of the major aspects
of production: the preparation, storage, distribution, and consumption of
food. It was the matriarch who dictated what and how much produce was to be
prepared as a meal or prepared into and stored as other foodstuffs, such as beer,
wine, oil, parched grain, and dried fruit. Who was going to perform these tasks
and when were also under the command of the matriarch. In essence, it was
she who decided who ate, when, what, and how much—the authority over the
household food contained much power. The capable wife in Proverbs 31 sings
the praises of the matriarch as the manager of the household:
She is like the ships of the merchant, she brings her food from
far away. She rises while it is still night and provides food for her
household and tasks for her servant girls. . . . She looks well to the
ways of her household and does not eat the bread of idleness. (Prov
31:14–15, 27)
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Indeed, the matriarch’s role as the manager was essential to the survival of her
household and would have required exceptional skill, expertise, and diplomacy, resulting in a significant amount of household power and prestige.24
SUMMARY
This essay discussed the context of the ancient Israelite and Judahite family;
more specifically, it addressed who was considered part of the Israelite family, how they lived, and what their daily lives consisted of. The study of the
material, social, and behavioral aspects of an ancient household clarified what
the daily lives of the average ancient Israelite/Judahite man, woman, and child
would have looked like during Israel’s Iron Age. Sources such as the Hebrew
Bible and archaeological remains helped visualize the form and function of the
household. To truly understand ancient Israel and Judah better, we must shift
our attention away from what Carol Meyers calls “places of prestige,” meaning the palaces, temples, and battlefields that hardly represent what daily life
would have included for the average Israelite and Judahite; rather, our attention should shift to focus on the stage where daily life occurred—the home.25
Could we even be so bold as to say that the concept of household and family
meant more to the ancient Israelites than we could ever imagine? Indeed,
every member of the household was imperative to its survival regardless of sex,
age, or any other differential; the family and its members were highly valued.
In today’s world, where the importance of family is often overlooked or dismissed, perhaps we can look to the Israelite and Judahite family to remind us
of the value and significance of family.
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Family Values and Biblical Courtship
and Marriage: Spanning the Time Barrier
Charles David Isbell
INTRODUCTION
The importance of family1 within the broader community of Judaism has its
roots in some of the most significant narratives of the Hebrew Bible, and in
each case marriage is portrayed as the cornerstone of the biblical family. And
marriage is very much in the news these days. From one end of the political
spectrum comes an impassioned plea for the legalization of gay marriage,
which, we are repeatedly assured, is the only way to provide full enfranchisement to the homosexual segment of our population and thus a moral and legal
imperative.2
Those at the opposite end of this spectrum warn that such a legal move
is certain to usher in the apocalypse. Especially significant is the accompanying view that this particular apocalypse could easily be avoided by the administration of a few doses of “reparative therapy.”3 Equally prominent at the
apocalypse-fearing end of the religio-socio-political spectrum, and a close ally
of the opposition to homosexual marriage, is the simplistic position of those
who call for a return to biblical marriage, which, we are assured with deadly
fervor, is among “the fundamental unchanging truths that have been ordained
by God in the Bible”4—and thus another of those monolithic and immutable
scriptural principles upon which Christian America was founded.
Were they not so morbidly serious, we might be tempted to chuckle at
our fundamentalist friends when they pound on the Bible regarding marriage.
But at the least, these proponents of biblical marriage should be required to
spell out exactly what parts of marriage they intend to import from the world
of the Bible into modern society. And since they insist on being fully dedicated
to their proposal, we should be allowed to ask some basic questions, beginning with this one: If biblical marriage is the goal, should biblical customs of
courtship also be followed?
BIBLICAL COURTSHIP CUSTOMS
Do proponents of biblical marriage support the courtship method used to
find a wife for Isaac?5 His father dispatched to a friendly tribe in the home
45
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country a trusted emissary at the head of a ten-camel cavalcade laden with
gold, an ample supply of those alluring and ever-popular nose rings, and other
visible symbols of the family’s great wealth. Launching his search at a popular
drinking establishment, the faithful servant quickly located an appropriately
beautiful and healthy female, whom he showered with expensive gifts and
effusive compliments before cleverly finagling an invitation to spend the night
at her family home. The vulgar show of wealth proved to be highly effective,
for when the young lady returned home and her older brother “spied the
expensive nose ring and the bracelets on the arms of his sister” (Gen 24:30),
he rushed back to the oasis to find the emissary. There he not only repeated the
invitation of his sister to spend the night with the family but also invited
the man to supper with warm and friendly words: “Come in, O blessed of the
LORD. Why are you standing outside? I have already prepared the house [for
you], and even a place for your camels” (24:31).
The biblical narrative clearly implies that Laban lacked adequate time
to complete a full background investigation or even a cursory credit check
on Isaac, and this fact leads Rashi to explain that the phrase “All the good
stuff of his master in his hand” (Gen 24:10) refers to a written document6
from Abraham signing over “all his possessions to Isaac, so that they should
be eager [yiqpǝtzu] to send their daughter to him.” This accords well with the
statement later in the narrative that the servant, seated in the family home of
Nahor, described the wealth of Abraham in detail but assured his hosts that
“he [Abraham] has given him [Isaac] everything he owns” (24:36).7 Clearly,
with or without the midrashic explanation of Rashi, the force of the story is
that the opportunity to marry his sister to an ostentatiously wealthy suitor,
even a man whom no one in the country had ever seen, provided adequate
biblical grounds for big brother Laban.
Perhaps modern marriage should begin with the type of biblical courtship illustrated by the actions of Jacob and Moses. Both of these men fled from
the land of their birth, one to escape a murderous twin brother (Gen 27:41)
and the other to avoid prosecution as a murderer (Exod 2:15). Arriving in a
foreign land, both men followed the biblical precedent set by the emissary of
Abraham and headed immediately to the local watering hole to meet chicks.
Jacob moved to the head of the eligible bachelor line, waited for the
appropriate moment, and showed off his physical prowess by rolling a huge
stone from the entrance to the communal well of water (Gen 29:10). This
proved to be precisely the kind of testosterone exhibition guaranteed to
impress the lovely Rachel and intimidate all other potential suitors.
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Moses, dressed as an Egyptian (Exod 2:19) rather than a fleeing felon or a
lowly Hebrew slave, faced down the local tough guys who regularly stole water
from hapless female shepherdesses (2:17) in his own display of masculinity.
Two significant aspects of Mosaic courtship stand out. Not only did he present
himself as an Egyptian aristocrat who would obviously be considered wealthy,
but he also combined his appearance of wealth with a display of the kind of
physical prowess that had proved so successful for Jacob.
Soon after their showy displays, Jacob and Moses each married the prettiest girl in town, and each man took a job with his new father-in-law. In fact,
as a reward for his faithful service in the family business, Jacob was awarded
two wives!
Maybe the biblical courtship custom our conservative friends are pushing is chronicled in the narrative about the marriage of Dinah to the son of
the regional prince, H> amor (Gen 34). After he had raped her, Shechem now
wanted to marry Dinah (34:4),8 and we can only hope that this is one biblical custom that modern proponents of biblical marriage will have difficulty
in reviving. Swayed in part by the promise of an unusually hefty bridal price
(34:12), the brothers of Dinah agreed to the marriage but insisted that not
only the prospective bridegroom but also every other male in the city of
Shechem be circumcised. They then waited until the men of the town were
recovering from surgery and slaughtered them all (34:25). They even killed
the new groom and his father before bringing their sister back to the family
home, of course without returning the bridal price (34:25–26)! Finally, they
seized the material wealth, the children, and the wives of the slaughtered
males (34:29).9
Perhaps the biblical template for courtship leading to marriage is to
be found in the example of Ruth and Boaz. Here, we recall, a saucy widow
tarted herself up a bit and hied off to waylay the slightly inebriated Boaz in
the middle of the night, boldly uncovering his genitals (“feet”) before hopping
into bed with him in what was clearly an audacious marriage proposal from
a determined young lady to the wealthiest bachelor in town.10 This was not
only sex before marriage but sex employed to induce marriage. What could be
more biblical?
Yet another biblical courtship custom appears in the account of the
union between Michal and David. According to the narrative recounted in
1 Samuel 18:20–29, the prospective father-in-law (King Saul) was not happy
with the idea of having David in the family. So, he proposed that the young
suitor bring one hundred Philistine foreskins in place of a dowry, certain that
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the attempt would result in the death of David (18:25c). David, perhaps aware
that Saul would have preferred a nice Jewish doctor instead of a humble shepherd for his daughter (18:23), presented his future father-in-law with double
the requested number of Philistine foreskins (two hundred instead of merely
one hundred), thereby earning his way into the royal family (18:27).11
BIBLICAL MARRIAGE: ROMANTIC LOVE
OR JUST GOOD BUSINESS?
Surely the plea for biblical marriage cannot be referring to Abraham, the
righteous father of us all. We need not tarry over the open marriage arrangement he enjoyed with Sarah that allowed him to impregnate her female slave
Hagar.12 But we cannot ignore his polygamy in the context of the discussion
about current marriage customs. I refer here to the marriage of Abraham and
Keturah, the wife who produced six sons with Abraham (Gen 25:2). Since
Abraham, falling down laughing, had noted forty years earlier that he was too
old to sire children (Gen 17:17), since the discovery of Viagra was still some
years in the future, and since the notation of the marriage to Keturah in Genesis 25:1 simply notes that “Abraham took another wife” without specifying
a time frame, biblical scholar Nahum Sarna believed that the account of his
marriage with Keturah did not “relate to a time subsequent to Sarah’s death
and Isaac’s marriage, but to many years before.”13 This would be consistent
with the rabbinic dictum that ‘eyn mȗqdam ȗmǝ’ȗh>ar ba-tôrah [there is no
early or late in the Torah]—that is, that the narratives of the Torah are not
always in strict chronological sequence. But it also makes Abraham the husband of two women at the same time and the father of children by both wives
as well as one slave girl.14
These narratives about some of our most famous ancestors, especially
the report of the marriage between Abraham and Keturah, require that we
examine the legitimate purposes of marriage in biblical times. Only then can
we ask whether any of those purposes still obtain in the twenty-first century.
We note first that romantic love, as popularly understood in the modern
world, plays virtually no role in the biblical institution of marriage.15 Proposals
did not occur in the moonlight between two young people who were scarcely
mature enough to distinguish the difference between being in love and being
in heat. Most frequently, they were arranged as a business or political transaction between the heads of two families that shared mutual interests, customs,
and culture.
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The fact that the name of Abraham’s second wife is linked with the word
for “spices” [kǝtoret] lends plausibility to the idea that the Keturah tribes were
involved in the production, shipment, and distribution of spices, a precious
commodity and a valuable source of income. Of the six Keturah tribal leaders,
three bear names well known from nonbiblical sources and are associated with
oases along the international trade routes.16 Thus, the linkage of Abraham
and Keturah secured a vital connection between the Abraham tribes and other
important members of the economic cartel in the region.
This leads to a second observation about the biblical concept of marriage.
Not only does the Torah regularly describe an economic and political linkage
between two groups of people friendly to each other, but such alliances are also
often described in familial terms “arranged in a genealogical pattern.”17 That is,
terms such as “brother,” “son,” “father,” “sister,” etc., often referred to the social
standing of the persons described rather than simply to the biological cellular
unit. Thus “brothers” or “sisters” were social equals, “sons” or “daughters” ranked
below “fathers” or “mothers,” and so forth. Clearly the relationship between
Abraham and Keturah is better understood as an economic alliance between the
“family” of Abraham and at least six tribal groups affiliated with Keturah rather
than as a marriage between one male and one female.18
Third, apart from the existence of an economic, military, or social alliance between groups of people with mutual interests, the primary purpose of
marriage was the production of offspring. And this is indicated in multiple
ways, not least of which is the biblical conception of feminine beauty. Rivkah
is a clear example. Not only did she come from an acceptable family headed by
a “brother” of Abraham (Gen 24: 15), but her physical ability to draw enough
water to satisfy ten thirsty camels that had just completed a long journey leads
directly to the biblical description of her as “beautiful.” This was no mere slip
of a lass, no delicate flower of femininity, but a woman hardy and healthy
enough to do strenuous physical labor and above all to bear children.
THE CORE VALUES EXEMPLIFIED IN BIBLICAL MARRIAGE
What I am suggesting is that it is impossible to draw directly upon the biblical customs of marriage as templates for our own day. The world has changed
radically from their time to ours, and it is necessary to look not at the external
customs with which the biblical personalities were familiar and comfortable
and instead to probe more deeply into the core values of family and social constructs that were important to them, apart from the ways in which those core
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values were expressed externally in their era. Clearly, biblical marital compatibility was defined in ways that we have difficulty comprehending.
And yet, the biblical ideas of marriage have much to teach us about
responsibility to a goal larger than our own selfish interests. To limit the idea of
marital love to physical compatibility alone is perhaps the height of arrogance
on our part. We see daily the results of a system that allows marriage to begin in
the deceptive glow of moonlight, only to end when the moonlight fades and the
temporary physical attraction it induced no longer exists. The dashing suitor
whose body is ravaged by illness or the stunning beauty whose body succumbs
to gravity and time are realities that cannot be avoided. If a relationship is built
solely on the physical, age or disease can dull the ardor of both partners and can
ultimately render meaningless all thoughts of a “better or worse” clause. To put
it bluntly, when moments of illness or physical deterioration arrive, something
more is required than romance and moonlight. Seen in this manner, it would
be well for us to examine once again the biblical concern with the creation of a
unit that serves the larger societal development. I submit that there are at least
three aspects of biblical marriage worthy of our careful consideration.
First, it should not be unthinkable that the choice of appropriate partners
might be made, or at least assisted, by adults whose experience and wisdom
can see past the external markers of physical beauty and who are not bewitched
by the moon, bothered by alcohol, or bewildered by physical characteristics
that will change with time all too quickly. In other words, our modern ideas
about the basis or proper foundation for marriage need to be reexamined.
Second, there can be no question about the sad fact that when a modern
marriage fails because it was built on a shaky foundation or because the two
principals grow in different directions, it is the children who suffer the most.
We surely owe it to our world to emphasize the responsibility of a marital partnership to the nurturing of children who will enhance society and advance the
moral and ethical ideals of Judaism and indeed of all humanity. This should
not mean a simplistic rule forcing two people to remain married “for the sake
of the children,” but it surely requires the acknowledgment of the fact that the
dissolution of a marriage is almost never an issue that involves only two people.
DIVORCE
These concepts lead us to examine the biblical and rabbinic views of divorce.
The key verse from Scripture is Deuteronomy 24:1: “If a man takes a woman
and marries her, and she does not find favor with him because he finds
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something obnoxious about her, he may write a bill of divorce for her and
send her away.” Now, “something obnoxious” is the difficult Hebrew phrase
‘ervat davar [literally, a matter of nakedness], which the Septuagint renders by
aseksemon pragma [a dishonorable deed], itself as ambiguous as the Hebrew it
translates. Matters of nakedness or deeds of dishonor could include adultery,
of course, but would not be limited to that single example.
The Mishnaic discussion of divorce19 ends by citing three competing rabbinic opinions about the meaning of this Hebrew phrase ‘ervat davar. (1) The
conservative School of Shammai ruled that “a man may not divorce his wife
unless he has found unchastity in her,” specifically citing Deuteronomy 24:1
and interpreting ‘ervat davar to mean adultery.20 (2) The liberal School of Hillel ruled that divorce was permissible “even if she spoiled a dish for him” and
cites the same biblical phrase as its authority!21 (3) Rabbi Akiva offered yet a
third ruling, still more liberal than that of Hillel, authorizing divorce even if
a man found another woman who was prettier, which he also links to Deuteronomy 24:1 but from which he highlights a different phrase: “she has not
found favor in his sight.”22
There is yet another Hebrew phrase in Deuteronomy 24:1 that demands
attention: “a writ of divorce” [sepher kǝrı̑ tȗt], a term not discussed specifically
by the three rabbinic authorities.23 The rabbinic word for this phrase is get.,
and the Tanna’im considered it such an important issue that they devoted a
complete tractate (Gittin) to the subject. But to understand the rabbinic views
of divorce, we must turn to a related tractate devoted entirely to the matter of
marital agreements, Ketubbot. A ketubbah was/is a marriage contract that a
man was required to give to his bride at the time of the betrothal, similar
in many ways to a modern prenuptial agreement. It sets forth in writing the
obligations to a wife that the groom agreed to fulfill, including his legal obligation to her if he should decide to divorce her. Adultery by the wife, of course,
could invalidate the entire marital contract and trigger a release of the husband
from his obligation to continue to support her. This is the context in which
Shammai offered such an apparently restrictive opinion about the rights of a
man to divorce his wife. But if the reason of a husband were only that he did
not like a wife’s cooking (Hillel) or that he had found someone more attractive
(Akiva), he would be required to complete all of his financial obligations to her
set forth in the ketubbah. Because the ketubbah would have been negotiated
before the wedding and thus before anger or disillusionment with the relationship had begun, and because the bride would have been represented by a person who was committed to protecting her (a father or a brother), her security
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would virtually always be safeguarded. Lacking a reason to invalidate the
ketubbah, such as adultery or a comparable act of lewdness or prostitution,
the unsatisfied husband could gain his divorce but would have no legal way to
avoid his continuing financial responsibilities.
Modern Jewish wives may well wish to quarrel with the uncomplicated exit
from marriage available only to a husband, and many modern Jewish authorities
have expressed a concern to provide comparable exit strategies for a wife who
is dissatisfied, perhaps because her husband has burned the supper once too
often.24 Yet from the perspective of our spiritual ancestors, surely our practice of
turning to secular courts to settle the dispute between estranged Jewish partners
would be hardly more satisfactory at the end of a relationship than our facile
acceptance of sexual attraction as the major basis for its beginning, especially
when at the end of the dispute it is often only the lawyers for both sides who
profit financially from the quarrel while husband, wife, and children are left
with far less to divide among themselves. Especially if it could be expanded to
include equality of opportunity to both partners, the classical rabbinic idea of
an agreement negotiated before anger and disillusionment begin to eat away at
the partnership quite conceivably could mitigate the economic losses typically
faced by the wife and children and thus serve the larger community far better.
CONCLUSION
No, the external customs of biblical courtship and marriage are not the crux
of the matter, and frantic calls for a return to biblical marriage simply obscure
the real issues. But the value of developing customs resulting in appropriate
partnerships that contribute positively to family and society is a biblical example worth following. We may find it necessary to modernize and reformulate
these time-bound biblical customs, and that is as it should be. Each generation
should be granted such freedom to express itself. But we need not abandon the
goal of marriages that are (1) formed to serve the moral values of the larger
human community, (2) produce children who contribute to the growth and
survival of society, and (3) result in unions that endure because they consist of
two partners who share values that have stood the test of time.
NOTES
1. The exact referential fields denoted by the biblical terms bayit, mišpah>ah, and ševet.
must be teased out contextually. For bayit and its allomorph beyt-’av, meanings as diverse
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as an actual physical dwelling place or the people who reside in it are possible, as are the
ideas of a royal dynasty (David) or a family that survives through numerous generations
(the midwives in Exodus). For mišpah>ah, reference is sometimes to a cellular family, but
at other times it implies an entire clan (including slaves and their children), (foreign)
hired servants, and concubines or second wives and their offspring as well. Sometimes
it describes a collection of several clans that have formed a political and social alliance.
A third biblical category to be defined is ševet., usually translated as “tribe.” Its relationship to “house” and “family” is difficult to describe simply, but ševet. must be examined
as a third major social unit in biblical Israel. All three terms presume the importance of
marital relationships that serve to ensure the continuity of the group as well as to foster
the inculcation of moral and spiritual values to successive generations.
2. I have yet to hear an impassioned plea for the inalienable right of the gay community
to experience the joy of bitter and costly legal disputes once the gild is off the lily and
divorce rears its ugly head. In addition, while it may not be doubted that granting true
legal equality to all citizens is a worthy goal that has been too long delayed, we might
be excused also for worrying about the unintended consequences of foisting in-laws on
people who have surely suffered enough already.
3. This is the term adopted into its party platform by Texas Republicans at their 2014
annual convention in Fort Worth. In the section “Celebrating Traditional Marriage,”
homosexuality is defined as “a chosen behavior that is contrary to the fundamental
unchanging truths that have been ordained by God in the Bible.” The following platform
plank boasts the actual title “Reparative Therapy” and notes that the Texas GOP recognizes “the legitimacy and efficacy of counseling, which offers reparative therapy and treatment for those patients seeking healing and wholeness from their homosexual lifestyle.”
The complete platform is available at www.texasgop.org.
4. See note 3 above.
5. See Genesis 24.
6. Literally, “a gift deed” [šǝt.ar mattanah].
7. This is the point where Rashi has the servant show the family the “gift deed.”
8. This is the remedy called for in Deuteronomy 22:28–29. But note the comment of
Robert Alter on this motif in the ancient world: “Rape was a dire fate, but one which
could be compensated for by marriage, where the violated virgin rejected and abandoned
by her violator was an unmarriageable outcast, condemned to a lifetime of ‘desolation.’”
See Robert Alter, The David Story (New York: Norton 1999), 269–70.
9. Although the physical evidence at the site is somewhat unclear, archaeologists have
speculated that the attorney handling this divorce might have based his fee on a body
count rather than on the standard contingency basis.
10. See my “Nice Jewish Girls: Liquor, Sex, and Power in Antiquity,” in Women and Judaism: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Philip M. and Ethel Klutznick
Chair in Jewish Civilization, October 28 and 29, 2001 (Studies in Jewish Civilization 14;
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ed. Leonard Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins, and Jean Cahan; Omaha: Creighton University Press, 2003), 23–32.
11. Although this particular biblical custom has much to commend it, I am not optimistic about its chances of becoming federal law. The Philistines are well represented in
Washington, and their powerful anticircumcision lobby would easily defeat any proposal
involving foreskins.
12. This was a custom that may have had legal precedents in the area of Mesopotamia,
where Abraham was born.
13. Nahum Sarna, Genesis: The JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: JPS, 1989), 172.
14. The text is interesting. In Genesis 25:1, Keturah is clearly labeled a “wife” [’ishah],
precisely the designation applied to Sarai in Genesis 11:29 and also to Hagar in 16:3. But
25:6 mentions “concubines” in the plural [pı̑ lagšı̑ m] as having born children to Abraham.
JPS Tanakh translates ’ishah as “concubine” in Genesis 16:3, apparently anticipating that
the plural in Genesis 25:6 appears to link Keturah and Hagar together. Thus, either Abraham (a) was married with three women (all designated by ’ishah) at the same time, (b) he
impregnated concubines during the time he was married to Sarah, or (c) he was married
with two wives simultaneously and also fathered a child with Hagar. Neither Hagar nor
Keturah is dubbed a “concubine” [pı̑ legeš] in the text, and except for the notation in 16:3
calling her a “wife” [’ishah] Hagar is referred to either as a “maidservant” [šifh>ah] or a
“[female] slave” [’amah]. Regardless of the way the text describes them, Abraham fathered
children with all three ladies in the same time period. I suspect that this biblical custom
will have trouble achieving legality in at least forty-nine of the fifty states.
15. See the essays on love in Love—Real and Ideal—in the Hebrew Bible and the Jewish Tradition: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Symposium of the Klutznick Chair in
Jewish Civilization—Harris Center for Judaic Studies, September 18–19, 2005 (Studies
in Jewish Civilization 18; ed. Leonard Greenspoon, Ronald A. Simkins and Jean Cahan;
Omaha: Creighton University Press, 2008).
16. Sarna, Genesis, 172.
17. Ibid., 171.
18. Parenthetically, this concept brings modern Jews great relief by helping us to realize
that Isaac did not marry his biological first cousin but rather the daughter of a tribal leader
who was the social equal of his own father Abraham (see Gen 24:24).
19. See Tractate Gittin. The citations of Shammai, Hillel, and Akiva are in Gittin 9:10.
20. This was the position later espoused by Jesus, according to Matthew 5:31.
21. Shammai and Hillel lived only about fifty years before Jesus, and it is likely that he
would have been aware of their schools of thought and teachings.
22. It is clear that while the ruling of Jesus was radically different from those of Hillel and
Akiva, the conservative Shammai had interpreted the Hebrew text of Deuteronomy itself
in a manner very close to what Jesus appears to teach in Matthew. And, as we know from
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rabbinic discussions of other issues, there was no movement among the rabbis to decide
once and for all among the three opinions of Shammai, Hillel, and Akiva, all of whom
were well-known and respected authorities. Contrary to an assumption sometimes made
about the teachings of Jesus serving to loosen the strictures of Jewish law, we may note
that both Shammai and Jesus are offering not a more liberal but a far more restrictive and
conservative interpretation.
23. And although it is cited from the Septuagint in the Greek text of Matthew, it likewise
receives no comment or explanation from Jesus.
24. The excellent book of Perry Netter, Divorce Is a Mitzvah (Woodstock: Jewish Lights,
2002), addresses concerns of this nature. The title of the book was suggested to Netter
by a phrase from Rashi, mitzvah ‘alav lǝgaršah, commenting on Deuteronomy 24:1.
The bibliography included by Netter is also invaluable.

Presumptuous Halachah: On Determining the
Status of Relationships Outside Jewish Marriage
Gail Labovitz
INTRODUCTION
When (now Rabbi) Amitai Adler and Rabbi Julie Pelc Adler stood together under
the huppah, their wedding may not, at first glance, have looked especially different from other Jewish weddings most of us are familiar with. But once there,
they did not ritually enact their union as might have been expected, through the
giving of a ring and the traditional formula “Behold you are betrothed to me by
this ring according to the law of Moses and Israel.” Instead, they chose to create a binding relationship between them by means of the innovative ceremony
of B’rit Ahuvim, or Lover’s Covenant—devised, in fact, by the groom’s mother,
Rachel Adler, in her critical book of feminist theology, Engendering Judaism1—
rather than by the traditional Jewish procedure known as kiddushin. The Lover’s
Covenant is constituted through a ritual/legal act in which the couple creates
a partnership between them, modeled on Jewish laws of creating partnerships
for business, trade, and other financial endeavors;2 this is done by each putting
something of value into a bag and then lifting the bag together. B’rit Ahuvim is
also enacted by means of a document in which the couple asserts their intent
to make a covenant of commitment and fidelity between them and delineates
emotional and practical obligations they agree to take on toward each other;
the language is both poetic (including biblical and rabbinic citations) and legal.
The document drafted and signed by this bride and groom contained an
intriguing additional provision, however, as follows:
This Lover’s Covenant is not kiddushin, and the sexual relations of
the groom and the bride are not with the intent of kiddushin, and not
with the intent of licentiousness, but only and solely with the intent
of the expression of love. In the event, God forbid, that the groom
and the bride should want or need to undo this partnership, it will
be undone by means of mutual agreement between them, by a
document and their own signatures and the signatures of two valid
witnesses, before a just beit din [rabbinical court]; or by the declaration of the desire of one of them, and his/her own signature and the
signatures of two valid witnesses, before a just beit din. . . . And all
of this is without the need for a get of divorce.
57
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Therefore, this partnership is established on the condition that
no beit din in Israel, in the event that the groom or the bride want
or need to undo this partnership, will call this partnership kiddushin
out of doubt, and rule that the groom and the bride require a get
of divorce for the kiddushin. But if this condition is met, then this
partnership will be annulled retroactively.3

It is the purpose of this essay to explore, and eventually explain, one key reason
why this couple might deem such a provision necessary.
According to Jewish law and practice since at least the time of the Mishnah (approximately 200 CE), the legal basis for Jewish marriage is the act
of kiddushin, a unilateral process in which a man “acquires” a woman. As Mishnah Kiddushin 1:1 has it, there are three methods by which this is accomplished:
A woman is acquired in three ways, and acquires herself in two ways.
She is acquired by money, by document, and by sexual intercourse.
By money—Beit Shammai say by a dinar (a silver coin), or by the
equivalent of a dinar; and Beit Hillel say by a p’rutah (a copper coin;
the smallest unit in rabbinic currency), or by the equivalent of a
p’rutah. . . . And she acquires herself by a divorce document, and by
death of the husband.

The mechanics of each of the methods is further spelled out in the Tosefta,
a collection structurally parallel to the Mishnah and containing materials
roughly contemporaneous with those of the Mishnah.4 In the first three paragraphs of Kiddushin in this work, each of the methods is explained:
Halachah 1
By money how (is the acquisition effected)? He gave her money [or the
equivalent of money], [and] he said to her “Behold, you are betrothed
[m’kuddeshet] to me,” “Behold, you are betrothed [m’oresset] to me,”
“Behold, you are a woman/wife to me,” she is m’kuddeshet.
Halakhah 2
And by document? . . . even if he wrote (the document) on a potsherd and gave it to her, [or] on blemished parchment and gave it to
her, she is m’kuddeshet.
Halakhah 3
And by sexual intercourse? Any act of sexual intercourse that is for
the sake of kiddushin, she is m’kuddeshet; that is not for the sake of
kiddushin, she is not m’kuddeshet.

The common elements are that (a) the man conveys the appropriate item (an
item of value or a document) or performs the appropriate act (consummating
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the relationship), and (b) the man specifies his intent to betroth the woman
by his act. Once this occurs, the woman is m’kuddeshet—betrothed, legally
bound to the man in a form of inchoate marriage. That is, although the couple
still needs to undergo the ceremony of nissu’in—full marriage marked by the
recitation of the Sheva Berachot, the seven blessings—and are not yet expected
to cohabitate, once kiddushin/acquisition is performed, any sexual encounter
the woman has with another man would be considered adulterous, and the
relationship can be severed only by the man giving the woman a get, a divorce
document. Divorce in Jewish law, it should also be noted, is thus constructed
in the same manner, as a unilateral act that mirrors and reverses betrothal; at
the core of Jewish divorce procedure and document (the get) is a statement
from the husband: “Behold you are permitted to any man” (see Mishnah Gittin 9:3). Since it is he who “acquired” her, it is he who must release her.
The challenge of kiddushin from a feminist perspective is thus both
practical and fundamental. On the practical level, because a man must grant
a halachic divorce of his own free will, it is within his power to withhold
the divorce or set onerous conditions, effectively “ransoming” the get and the
woman’s freedom to remarry. Such cases in fact occur with some frequency,
particularly in Orthodox communities and in Israel where marriage and
divorce are adjudicated under (Ultra-)Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law.
A great number of proposals have therefore been put forth and debated to
ameliorate the worst effects of this imbalance of power (though far fewer have
found general acceptance and been put into practice).5 But on a more foundational level, marriage by a unilateral act, one that is furthermore constructed
through metaphors of acquisition and ownership of the female partner6 and
nonreciprocal exclusive sexual access to her, is simply not a model that can
be made to comfortably fit with feminist ideals of equal and egalitarian commitments and obligations between life partners.7 One of my areas of personal
scholarly interest over the last several years has thus been in studying newly
developing proposals—such as B’rit Ahuvim—that reflect the intent of their
creators to devise ceremonies that do not meet the halachic requirements of
kiddushin (although they may bear some resemblance to kiddushin) and that
will not be taken as such by others.8
PRESUMPTUOUS HALACHAH
Any attempt to disentangle Jewish marriage from the gendered categories of
the traditional halachic system is complicated by some important additional
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factors built into halachic conceptualizations of marital and other sexual contact between Jewish men and women. In order to understand how this is so, let
us begin by taking a further look at Tosefta Kiddushin 1:3. What I would now
like to highlight is that this passage considers the possibility of a sex act not
for the sake of creating betrothal between a Jewish man and a Jewish woman
who are otherwise permitted and free to be married to each other. What
Tosefta Kiddushin 1:3, along with many subsequent legal and other sources,
therefore indicates is that rabbis and halachic decisors have long been aware
of the possibility and reality of Jewish men and women engaged in relationships involving sexual relations and/or long-term commitments to one another
outside the rubric of kiddushin. These include relationships initiated through
what the rabbis deemed to be (toraitically) ineffective kiddushin, through legal
or ceremonial means other than kiddushin (such as through the rites and rituals of another religion or by civil marriage) or through no set rite or legal act
at all (as in the Tosefta).
Rabbinic authorities were, over the course of Jewish history, called on
to evaluate the nature of these relationships and their status under Jewish law.
A great deal has been written on this topic—both in actual halachic analyses
and arguments and codes and rulings themselves, and in secondary studies of
the responsa and related literature. There are thus many lenses through which
scholars could and have analyzed rabbinic treatments of marriage outside
the bounds of kiddushin—considering, for example, how they reflect decisors’ theories of the nature of marriage or sociological conditions that have
influenced decision making. It is therefore not my intent to try to cover all or
even a significant portion of this vast body of material—an impossible task.
Rather, I will focus on what I see as one critical factor that recurs regularly in
the multiple approaches by which halachic authorities of the past and present
have attempted to address the halachic status of committed heterosexual relationships between Jews, even given the multiple forms that these relationships
have taken over history. This factor is yet one more element that emerges from
Tosefta Kiddushin 1:3, in which the evaluation of a sex act as effective betrothal
hinges on a matter of intent (whether the act is “for the sake of kiddushin” or
not)—thereby raising the question of how intent is to be determined. I will
then conclude by addressing how this factor becomes relevant to the possibility
of creating new ceremonies and forms of Jewish marriage today.
I am guided here most significantly by the work of Rachel Adler, who has
addressed in depth the feminist critique of classical halachah in her aforementioned work of Jewish feminist theology and theory, Engendering Judaism.9
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Adler also elaborates and expands on this topic in an article in which she analyzes the writings of Rabbi Zvi Schachter in opposition to the phenomenon of
“women’s prayer groups” in Orthodoxy, which I will also cite below.10 Based
on these works, I would like to highlight two concerns in particular that I
find relevant to my inquiry here. First, Adler notes the ways in which classical
halachic discourse is prone to prioritizing certain questions and issues while
rendering others invisible: “The method . . . determines the choice of questions, rather than the questions determining the choice of method. Questions
that do not conform to the system’s method and categories are simply reclassified as non-data and dumped out.”11 She continues: “The presumptions select
the questions. The categories shape them.”12 To the extent that the arbiters
of the halachic system did recognize these forms of relationship outside of
kiddushin, Adler’s analysis would suggest that a strong impulse existed (and
still exists) to frame them in such a way that they fit the preexisting categories
and methods of the classical halachic system. To some degree, of course, this
sort of process is necessary to and representative of any legal system, as not all
cases that will arise could ever be anticipated, and the system must use what
resources it already has to assimilate them. The concomitant risk, however, is
that this process may facilitate a tendency to distort the circumstances of the
case in question and the issues it raises into ill-fitting but already known categories if the decisor is reluctant to innovate new categories and understandings or if using the preexisting categories advances the interests of the decisor.13
What is more, Adler elaborates an additional related concern in “Innovation and Authority”: “The male elite who claim responsa literature as their
domain continue to converse only with one another and to render anonymous
the outsiders whose acts provide the content for the elite conversation.”14
In the context of women’s prayer groups, this means that even though the women
who first contributed to the development of these groups are known and identifiable and that they themselves and/or their writings on this subject could be
consulted, instead “There is a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ to converse about rather
than with these mothers of inventions so that their accomplishments may be
reframed for the purposes of the responsa literature as problems detected by
one rabbi and referred to another for solution.”15 Thus, although the creators
of and participants in ceremonies through means other than kiddushin (such as
Adler’s son and daughter-in-law) potentially stand before halachic authorities
to explain their decisions, choices, and intents, this phenomenon identified by
Adler suggests that they cannot presume that they will actually be granted such
opportunities or be properly heard and understood if they are. Thus, to think
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about alternatives to kiddushin and how they are likely be received by the legal
experts and arbiters of halachic communities16 first necessitates consideration
of the varying ways in which the more established halachic system might be
able to absorb marriages enacted by such ceremonies into its existing categories and the ways in which decisors have already attempted to absorb (or not)
and interpret other forms of non-kiddushin–based relationships into halachic
categories. To this end, in the remainder of this essay I will demonstrate that
halachic literature addressing the multiple questions of marriages and relationships established without the rituals of kiddushin is rife with assumptions,
generalizations, and rabbinic principles that claim to interpret and speak for
the motives of the parties, particularly the male party, involved.
WHAT DOES A MAN INTEND? FURTHERING THE RABBINIC
PICTURE OF KIDDUSHIN
First, a bit of critical background for what follows is necessary: it should be
noted that a number of rabbinic passages strongly imply that marriage via
kiddushin is ideally the only context in which Jewish men and women should
engage in sexual relationships with each other. In the very next paragraph in
Tosefta Kiddushin after those considered above (1:4), for example, Rabbi Lazar
[Elazar] interprets Leviticus 19:29—“Do not degrade your daughter and make
her a harlot, lest the land fall into harlotry and the land be filled with depravity”—to refer to sexual relations between unmarried partners without marital
intent. In the tannaitic midrashic commentary to Leviticus, Sifra (Kodashim
perek 7), the same verse receives a similar exegesis, in this case anonymously
and as an uncontested view:
I spoke only of defilement that is for the sake of licentiousness. And
which is this? This is one who hands his daughter over to his fellow
without the intent of marriage, and similarly the one who hands
herself over without the intent of marriage.17

This source also designates sex without marital intent as a form of zenut,18
meaning “licentiousness” or “fornication”; in rabbinic Hebrew, this term
encompasses a broad range of sexual acts that take place outside of rabbinically
sanctioned parameters even if they do not violate explicit biblical prohibitions
such as the incest laws of Leviticus 18 and 20.19 That is, according to the Sifra,
any intimate relationship between a man and a woman for which intent to
create kiddushin had not been explicitly specified would fall under this rubric.
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Thus, based even on just this source and others seen above so far, those
authorities addressing the status of relationships outside of kiddushin would
confront the dilemma expressed by legal scholar David Novak:
In the rabbinic sources there seem to be only two possible heterosexual unions between Jews: either Jewish marriage [kidushin], or
fornication [be’ilat zenut]. . . . In working up from these sources one
has basically two options: (1) everything which is not explicitly kidushin is, therefore, fornication; (2) everything which is not explicitly
fornication is, therefore, kidushin. At this level the argument can
move, with equal ease, in either direction. On the one hand, one
can argue that Jewish marriage requires that one’s intention be for
Jewish marriage and all that it entails. . . . On the other hand, one
can argue that a couple, who have taken upon themselves the public
responsibility of living together as husband and wife, can hardly be
equated with a couple spending some time together in private lust.20

As already noted, a number of factors could and did influence the reasons
and means by which individual rabbis and scholars over time have decided to
pursue one approach or the other, including personal inclinations and understandings of the nature of marriage, historical circumstances in which decisors
found themselves, and the unique details of each specific case that came before
a decisor. In order to understand some of the later legal history relevant to this
question, several important implications of the sources we have already seen
need to drawn out and a few additional rabbinic sources considered. In particular, I would like to highlight those that relate to the intent of the parties to
a marriage or other relationship.
First is the Talmudic elaboration on the theme of male agency in enacting kiddushin, known in subsequent halachic literature as the requirement
of natan hu v’amar hu—“he gives, and he speaks.” After citing the definition of
betrothal by money as in Tosefta Kiddushin 1:1, the Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 5b, adds a discussion of several permutations of actions and statements
between the two parties:
But if she gave (an item of value to him), and she said, “Behold,
I am betrothed [m’kuddeshet] to you,” “Behold, I am betrothed
[m’oresset] to you,” “Behold, I am a woman/wife to you”—she is not
m’kuddeshet.
Rav Pappa objected to this: The reason (why she is not betrothed)
is (because we require that) he gave and he spoke, but if he gave and
she spoke, she is not betrothed.
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But take note of the latter part (of our opening tradition): But if
she gave to him and she said (one of the formulas)—it is not (binding)
kiddushin. This implies that if he gave and she spoke—it would
be kiddushin! . . .
Rather, this is what it means to say: If he gave and he spoke—it
is obvious that it is kiddushin. If he gave and she spoke—it becomes
as if she gave and she spoke and it is not kiddushin.
And if you like I can say (as an alternate answer): If he gave and
he spoke—it is kiddushin; if she gave and she spoke—it is not kiddushin; if he gave and she spoke—it is a doubtful case, and we are
concerned on the level of rabbinic (rather than Torah) law.

Only regarding a betrothal in which the man is the sole and fully active
party—initiating the betrothal and stating the intent that his actions create a
betrothal—is it certain that a binding betrothal has taken place.
This is not to say that the will and intent of the woman are immaterial,
as an earlier Talmudic passage on 2a–b makes clear—although here too the
discussion is framed around male agency and the question of why the mishnah
is worded in such a way that the woman is the grammatical subject of a passive
verb (“is acquired”) rather than specifying that the man actively acquires her:
If it had taught “he acquires,” I might have said even without her
consent. [Since] it teaches “A woman is acquired” (this indicates
that) by her consent—yes (she is betrothed); without her consent—
no (she is not betrothed).

However, in keeping with the rule just noted that the man is the one who
acts and speaks in the optimal betrothal procedure, it may be no surprise to
find that the woman need not overtly state or mark her acceptance. Short of
a purposeful, discernible rejection of the kiddushin (for example, immediately
discarding the item given to her), the woman is usually deemed to have freely
consented to become betrothed. As we shall thus see, because kiddushin is
fundamentally a unilateral act in which the man acquires the woman, but not
vice versa, it will be the will and intent of the man—and rabbinic presumptions about the will and intent of the man—that become central to much of
the discussion on this topic.
One of the key instances in which this kind of attention to the man’s
intent becomes apparent is in a discussion found in Bavli Gittin 81b. The
mishnah to which this passage is commentary describes a couple who has previously been married and divorced, who then (after the divorce) share a room
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in an inn. Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree as to whether the woman
needs a second divorce document (Beit Hillel rules yes, Beit Shammai no):
And Rabbi Yohanan holds like this tanna, as it was taught: Rabbi
Shimon ben Elazar said: They Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai did
not dispute about [a case in which] they did not see that she
engaged in sexual intercourse—that [in that case] she does not
need a second divorce document. About what did they dispute?
When they did see that she engaged in sexual intercourse, for Beit
Shammai say that a man may intend his sex act to be licentious
(i.e., nonmarital) sex, and Beit Hillel say a man does not intend his
sex act to be licentious sex.
And as for the Mishnah, which we established as referring to
[a case in which] they did not see that she engaged in intercourse—
about what did they dispute? When there are witnesses to the seclusion (the man and woman being alone together) and there are not
witnesses to sexual intercourse—Beit Shammai hold [that] we do not
say that witnesses to seclusion are equivalent to witnesses to sexual
intercourse, and Beit Hillel hold [that] we do say that witnesses to
seclusion are equivalent to witnesses to sexual intercourse.

The case hinges on the question of whether there is reason to be concerned
that the couple has reestablished kiddushin and their marital relationship
by means of sexual intercourse. As the Gemara analyses the dispute in the
mishnah, it thus considers these factors: (1) Is it possible to presume intent
(notably the man’s intent) for kiddushin even when not explicitly stated? (2) If
there is credible evidence that the couple was alone together such that sexual
intercourse could have or even was likely to have taken place but no definitive
evidence that it did take place, should it nonetheless be assumed that it did?
Given that Jewish law has typically followed Beit Hillel, two things thus
emerge from the passage, each framed as a broad legal principle. The first of
these is the legal presumption ein adam oseh be’ilato be’ilat z’nut; that is, a man
does not intend his sex act to be licentious sex. This principle also appears a
few additional times in the Babylonian Talmud in a few additional distinct
circumstances.21 As in this case, the issue at hand in each is the possibility
that the couple, and more particularly the man, was of the intent to initiate
kiddushin through sexual intercourse. Since the alternative is to define the sex
act as z’nut, outside the bounds of proper Jewish behavior, the proposal here
is to give the man the “benefit of the doubt” through a presumption that his
intentions instead must certainly have been legitimate, that is, marital. Second
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is Beit Hillel’s assertion that hen hen edei yihud v’hen hen edei bi’ah, or witnesses to seclusion of a man and a woman together are deemed equivalent to
witnesses to sexual intercourse between them. Even though it is not known
for certain that a sexual encounter took place, the seclusion itself is sufficient
grounds to be concerned, or even presume outright, that one did. Putting
these two factors together, the legal result is that at least in this case there do
not need to be either witnesses to the sexual act itself or an explicit statement
of intent in order to establish a reasonable concern that kiddushin may have
taken place; rather, if the couple has been in seclusion together in circumstances conducive to sexual contact, there is at minimum a suspicion and at
maximum a legal presumption that (a) sexual intercourse has taken place and
(b) that the man intended the intercourse as an act of betrothal. The woman’s
understanding of what is happening during the seclusion and/or sex acts is not
considered directly. Perhaps her participation alone is taken as her consent.
When subsequent authorities begin to develop their legal stances on (heterosexual) sexual relationships between Jews outside of kiddushin, it is considerations about the scope of this case (and others like it) and most particularly
the legal principles that emerge from it that take center stage. To recap, at this
point several key points and presumptions have been established:
1. Kiddushin is an act of male agency, and not a mutual process; a Jewish couple does not “get married to each other.” Put another way, kiddushin
is enacted through a model of acquisition. The man “takes” or “acquires” the
woman, and in doing so he becomes entitled to exclusive sexual access to her;
she has no reciprocal legal entitlement to his sexual exclusivity.
2. Acquisition must be done with his intent and her consent. Therefore,
because sexual intercourse between two parties who are free to become husband and wife is a means of initiating kiddushin, knowing the intent of such
a sex act is critical.
3. A sex act without marital intent is classified as licentiousness, improper
behavior not to be engaged in by Jews observant of the rabbinic halachic system. Therefore, we presume that a Jewish man would certainly not engage in
licentiousness. At least under certain circumstances, then, if he did have sexual
relations with a woman not already legally his wife, it may be further presumed
that his intent was for kiddushin instead [ein adam oseh be’ilato be’ilat z’nut].
4. If there is a reasonable possibility that a couple might have had sexual
relations, although proof is lacking, this is sufficient to be concerned that such
an act took place [hen hen edei yihud v’hen hen edei bi’ah] and may be grounds
to impose the legal ramification of that sex act at least as a measure of caution.
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POST-TALMUDIC DEVELOPMENTS: RESPONSA AND CODES
It is in the post-Talmudic period that we begin to have records of rabbis
attempting to apply this set of principles and legal assumptions to actual cases
that are brought before them. These cases are also then considered by others through the lens of their theoretical underpinnings and in the process of
codification in works such as the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam. I will single
out here just a few cases and rulings that are especially critical in terms of their
impact on the development of halachic jurisprudence on this topic and the
deployment of some of the rabbinic principles and presumptions about marriage, sexual conduct, and (male) intent surveyed just above.
In the course of answering a question on a related topic, Hai Gaon, a
leading scholar of the Babylonian Jewish community at the turn of the millenium, makes reference to a cause célèbre that roiled the Jewish Babylonian
community in the seventh century (and had continuing ramifications for
several generations after). In the case at hand, the Resh Galuta, the “Head of
the Exile” and representative of the Jewish community to the Arabic/Muslim
authorities, had fathered a son by his slave woman (who had been given to
him by the Arabic king).22 The question arose as to the status of the child. It is
a general principle in Jewish law (as in many other, but not all, slave systems)
that the child of a slave woman has the status of the mother (i.e., is also a slave)
and as such has the status of a possession that would be inherited by his biological siblings as part of his biological father’s estate. Jewish law and tradition
also, however, discourages if not outright prohibits sexual contact between a
free Jewish man and an enslaved woman (and similarly or all the more so an
enslaved man and a free Jewish woman); by law there can be no binding kiddushin with a woman who is enslaved. Hence, by the understandings of nonmarital sex already discussed above, sexual contact under such circumstances
would necessarily be understood as z’nut [licentiousness]. Thus, the geonic
authorities of the time were presented with a social, moral, and quite possibly
political quandary: could it be that the political leader and representative of
the Jewish community would act in this manner?
Some geonic authorities of the time thus invoked the principle of the
Talmud, ein adam oseh be’ilato be’ilat z’nut, to propose a novel “solution”:
However, this is a dispute on the matter among the later Geonim,
and the root of it is [the case of ] Bustanai the Resh Galuta (who is
the same [person] as Haninai23) who had sexual intercourse with
his slave woman, the daughter of Kansari the king of Persia, given
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to him by Amar son of Katav, king of the Ishmaelites as a gift, and
she gave birth to a son, and he [Bustanai] died, and his [the child’s]
brothers rose up to sell him. And the sages of the yeshivot disputed
over this. There were those among them who said, so long as
he [Bustanai] did not free him [the son], he is a slave and needs to
be freed by his brothers. . . . And there were those among them who
said: Bustanai was a head of the community, and it was in his power
to free her, and if he had not freed her he would not have had sexual
contact with her, since Beit Hillel held that a man does not intend
his sex act to be licentious sex, and all the more so the head of the
community.24

Since it is within a man’s power to free his slaves, if Bustanai wanted to have
a legitimate relationship with his slave woman he could free her and immerse
her in a mikvah [ritual bath], at which point she would become a legitimate
convert to Judaism (and eligible for Jewish marriage). Given the principle that
a man will seek to avoid licentious sex—read quite broadly—and since it was
within Bustanai’s power to make the sex legitimate, some geonic authorities
argued that one must allow for the possibility that this is precisely what Bustanai did; moreover, as a result, both she and the child must be considered as full
Jews at least out of doubt that this happened.
It should not be difficult to see, though, that the logic of this case—
and the way in which the principle that presumes the righteous intent of Jewish men has been deployed here to “resolve” it—could be readily expanded
from the original circumstances to cases of other men who fathered children
by their slave women (which was the context in which Hai Gaon considered
the issue) and well beyond. Thus, it is not surprising to find that while some
contemporary and later authorities cited and/or adopted the reasoning of this
case, others expressed significant resistance. Most notable of these is the great
codifier of Jewish law Moses Maimonides (the Rambam), who took up this
issue in conjunction with the case of the couple at the inn in his explication of
the laws of divorce (Mishneh Torah, “Laws of Divorce” 10:19):
Some of the Geonim ruled that any woman with whom a man had
sexual intercourse in the presence of witnesses needs a divorce document, on the presumption that a man does not intend his sex act to
be licentious sex. And they expanded and added to this matter that
arose in their minds such that they ruled that [in the case in which]
one who has a child by his slave woman, we are concerned regarding
him . . . lest perhaps he freed his slave woman and [only] afterwards
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had sexual intercourse with her, and there is one who rules that he
certainly freed [her] since a man does not intend his sex act to
be licentious sex. And all these things are extremely far-removed in
my eyes from the ways of proper ruling and it is improper to rely
on them. For the sages did not articulate this presumption except
regarding his wife whom he divorced . . . since she is [has been] his
wife, and it is with his wife (e.g., only with a woman with whom
he has already had a marital connection) that it is presumed of him
that a man does not intend his sex act to be licentious sex, until he
specifies that it is licentious sex. . . . But with all other women, every
fornicator is under the presumption that he had sexual intercourse
for the purpose of licentiousness, until he specifies that it is for the
purpose of kiddushin.

In the Rambam’s understanding, if the principle is taken to its logical
extreme,25 we would have to be concerned about the possibility of kiddushin
any time there was reasonable evidence of sexual contact between an unmarried Jewish woman and a Jewish man—which we also know from Bavli Gittin
81b means evidence not necessarily of the sex act itself but even seclusion of
the couple together [hen hen edei yihud . . .].
While the Rambam did not explicitly spell out the ramifications of such
a position, his rhetoric does suggest that it does not comport with reasonable
conclusions about human behavior. While it might be nice to suppose that all
Jewish men had “honorable” intentions when engaging in sexual relations outside of already established marriages, such an assumption stretches the boundaries of credulity. Rather, the Rambam argues, the Bavli invoked this principle
only in a small set of circumstances, all of which share a common feature:
that is, that some form of marital relationship had already been established at
some time between the couple. Only when there is reason to suspect that the
man’s thoughts and intentions are already focused on a marital relationship
can we legally presume that his intent in this sexual encounter is for the sake of
(re)establishing marriage. And indeed, this reading is confirmed in the Rambam’s discussion of the status of the slave child in regard to his father’s estate
(is he an heir to it or part of it?) in the laws of inheritance (Mishneh Torah,
“Laws of Inheritance” 4:6):
One who had a slave woman and fathered a child from her, and
acted towards him [the child] in the manner of [legitimate] children,
or if he says “He is my son and his mother has been freed”—if he
were a scholar or a man of good reputation who is very punctilious
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in the details of the commandments, then this [child] inherits from
him. . . . But if he were from among the other ordinary folk—and
it goes without saying if he was among those who act freely in this
[type of behavior]—then this [child] is under the presumption of
being a slave in all matters, and his [biological] brothers from his
father may sell him.

Although the Rambam does not invoke the principle of ein adam . . . directly
here, he is clearly trying once again to limit the scope of its applicability by
distinguishing cases in which the father was known to be a scholar and/or a
religiously scrupulous man, whereas other more “ordinary” Jewish men do not
get presumptions of having acting in a proper manner.
Finally, in this portion of our discussion there is the highly influential
responsum of Rabbi Yitzhak ben Sheshet, known as the Rivash (Responsa of the
Rivash, 6), which would come to be cited in nearly every analysis of this question that followed. This responsum discusses the case of a female forced convert
from Majorca during the Inquisition who had married another forced convert under Catholic rites. The woman bore a child, but the husband subsequently went abroad and disappeared. The woman was eventually able to return
to a Jewish community and Jewish practice. Since both parties were Jewish
by birth, were there grounds to consider the marriage between them a
Jewish marriage, kiddushin at least after the fact, in which case the woman
would need to (locate the man and) get a divorce before being allowed to
remarry in the Jewish community? The Rivash musters a number of arguments
to deny any halachic significance to the marriage, and I cannot review them all
here. But what I would like to emphasize is how he assembles together many
of the considerations we have already been discussing to bolster his argument.
The Rivash begins with the claim that only relationships established
knowingly and intentionally as kiddushin, through the recognized and correctly
performed procedures of kiddushin (the couple is eligible for kiddushin, the kiddushin is properly witnessed, etc.), thereby have the status of kiddushin:
There is no doubt that the betrothal or marriage, call it what you
wish, which were done in the religion of idolaters and by the priests
of their gathering places—there is not even a suspicion of kiddushin
in them, even if there were valid witnesses at them, because [the
requirement of ] “he gave and he spoke” was not fulfilled by them
(the rites performed). . . . And in any case, in this situation he did
not give her anything; rather only the priest blesses them aloud and
gives a ring to each one.
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The Rivash quickly moves on, however, directly to the question of whether the
presumption ein adam . . . should be relevant here. It was, after all, known to
others, including other originally Jewish forced converts, that the couple lived
together as husband and wife. Under the additional principle of Beit Hillel in
Bavli Gittin 81b—witnesses to seclusion are equivalent to witnesses to sexual
intercourse—perhaps that knowledge of cohabitation between the man and
the woman (not to mention her pregnancy!) should be sufficient to presume
sexual contact between them:
But rather, what needs to be looked into is that he was secluded
with her in a publicly known way, and she “stood under him” (lived
as his wife) and became pregnant from him. . . . And according to
their words (i.e., the views of those Geonim who ruled broadly), in a
case such as this where they are familiar with each other, and also he
took her to be his wife, it would seem at first glance that she needs
a get because there are witnesses that he was secluded with her, even
though there are no witnesses to a sex act [itself ]. And in a case of
this sort, we say witnesses to seclusion are equivalent to witnesses
to sexual intercourse, and since she engaged in sexual intercourse,
we say that he had sex with the intent of kiddushin, because a
man does not intend his sex act to be licentious sex.

Can it therefore be presumed (or at least possible) that the sexual act was done
with the intent of legitimate (Jewish) marriage, that is, kiddushin?
The Rivash’s response, however, is to turn to the Rambam’s argument (and
those of others as well) against a broad application of the ein adam . . . principle:
However, the Rambam, z”l, deflected this ruling with all his power
(literally: with both hands). . . .
For even according to the view of those Geonim z”l who held
that in general we say that he had sexual relations for the purpose
of kiddushin, here this man under consideration did not have sexual
relations for the purpose of kiddushin. For since they married in
marriage rites under the law of the idolators and at their gathering
place by the word of the priest, it is as though they made clear that
their intent was not for kiddushin according to the laws of Moses
and Jewish women, but rather for the ways of idolaters, who are not
under the law of kiddushin and gittin. And if this is so, she is not like
a (Jewishly) married woman. . . .
And in the case under consideration, certainly you do not have
more brazen people than these, who go of their personal desires to
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idolatry to bow down there, and their acts demonstrate their brazenness and their irreverence.

The fact that the wedding took place as a Catholic ceremony does not mean
only that the rites were substantially different from Jewish marriage. Rather,
entirely other presumptions about the actions, motives, and intent of the parties emerge. The choice of ceremony in the rites of another religion is to be
understood as an active rejection of kiddushin as the basis of the marriage;
the nature of the ceremony itself creates a presumption that the man had no
intent at any time to create a Jewish marriage between himself and the woman.
Indeed, if, as the Rambam ruled, only a person of good reputation and Jewish practice can even perhaps be presumed to have engaged in a sex act with
only legitimate intent, then participation in Catholic—in the words of the
Rivash, “idolatrous”—rites itself removes one from possible consideration on
this account and in fact creates the opposite presumption: that the intent was
of brazenness and disregard for proper Jewish sexual morals.
CIVIL MARRIAGE
The concept of civil marriage—that is, marriage overseen through secular governmental authority—first appeared in Holland in 1580 but did not immediately attract rabbinic attention. The apparent first published responsum
addressing the topic is dated to 1741.26 The challenge of civil marriage is that
it takes place outside the framework of Jewish marriage by means of kiddushin
but, seemingly, also does not take place within the framework of any other
religion or set of theological assumptions immediately antithetical to Judaism.
Frequently, the two coexist: a couple is legally required to be civilly licensed or
married under the law of the state but is not prevented from having a religious
ceremony of their choice as well; it may even be that the officiation of a clergy
person also fulfills the civil requirement. When couples both follow the procedures of the state and marry through kiddushin, there has been relatively little
halachic concern; the couple is married Jewishly, and she will need to receive
a get for the Jewish marriage to be severed, since marriage by kiddushin can be
severed only by the get process.
Yet the existence of civil marriage allows a couple a new option for marrying—and severing that marriage—outside of any Jewish framework. What
is the status of a marriage enacted only through civil procedures, without a
Jewish ceremony? If living together as husband and wife by virtue of a civil
marriage in some way creates at least a doubtful kiddushin after the fact, then
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from within the halachic system it should not be severed merely by a civil
divorce degree, and any subsequent marriage of one of the parties—especially
the wife—to another Jew is potentially adulterous. This set of questions has
generated a vast body of literature and a multiplicity of views among those
who have addressed it. Among the decisors who have taken it up, some
have written responsa of great length and/or multiple responsa and have also
responded to each others’ views in additional writings. Thus, following Gedsel
Ellinson, author of the thorough study Non-Halachic Marriage, I will state
now that “It is not our aim to put in order the responsa on the topic; we will
consider only the halachic foundations, in the course of investigation of a
selection of rulings.”27
A starting point for many of these responsa and analyses is the ruling of
the Rivash discussed just above. Its applicability, however, can be understood
in very different and even opposite ways. That is, if one wants to apply or
extend the reasoning of the Rivash regarding the forced converts (and of other
decisors considering other similar cases), one must come to a personal judgment: is the critical factor in that case that the marriage rites were something
other than kiddushin and did not meet the criteria for valid kiddushin, or is it
the very “choice” of Catholic rites in particular—that is, the rites of a religion
contrary to Judaism—that negates any validity under Jewish law? Put another
way, is civil marriage religiously neutral, in which case it can be evaluated in
terms of other factors such as its content, the legal rights and responsibilities it
entails, and/or the social expectations regarding the commitments the couple
are making to each other—and the correspondences or lack thereof with Jewish understandings of marriage? Could such a couple subsequently lend a
Jewish character to their union ex post facto through their open life together as
husband and wife and the reasonable assumption that they have consummated
their relationship? Alternately, does the very choice to enter a civil marriage
while foregoing kiddushin and Jewish rites carry religious significance? Does
such a choice indicate something about the desire of the couple, and particularly of the man, not to establish their relationship as kiddushin—or, going a
step further, perhaps even indicate something about their lack of connection
to Judaism and lack of commitment to “proper” Jewish practice?
In fact, it is intriguing to see the way in which both decisors and those
who have analyzed their decisions yet again turn to the discourse of what
presumptions may be made about the intent of those entering into civil marriage without also participating in a Jewish ceremony of kiddushin (among
other considerations). As Ellinson summarizes one strand of thinking found
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in some of the more recent responsa of the twentieth century, “We are concerned for [the possibility] of kiddushin through sexual intercourse, even if the
parties did not intend Toraitic kiddushin. There are those who hold that for
the requirements of kiddushin, it is possible to suffice with the intent of the
parties to create between them fixed marital bonds.”28 Orthodox authorities
often cited in association with this view include Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin
and Rabbi Yosef Rosen (also known as the Rogatchover), both active in the
early part of the twentieth century prior to World War II. While there are
some important difference in their approaches and they come to somewhat
different conclusions, both make one central point in their arguments: the presumption that parties to a civil marriage—and once again, most particularly
the man—expect that a critical commitment of marriage is sexual exclusivity.
The husband’s expectation that through marriage he has exclusive rights to
sexual access to his wife is similar, both argue, to the legal condition created
by kiddushin. Any relations between them are thus more like his ownership
of (understood as exclusive sexual access to) her through kiddushin than licentious relations, z’nut, and must be evaluated as such. Such a marriage should
be severed by a get, at least out of doubt that it might fulfill the requirements
of kiddushin.29 Nor is this approach limited to Orthodox thinkers. As Rabbi
Isaac Klein, a leading halachic authority of the Conservative movement and
author of the responsum that guides Conservative practice to this day, wrote in
1938, “Our experience is that the moral standards of those who have become
united through civil marriage, as far as marital fidelity and the purity of their
family life is concerned, compares very favorably with the standards of those
who have had the benefit of a religious marriage.”30
On the other side—that is, among those who hold that civil marriage has
no Jewish standing—rulings often hinge on presumptions about the intents
and desires of the parties vis-à-vis Judaism and Jewish marriage. The choice
of a civil marriage, no less than the choice of a marriage in a religion other
than Judaism, is understood as a conscious and willing rejection by the couple
of Jewish marriage and kiddushin and indeed a rejection of a commitment to
Judaism altogether. This view was expressed, for example, in several responses
to Rabbi Henkin’s responsum, as in the following from Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, who emphasizes the secular nature of civil marriage: “just as
they don’t worry and think that she might not be betrothed to him according
to the religions of the Christians and the Ishmaelites, thus to our great sorrow he doesn’t care at all that she is not betrothed to him according to our
holy Torah.”31 The very point of civil marriage alone, he suggests, is that it
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represents a rejection of any religion. It should be noted that even according
to this view some rabbis, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein being a notable example,
have ruled that it is still preferable to have a get given where possible to resolve
any doubt, but they would allow the woman’s remarriage without a Jewish
divorce when circumstances make insisting on a get problematic. It is also
possible to make the exact opposite presumption, as does Rabbi Klein of the
Conservative movement: “Let us see what the mental attitude is of the parties
that go through a civil marriage. Is it a matter of l’hakhit (‘spite’), or just a
passive disregard of the requirements of the Jewish law? In most cases it is safe
to assume that the parties do not object to a religious marriage. . . . In many
cases it is sheer case of ignorance. . . . Under these circumstances, we surely
cannot assume that the parties have definite objections to being married k’Dat
Mosheh v’Yisroel.”32
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we return to the wedding of the Adlers, and the strange provision in their marital document, and to the question of how the traditional
halachic system is likely to approach newly developing alternatives to kiddushin such as, but not limited to, B’rit Ahuvim. What the Adlers, both of whom
are rabbinically trained and versed in many of the complexities discussed in
this essay, intuited is that when the arbiters of traditional halachah come to
consider a ceremony such as theirs, those arbiters will come with a tradition
full of presuppositions and presumptions that may be imposed on a marriage
and the couple who entered it. In the sources surveyed here, we have seen that
exclusive and binding relationships between heterosexual partners, initiated by
marital processes other than kiddushin, may be brought under the rubric of
kiddushin, such that they must be severed by the (unilateral) get process.
It is certainly possible, based on sources here, that to use a ceremony such
as B’rit Ahuvim is to state clearly, in a way that civil marriage may not, that
the couple is deliberately foregoing kiddushin and that their marriage should
not be evaluated as such. Alternately, the choice of a ceremony that retains
elements of Jewish language could as easily be taken as a desire not to reject
Jewish forms and proper Jewish behavior, something that is more doubtful in
the case of civil marriage. Knowing that their motives will be scrutinized and
defined by others, the Adlers are attempting to the best of their abilities to
make their own assumptions about their marriage, their relations, and their
intents explicit, to forestall the possibility that other assumptions might be

76

Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition

imposed upon them. In this, I would suggest that the couple has identified
an important challenge that anyone seeking alternatives to kiddushin must
consider and attempt to address, as they have.
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Ronit Irshai, Fertility and Jewish Law: Feminist Perspectives on Orthodox Responsa Literature
(Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2012), 17, my emphasis.
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Agunot, Immigration, and Modernization,
from 1857 to 1896
Haim Sperber
INTRODUCTION
This essay investigates the phenomenon of agunot (explained below) in the
second half of the nineteenth century. Since then, and especially during
the first two decades of the twentieth century, this has become one of the most
discussed issues on the social and cultural Jewish agenda. Although referred to
sporadically in nineteenth century Jewish social history research, this issue has
not been extensively investigated. This essay offers an introduction to this topic.
The essay’s main objectives are to
1.
2.
3.
4.

sum up the research to date,
estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon,
discuss the available databases,
formulate certain conclusions based on research on all the known
cases of agunot between 1857 and 1896, and
5. provide insights on the effect of the phenomenon of agunot on
A.	the status of nineteenth century Eastern European Jewish women,
B.	the changing role of rabbis in Eastern European communities, and
C.	the complex relationship between absconding husbands and immigration.

DEFINITION OF AGUNOT
The term agunot (sing. agunah) refers to Jewish women who are unable to
divorce because they have been abandoned by their husbands. The word
literally means “anchored,” suggesting that such women are chained to their
marriages, since according to Jewish law only the husband is able to grant
the wife a get [writ of divorce]. Although in the past most agunot were abandoned wives, there are various other ways of attaining this status.
The traditional way of coping with the phenomenon of agunot was to ask
the rabbis for advice. A rabbi usually alerted other rabbis about the absconding
husband as part of the effort to find him and obtain a get for the abandoned
wife. Rabbis were also very instrumental in offering legal aid to agunot.1 This
79

80

Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition

changed with the advent of Jewish journalism in the mid-nineteenth century.
Women began to search for their absconding husbands by placing advertisements in newspapers and other journals. With these new avenues open to
them, women no longer depended solely on rabbinical help for finding a solution to their plight.
THE STATE OF RESEARCH TO DATE
Historical research of the phenomenon in the second half of the nineteenth
century is virtually nonexistent.2 However, much more has been written about
agunot in the early twentieth century, especially in North America.3
CheaRan Freeze devoted thirteen pages to agunot in her pathbreaking
research on Jewish divorce and marriage in the Russian Empire in the late
nineteenth century.4 She was the first to regard it as an important aspect of
the nineteenth century Jewish family history. Arthur Hertzberg and, recently,
Gur Alroey probed this phenomenon as part of their research of Jewish immigration.5 Margalith Shilo investigated agunot in the small Jewish community
in Jerusalem in the nineteenth century.6
Mark Baker is the only researcher who primarily focused on this topic,
but his work covers only four years, from 1867 to 1870, and is limited to only
one source, the Hebrew Newspaper HaMagid.7 In her Ph.D. dissertation, Noa
Shashar relates only to the period before 1850.8
The research results in this essay are the first exclusively dedicated to
agunot in the late nineteenth century.
THE EXTENT OF THE PHENOMENON
All the data for the scope of the phenomenon of agunot are estimates. Most
agunot were not reported as such due to either shame or despair. Furthermore,
although most agunot lived in Eastern Europe, much of the data refer to postmigration reports, particularly to North America and the United Kingdom, in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Mark Baker suggests that the agunot reported in Jewish newspapers represented only 1 percent of all the cases, based on Ephraim Deinew’s statement
in a footnote in HaMagid (April 21, 1869): “Readers of the Jewish journals
need not think that the published cases of agunot in newspapers are all the
cases. In fact if all agunot would wish to publish their troubles, all the journals
would not suffice. In fact only one in a hundred is mentioned.”9
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Arthur Hertzberg claimed that during the period of the Great Immigration (1881–1924) one hundred thousand Russian Jews deserted their wives
and families, but he did not cite his sources.10 ChaeRan Freeze doubts this
estimate.11
However, figures given by Jewish organizations in Great Britain and
the United States might give some further hints. The British Jewish Board of
Guardians’ report for 1870 gives the number of agunot as 103.12 Their report
for 1871 refers to 105 cases.13 These are huge numbers, if the size of the Jewish population in Great Britain (fewer than 300,000 in 1870) is taken into
account. In the 1880s, the figures were much higher. The report for 1881 cites
151 cases,14 and the 1886 report cites 214 cases.15 The numbers for the 1890s
was even higher. The report for 1892, for example, gives 353 agunot.16
As far as North America is concerned, Hertzberg’s figures are indirectly
supported by a report by Morris D. Waldman to the Sixth Conference of the
National Jewish Charities in the United States in 1909. Waldman reported
on deserted women requesting aid from charities in various cities: 78 in St.
Louis, 90 in Baltimore, 204 in Chicago, and 1,046 in New York.17 Waldman
also quoted research from 1901, with the number of deserted Jewish women
in Boston given as 105 for the same year.18
In 1908–1909, the records of the United Hebrew Charities of New York
(UHCNY) showed that 652 out of 1,046 women were deserted for more than
a year, including 130 for more than a decade. Waldman provided figures of
deserted women assisted by the UHCNY from 1903 to 1909 (1,052, 970,
1,124, 1,040, 106, 1,049, and 1,046, respectively).19 It seems that in New
York alone, there were at least a few hundred new agunot per year. As early as
1871, a report of the Hebrew Benevolent and Orphan Asylum Society of New
York, published in the Jewish Messenger on May 5, 1871, refers to 78 deserted
wives supported by the society in 1870 alone.
All these figures do not include Eastern Europe. However, most agunot
found in the present research came from the Russian and Hapsburg Empires,
and figures do not exist for them. Rather, research on East European agunot
relies heavily on qualitative rather than quantitative sources
THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
This essay is based on research on over forty-seven hundred cases of identified
agunot, most of them from Eastern Europe. Most information on agunot can be
found either in newspapers (mostly Jewish newspapers in Hebrew or Yiddish)
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or in rabbinical responsa books and other sources. As shown here, these two
main databases portray different agunot narratives. The basic assumption is that
at least one hundred thousand Jewish agunot lived in Eastern Europe during
the second half of the nineteenth century. Although there is some information
relating to anonymous agunot, especially in the rabbinical sources, this research
concentrates solely on those identifiable by either name or place.
CATEGORIES OF AGUNOT

Based on research of forty-seven hundred cases of agunot in the nineteenth
century, seven basic types were identified.20
1. Women Deserted by Husbands Who Disappeared

Isaac Waldorf is probably the most notorious case of desertion. After deserting
his wife in Vienna, he went to New York and remarried. When his second wife
died, leaving three young children, he appointed an eighteen-year-old girl,
who came from Vienna, to look after his children, and later he married her.
The bride invited her mother from Vienna to come to New York. The mother
recognized her son-in-law as the husband who deserted her. The daughter/
third wife was born a few months after Waldorf ’s desertion.21
In most of the known cases, the husbands were not found. There were
also a few cases of wives deserting husbands.22 However, deserted husbands
who were still married could apply for a heter meah rabanim [permission,
signed by one hundred rabbis (from three countries)] to marry another wife.
Men would look for rabbis willing to sign such permissions. In a peculiar case,
in 1857, Itzik Walershtein from Hungary went on a mission to collect one
hundred rabbis’ signatures for another man whose wife was insane. However,
Walershtein disappeared, making his own wife an agunah.23
According to Jewish law, wives could not receive such permission. This
created a problem in countries where bigamy was illegal.24 In some cases of
couples married according to Jewish law but without having recorded the marriages by the state, husbands would deny the marriages altogether.25 However,
since they were married according to Jewish law, the wives would remain agunot, although the whereabouts of the husbands were known.
Since women could not receive heter meah rabanim, their only option
was heter agunah [permission to the agunah], which is discussed later in this
essay. Desertion was the most common reason for women becoming agunot
(see Table 1).
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2. Women Who Refused to Receive or Were Not Granted a Get

Some husbands who refused to grant their wives permission for divorce were
imprisoned or deported. The cases of imprisoned or deported women unwilling to receive a get were much fewer,26 while some refused to receive it for
other reasons, particularly economic considerations.27 Not many cases of the
latter were found, although this later became more widespread.
3. Widowed Women Whose Brothers-in-Law Refused
to Grant Them Permission to Marry Others

According to Jewish law, when a husband dies and has a surviving brother, the
widow, if she does not have children, is obliged to marry the brother unless
she is released from this duty. This is done through a ceremony called
halitza [Levirate marriage] in which the widow takes off the brother-in-law’s
shoe, whereby she receives the brother-in-law’s permission to marry another
man. Thus, he is released from the obligation to marry her, and she becomes
free to marry whomever she desires. In one peculiar case, a brother of a
deceased man went to give his sister-in-law halitza but disappeared, and his
own wife thus became an agunah as well.28 Sometimes the brother-in-law
could not be found,29 refused to give permission,30 or demanded payment
for it.31
4. Women Whose Husbands’ Bodies Have Disappeared

Such instances include husbands’ deaths by drowning32 or by natural disasters
while traveling. The difficulties in such cases could be that a husband’s body
was not found or was mutilated beyond recognition.33 In such instances,
women could not remarry until the husbands were officially pronounced dead.
There were many instances in which husbands had been taken into the armed
forces and died during their service, but their bodies were missing or mutilated.34 In some cases enlisted husbands did not return home, sometimes by
choice.35 In other cases they were missing in action, but the rabbis refused to
accept the army death reports.36 In one case the husband had been murdered
but the body was discovered only much later,37 and during all the intervening
years the woman remained chained to the marriage.
5. Improperly or Incorrectly Written Get

The divorces of women with such a get38 could not be finalized.39 In some
cases, the get was deliberately written in an improper way.40
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This issue was the subject of a number of literary works, mainly in nineteenth century Russia. Among the most famous of such pieces was Yehuda
Leib Gordon’s poem “Kotzo shel Yod” []קוצו של יוד.41
There were also some cases in which women refused to receive the
get because the husband tried to serve it by using force or intimidating
the woman.42 In other cases, rabbis refused to accept the get written by rabbis who were appointed by the state but whose ruling was deemed improper
because they did not have rabbinical training and formal rabbinical education.43
6. Women Whose Husbands Became Mentally Ill
and Were Not Competent to Grant a Get

In such cases, women had to apply for heter beth din ([ )התר בית דיןpermission
of the rabbinical court] to be released from the marriage.44 Similarly, women
who had become mentally ill were not considered competent to receive a writ
of divorce,45 and the husbands became chained to such marriages. Such matters
could be adjudicated by rabbis using heter meah rabanim, as mentioned above.
7. Women Refused a Get by Jewish Converts to Christianity or Islam

Some of the converts to Christianity became anti-Jewish agitators, such as
Israel Aaron Birman, also known as Dr. Yustus.46 In such cases, the divorces
still had to be granted according to Jewish law. In the event that converts refused
to grant a get, the women became agunot.47
The most famous instance involving conversion was of Sarah Leah, the
widow of Mechel Alter Gener of Odessa in the Russian Empire, who became
an agunah. Both of Mechel Alter Gener’s brothers converted to Christianity
and were not willing to grant Sarah Leah halitza. She needed special rabbinical permission to remarry. The case was much debated in newspapers,
rabbinical responsa, and civil courts in Odessa. The rabbinical debate was
conducted by Rabbi Avraham Yoel Abelson of Odessa. The correspondents
included Avraham Yoel Abelson, Israel Issar Shapira, Aaron Zeev Wolf Wail,
Itzhak Elhanan Spector, Mordechai Aarom Gimple, Leib Frankel, Yosef
Zechaia Shtern, Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Shimon Arie Schwabacher, and
Shmuel Mohaliver—many of the most important rabbis in Eastern Europe.48
HOW AGUNOT COULD OBTAIN PERMISSION TO REMARRY
In cases (categories 2–6) in which a husband was not found for a few years
or was declared insane, in a coma, or unable to function, the rabbis could
release the agunah from her chains by the heter aguna []התר עגונה. To gain
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Table 1. Data on the Categories of the Known Cases of Agunot
Agunot
1

Deserted by husband or wife

1a

Serial deserting husband (2 or more deserted wives)
Total deserted wives
Total deserted by wife
Total desertions

No.

%

3,012
150
2,987
   175
3,162

68.09

2

Refusing to grant or receive a get

1281

2.54

3

Halitza issues

202

4.28

4

Husband suspected dead (one case of a wife)

608

12.50

5

Improper get

235

4.59

6

Mental or severe illnesses

2742

5.79

7

Conversion

80

1.71

8

Undefined and other cases
Total

23

0.50

4,712

100.00

1. Among those cases, 24 women refused to receive the get.
2. Including 13 males [agunim] and 249 females [agunot].

such permission was the principal goal of agunot. However, rabbis could grant
such permission only within the framework of Jewish law.49 In many cases, the
newspapers applied pressure on the rabbis to be more liberal and issue written
permissions to remarry more frequently.
Table 1 divides the known cases of agunot into various categories. About
30 percent of the women researched became agunot for reasons other than
desertion by their husbands. Furthermore, the two major sources on agunot,
which are discussed below—namely Jewish newspapers and responsa books—
offer two different narratives regarding agunot. While the newspapers dealt
mainly with deserted women, the responsa dealt mainly with women whose
husbands were deceased as well as with 6 halitza cases and get and mental
health issues. Thus, out of 1,584 cases of agunot cited in responsa, 1,121
(70.8 percent) were women not deserted by their husbands, while 2,260 out
of 2,560 cases (88.3 percent) reported in the Jewish newspapers were women
deserted by husbands (see Table 5 later in this chapter). The reason for this is
explained in the next section.
THE SOURCES
The sources describing such phenomenon are vast, but most have not been
researched until now. There are four main databases on agunot: newspapers,
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especially Jewish ones; rabbinical sources, especially responsa books; official
Russian rabbinical documents; and letters and documents in private archives.
As mentioned earlier, the different sources offer alternative and sometimes conflicting narratives regarding agunot. This is demonstrated in the
analysis of the various sources.
I. JEWISH NEWSPAPERS

While the Jewish newspapers are mostly in Hebrew, there are some in Yiddish50 and in various local Jewish newspapers.51
Much information regarding agunot is found in the Jewish newspapers.
Indeed, the first Hebrew newspaper, HaMagid,52 published from 1856 to
1903 initially in Lyck, Prussia, and later in other places, put the matter of
agunot very high on the agenda. While Mark Baker’s research on agunot in
HaMagid is restricted to the years between 1867 and 1870,53 the current
research investigates all the issues of the newspaper.
Information on agunot is also available in other Jewish newspapers, particularly in those published after 1880.54 Information on agunot in the newspapers appeared in two main forms: advertisements and news reports.
The advertisements, placed by women or their relatives, mostly fathers,
sought information on the whereabouts of husbands. They were published
only after the editors verified the validity of the information.
The editors were very much aware of possible manipulation by the
parties concerned. On June 28, 1871, the editor of HaMagid reported on
some instances of women approaching the newspaper a few weeks after husbands went away on business, and by the time of publication the husbands
had returned. To avoid such problems, the newspapers specified the infor
mation that advertisements should include and stated that “We will not advertise any advertisements concerning agunot if the matter is not presented to us
by the rabbi or communal officials of the place where the agunah resides.”55
The usual procedure was to ask the local rabbi to confirm the woman’s version,
after the editor of HaMagid (June 23, 1869) wrote that he had been deceived
by two people a few years earlier. He decided that advertisements would not
be published without rabbinical consent.56
In many cases the rabbis would write the advertisements,57 which were
then posted as letters from the rabbis to the editor. In other cases, advertisements were written by newspaper correspondents or community officials.
Two typical examples of advertisements are the following:
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1. This first advertisement was published in HaMagid (June 16, 1866,
and September 9, 1866). It relates to a woman deserted by her husband five years earlier. In most such advertisements there is much
information regarding the deserters, while information on the abandoned wives is rare:
A woman Necha, the daughter of Haim David of Warsaw, was
betrayed by her husband five years ago. Last year, he wrote to his
family that he was in Suez, Egypt, and has not been heard from
for nine months now. The man is tall and has a black beard and
hair. He is about 34 years old and is a roofer by profession. Some
years ago he was in the Caucasus. The address he sent is in Suez
under the name of Moritz Greenwald. The person who would do
the good deed of meeting him and receiving the get from him will
be well rewarded, as our late Sages have proclaimed many times.
Please, as soon as the editor should learn anything, let him inform
the great genius, our teacher, Rabbi Doberosh Meizlish, may his
light shine, the head of the Beth Din of Warsaw. I hope that all
our fellow sons of Israel, wherever they are, will try to find out the
whereabouts of this man.
Benjamin David, Secretary, Warsaw Sacred Community

2. The second advertisement refers to two women left by the same
man. Again, there is much information about the deserter and very
little concerning the deserted wives. The advertisement appeared in
HaMagid (August 20, 1873):
A WOMAN’S CRYING VOICE
A woman [named] Pesia, daughter of David Levy, is seeking Israel
Baer, born in Berditsov, Russia. [Baer is] the son of Yehoshua
Heschel Shapira, grandson of the famed Leah Menasche. Having
married in the town of Hamla, Galicia, [the said Baer] lived in
Yassi, Romania, for a number of years but ran off, not to be found.
I have been traveling for three and a half years, looking for him
without success. Therefore, I beg all those who have a connection with HaMagid to try and make him send a get to his abovenamed wife. This is how he looks: He is about forty-four years old,
of medium height; his hair and beard are black [giving his face]
a round [appearance]. On one foot, he has a [birth] mark, and,
on his lower [back . . . a scar from] a healed blow. He took along
Yaacov, his [now] 15-year-old son from this marriage. The son is
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bleary-eyed and has a dark, dappled face due to blisters; he has
thick lips. Now I know, as a matter of certainty, that this betrayer
has abandoned another wife in the city of Tchernowitz, Romania.
Her name is Yenta, and she is divorced from her first husband,
Mihel Tandetnik. She resides at a baker’s place near the military
hospital. It is a religious commandment to force him to release
both his wives from their chains. A get for each of them should
be addressed to me, care of my aid Yosef ben Itzhak or care of the
rabbis in the above-mentioned cities.
Itzhak Aizik Shor, Chief Rabbi of Bucharest

In most cases the advertisements were published free of charge.58 In some cases
the advertisement was published in more than one newspaper,59 but in most
cases they appeared only in one. If a woman wanted to publish a series of pleas,
she had to pay for the advertisements. The best-known case of paid advertisement is of Bassia Freizetova, who published her requests in three newspapers in
1883. Freizetova also tried other routes, such as appealing to rabbis and local
Russian authorities.60 In some cases women would publish an advertisement
and, after a decade or more, publish another one.61 Occasionally a woman or
her relatives offered financial rewards.62 However, offers of rewards were rare.
Another way a woman’s plight would become known was through the
publication of her story by a newspaper correspondent. A good example is
the case of Shlomo Braham. The story was initiated and followed up by a
HaMagid correspondent. Many correspondents helped to trace deserting husbands across borders, notably Ber Dov Goldberg in Paris, David Fishman in
Tiberias, and Shlomo Behor Hutzin in Bagdad.63
The editors encouraged their correspondents to pursue elusive husbands.
Such was the case of Libbe Marcus. David Meyer Marcus left his wife Libbe
twice. In the second abandonment, he emigrated from Russia to France. The
Paris correspondent of HaMagid, Ber Dov Goldberg, was very helpful in finding Marcus and preparing the get. The editor helped Libbe reach Paris and
receive the get.64 In some cases readers added information that helped with the
deserters’ apprehension,65 or the pursuit might have begun with an advertisement but was then followed by a newspaper investigation.66
Sometimes the editors published incorrect information in attempts to
locate the deserter. Such was the case with Ithzhak, the son of Moshe the
Cohen. An advertisement was published in HaMagid (January 17, 1884). The
publication detailed the route Itzhak took in 1881 from Breslau through Italy,
England, and Egypt. In his final letter to the family, he stated that he intended
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to go to Bombay, India. After late 1881, all contact with him was lost. The
advertisement was published in early 1884, and meanwhile the family moved
from Breslau to Serbia. On April 3, 1884, the HaMagid correspondent in San
Francisco wrote that Itzhak came there from the East Indies and then moved
to Los Angeles. However, the original advertisement was republished on September 24, 1884. A possible explanation is that despite the further information, he did not return or send a get. Another explanation may be that since the
name “Itzhak the son of Moshe the Cohen” is very common, the San Francisco
correspondent was reporting on another Itzhak. In my view the second explanation is more feasible, since some details were added that were different from
those given in the original advertisement.
In some instances, the newspaper editors were quite eager to publish
stories of agunot. This was the case regarding the alleged deserting husband
Yehuda Kahalan, who was accused of abandoning Rachel Friedel. The newspaper published both sides of the story: the wife accused Kahalan of desertion,
and Kahalan himself denied the accusation. However, the newspaper kept on
insisting that it was a desertion case even after it became clear that Kahalan
had not deserted his wife.67
The editors were clearly looking for agunot even if there were none, and
they were much criticized for this. As a result, from 1879 onward HaMagid
published far fewer dispatches about agunot and only if the editors were certain
that the wives were indeed deserted.68
In rare instances, the Hebrew newspapers cited cases published earlier in
other Jewish newspapers.69 The editors also referred cases to rabbis, encouraging
them publicly to help the agunot.70 They even published articles condemning
rabbis who were reluctant to do so.
Special attention was drawn to cases of serial deserters. For example,
Zeev Margaliot abandoned seven wives (see HaMagid, February 24, 1874, and
HaLebanon, March 25, 1874, and August 26, 1874), and his namesake Alexander Sender Margaliot deserted three wives (see HaMagid, July 6, 1859; August
30, 1859; October 6, 1859; December 7, 1859; and March 21, 1860).71
Awareness of the issue of agunot in the public sphere had side effects. Some
dishonest people would try to make a living from such a matter. Moshe Goldstein of Cairo, Egypt, claimed that he was carrying a get from Itzhak Finkel to his
wife Ester Zissel. Goldstein claimed that Finkel asked him deliver a get to
his wife. According to the Jewish law, a get has to be sent via a messenger if
the husband and wife were living in places far away from each other. Finkel was
supposed to be living somewhere near the Caspian Sea, while Ester lived in

90

Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition

Russia. In each city Goldstein passed through, he requested that Jews pay for
his expenses, since he was performing a mitzvah [holy commandment].72
Similarly, the above-mentioned case of Bassia Freizetova became so
famous that two criminals, presenting themselves as her father and husband,
tried to profit from her plight. The older one, who posed as Bassia’s father,
asked Jews for money to help him take the deserter back to his deserted wife.73
For some professional criminals, such as Hirsch Denmark, wife desertion was
just one of an assortment of criminal activities.74 Some deserters were actually
engaged in trafficking women.75
Another indication that the phenomenon of agunot was becoming an
important issue among the Jewish public was that some husbands threatened
to leave their wives without granting a get, thus making them agunot.76
HEBREW NEWSPAPERS AND THE ISSUE OF AGUNOT

The newspapers dealt mainly with the first type of agunot—wives deserted by
husbands. The issue of agunot was mainly addressed in Hebrew newspapers
and rarely in the Yiddish ones. For example, between 1862 and 1872 while
Hamelitz published sixty-five advertisements on agunot, its Yiddish edition
Kol Mevaser published only five. American Yiddish newspapers, which began
to appear only in late 1870, published more information, mostly referring to
North American agunot.77
Eliezer Lipman Zilbermann (1819–1882), the publisher and first editor
of HaMagid (founded in 1856), brought the issue of agunot to the forefront
of the Jewish social debate. As Baker has shown, Zilbermann made this issue
one of the most important topics in HaMagid.78
On September 13, 1865, in a very long editorial, Zilbermann proclaimed
that agunot were one of the most important matters that should be discussed
in the Jewish press. He also stated that HaMagid would put pressure on rabbis
who hesitated in taking up the cause.79
Orthodox newspaper editors disagreed with, in their view, the overemphasis of the issue, especially Yehiel Brill, the editor of HaLebanon,80 who
accused Zilbermann of reporting on agunot even in simple marriage disputes
between husband and wife. In July 1879, Brill published another editorial in
which he stated that the issue should be dealt with exclusively by the rabbis,
and not in the media.81
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, David Gordon became the new editor
and publisher of HaMagid, promoted from deputy editor, in which position
he had served since the mid-1860s. Gordon was more concerned with the
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Jewish national movement and the settlement of Jews in Palestine and less
focused on social issues.82 After Gordon’s death in 1886, his son Dov, who
was the editor until 1890, continued his father’s editorial policy. In 1890,
Yaacov Shmuel Fux became publisher and editor; he continued along those
lines until HaMagid closed down in 1903. Under Fux’s leadership, HaMagid
concentrated solely on cultural and political issues, altogether neglecting the
social problems in the Jewish community.83
From 1880, HaMelitz (which was founded in Odessa in 1860 and later
moved to St. Petersburg)84 and Hatzfira (founded in Warsaw in 1862)85
became the leading newspapers to spread the word about the issue of agunot.
Both HaMelitz and Hatzfira became daily newspapers in the late 1880s, giving
the matter widespread coverage.86
Table 2 analyzes all information found in the Jewish newspapers on agunot between 1857 and 1896.87
As the analysis clearly shows, in the four decades investigated, about
75 percent of the mentions in media sources on agunot were advertisements.
However, the advertisements dropped from 88.9 percent in the first decade to
60.2 percent in the fourth decade. On the other hand, the number of news
reports on agunot rose from 31 in the first decade to 330 in the fourth, possibly reflecting the professionalization of Jewish media.
II. RESPONSA

Agunot became an ardent issue in the Jewish community, mainly in Eastern
Europe, as evidenced by the vast amount of information on the subject
in nineteenth century published responsa and rabbinical questions and
answers.88 Even more information is found in unpublished responsa, which
can be located in rabbinical archives.89 While this issue became prominent
in responsa in the nineteenth century, it was a major topic of discussion in
rabbinical literature long before.90 In traditional Jewish society, family issues
were usually handled privately and discreetly (although, of course, the disappearance of husbands was known in the shtetl and the community).91
A unique feature of nineteenth century responsa was their reaction to the
public challenge, including the leaders of nineteenth century Jewish community, and the high profile of the issue of agunot in the Jewish press. The
rise of journalism offered agunot a new way to try to solve their situation.
Requesting the aid of rabbis was practically the only avenue open to the
abandoned wives until the mid-nineteenth century.92 Thereafter, the public
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spotlight on the issue of agunot, not only in newspapers93 but also in Hebrew
and Yiddish literature,94 affected rabbinical literature in general and responsa
in particular.95
Some examples of the effect of the new public scene on the major rabbis
in Eastern Europe are presented below. Rabbi Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin,
head of the famous Volozin Yeshiva, referred to HaMelitz of 1887 as a source
of information on agunot.96 In another instance, Rabbi Berlin referred to
Hatzfira.97 However, he stated that rabbinical decisions should not appear in
the newspapers unless absolutely necessary.98 Rabbi Hayyim Berlin, the son of
Rabbi Naphtali Tzvi, referred to HaLebanon (a less surprising reference, since
it was an Orthodox journal that published an addendum of rabbinical literature).99 Rabbi Hayyim Berlin also mentioned his father’s habit of reading the
debates about religion in the newspapers, which he claimed was a common
thing to do on Shabbat.100 The well-known Rabbi David Friedman referred to
several mentions of agunot in HaMagid of 1873.101
Rabbi Shalom Mordechai Shvedron, in a responsum on the agunah Hava
Sateshny, even based his decision on information he found in a newspaper.102
In the case of the agunah Reizel Laysten (1895), whose husband drowned in a
ship on its way to America, Rabbi Shvedron also relied heavily on newspaper
reports, even claiming that had the husband survived, he could have sent a
note via the newspapers.103 Rabbi Yosef Shaul Nathanson as well as other rabbis published their requests regarding agunot in HaMagid.104
In fact, the most important rabbis in Eastern Europe, such as Shlomu
Kluger (1785–1869),105 Itzhak Elhanan Spector (1817–1896),106 Yosef Shaul
Nathanson (1810–1875), and many others, wrote responsa on agunot.
However, information in the responsa is partial in many cases and does
not provide precise data regarding persons and places involved in some cases.
In many of the cases, even the date is not specified. Another methodological problem is that many responsa books were not published by the authors
and appeared only long after they were written.107 Responsa literature mostly
deals with the second, third, and fourth categories of agunot, that is, involving
halitza, identifying the dead, and get completion issues. There are also many
other responsa on agunot.
Many other cases than those found in the responsa have been analyzed in
this research. All the cases of agunot mentioned without a date or clear timing
in the responsa were ignored in this research. The following methodology was
adopted: cases in which a year is not mentioned were ignored and left out of
the database, whereas instances in which only a place or a name was missing
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went into the database, while if both the place and name were missing, they
were not included. There are two other databases, but they have much less
information on agunot.
III. OFFICIAL RABBINATE PAPERS ESPECIALLY IN RUSSIA

From 1844 onward, officially recognized rabbis of the community became
officers of the state in the Russian Empire. Many communities continued to
employ unofficial rabbis alongside the official ones. However, many of those
living in Jewish communities were prepared to assent to administration by
the official state rabbis.108 This occasionally created a new category of agunot:
women thought to have married and divorced not exactly according to Jewish
law.109 However, research on these sources is just beginning.
IV. LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING IMMIGRANTS

This applies particularly to East European immigrants to the United States
and England.110 Such important sources can be found in the records of women’s benevolent societies and of social workers. Most of these records relate to
the early twentieth century and are thus outside the scope of this research.
This essay considers data mostly from Jewish newspapers and responsa.
The information collected is analyzed in Tables 3–8.
Table 3 shows a constant rise in the number of cases reported in each
decade. The reasons for this were the rising awareness to the issue of agunot
as well as the increase in the number of newspapers, which also became more
widespread. Agunot became a hot issue that helped to sell the newspapers.
Although 96 percent of the reported cases were deserted women, the
numbers of deserted men might be higher than was known. In a patriarchal
society, many men were reluctant to publicize the fact that they were deserted.
Many of the cases of deserted men portrayed the deserting women as either
out of their minds or unfaithful, which seems have been somewhat misleading.
Most information on the known cases of agunot comes from the
media. The information published in the newspapers is also much fuller
in details, and many cases can be followed for long periods of time. However, all sources have much more information (usually descriptions) about
the absconding men and much less about the women.
Many cases of agunot were related to immigration. Furthermore, although
in many cases the deserted did not go to other countries, others left their
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Table 3. Identified Agunot from 1857 to 1896
Cases

Incidents1

49

63

1857–1866

728

1,043

1867–1876

1,122

1,517

1877–1886

1,254

1,875

1887–1896

1,553

2,315

Total

4,712

6,813

Years
1851–1856

1. Some cases appeared in several sources, hence the difference between
the number of cases and the number of incidents.

Table 4. Gender Division of Agunot
Number
1

Males

Females

Percentage

218

4.6%

4,494

95.4%

1. A deserted man is one who could not be served a get because his wife
left or became mentally ill. He might ask to rabbis to grant him permission to marry another wife, which was denied in most cases.

Table 5. Sources of Agunot Cases
Sources
Jewish newspapers

2,560

General newspapers

229

TOTAL NEWSPAPERS

2,789

Responsa (Only 36 incidents appeared both in the responsa and in the newspapers. Rabbis who published advertisements about agunot did not discuss those
cases in their responsa.)

1,584

Others1

339

TOTAL

4,712

1. Others in Table 5 refer mainly to archival records; for example, the Jewish Board of Guardians, MS173,
Hartley Library, the University of Southampton.

Table 6. Breakdown of Cases
Percentage

Number

40.24%

1,896

Immigration-related cases

40.91%

1,928

Nonimmigration-related cases

18.85%

888

Not clear if related to immigration
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shtetls, villages, or cities for other places within the vast Russian and Hapsburg
Empires. Another research finding is that toward the end of the nineteenth
century, many couples or families migrated, and the desertions took place after
immigration. The author is currently investigating this phenomenon.
Table 7 clearly shows that agunot were mostly an East European phenomenon: 4,024 out of 4,712 known cases (85.3 percent) were in Eastern
Table 7. Geographical Dispersion from 1857 to 1896
Number

Place

2,198

Russian Empire1

1,164

Habsburg Empire (including Galicia, but excluding Hungary)

367

Congress Poland

155

Romania

145

Hungary

135

Eretz Israel

134

United States

119

England

105

German states

44

Turkey

36

Morocco

35

Iraq

13

France

11

Syria

11

Caucasus

10

Egypt

6

Sweden

6

Persia

5

Algeria & Tunis

2

Australia

3

Denmark

1

Bulgaria

1

Canada

4,712

Total cases identified

1. On the geographical complexity of Eastern Europe, see Shaul Stampfer, “The Geographical Background
of East European Jewish Migration to the United States before World War I,” in Migration across Time and
Nations: Population Mobility in Historical Contexts (ed. I. A. Glazier and L. De Rosa; London and New York:
Holmes & Meier, 1985), 227–28, and “Patterns of Internal Jewish Migration in the Russian Empire,” in Jews
and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union (ed. Y. Ro’i; Ilford, Essex, and Portland: F. Cass, 1995), 37.
Internal migration was the cause of many agunot cases.
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Table 8. Destinations1 of Known Immigration-Related Cases of Agunot
Destination

1851–1866 1867–1876 1877–1886 1887–1896

Total

United States

57

101

195

401

763

England

17

55

61

124

257

German states

16

55

35

16

122

Russian Empire

02

37

25

27

109

Congress Poland

25

34

16

15

09

Habsburg Empire (including
Galicia excluding Hungary)

61

22

81

26

28

Romania

22

28

16

12

78

Hungary

21

14

11

13

59

France

8

9

25

5

47

Eretz Israel

32

19

31

21

67

Turkey

71

10

9

6

42

Australia and New Zealand

12

10

4

6

28

India

6

7

5

3

21

Egypt

3

4

1

12

20

Sweden

4

7

3

1

15

Argentina

0

1

1

13

15

Caucasus

0

6

4

5

15

Holland

2

1

4

2

9

South Africa

0

1

4

3

8

Syria

2

1

1

4

8

Brazil

0

0

1

6

7

Iraq

4

1

1

1

7

Italy

4

1

1

1

7

Canada

0

0

1

4

5

Morocco

0

1

1

2

4

Algeria

0

0

1

1

2

China

1

0

1

0

2

Mexico

1

1

0

0

2

Persia

0

0

2

0

2

Denmark

0

1

0

0

1

Portugal

1

0

0

0

1

228

473

459

719

1,896

Total

1. See Lloyd P. Gartner, “Jewish Migrants en Route from Europe to America: Traditions and Realities,” Jewish
History 1:2 (1986): 49–67.
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Europe. However, since the 1890s, the number of cases in immigration countries (especially the United States) rose.
Table 8 shows that 1,293 out of 1,896 cases (68.2 percent) of husbands
left for distant foreign countries (especially on the American continent), while
603 (31.9 percent) left for nearby countries (for example, from the Russian
Empire to Romania or the Hapsburg Empire).
CONCLUSION: AGUNOT, IMMIGRATION,
AND MODERNIZATION
Various conclusions can be drawn from this research:
1. The role of rabbis as the sole decision makers in the Jewish community, and in particular as far as women were concerned, was diminished by the Jewish media, which played a major role, as well as by
other factors. Women, and agunot in particular, took advantage of
this. Rabbis based their decisions on halachah [Jewish Law]. Rabbis
could be more lenient toward women’s needs on certain occasions.
However, since the status of women in halachah was inferior, rabbis
could not provide them with much help. As the phenomenon of
agunot became more extensive, the rabbis became more helpless in
supporting the women’s cause.
2. Deserted women could not rely on the rabbinical establishment
or other communal institutions. They came to realize that women
needed to help themselves. Publishing advertisements was only one of
the avenues open to women in dealing with their plight. The fact that
religious Jewish women were now turning to the newly formed public
arena was probably the most significant change. This also reflected
women’s deep understanding of the modern public sphere, especially
with regard to the role of the media in modern society. The wide
public airing given to the issue of agunot in the nineteenth century
was an important indicator of East European Jewry’s modernization.
		 This research does not manage to give a satisfactory answer as to
why desertion of wives became more widespread. Possibly, demographical parameters, such as the age difference between husbands
and wives, particularly at the time of marriage, should also be taken
into account in attempts to explain the issue.111 Another explanation
might be the effect of immigration, as discussed in the next point.
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3. Immigration was among the major reasons behind the phenomenon
of agunot in the nineteenth century. The sense of being in constant
motion created a cultural environment that encouraged many men
to desert their wives and families. But was the issue of agunot part of
the immigration process,112 or did immigration just exacerbate the
matter?113 Although in my view immigration certainly played a role,
it was not causal. Rather, it was an added complication, together
with other radical changes in Jewish family life and the role of
women in Jewish society in nineteenth century Eastern Europe.114
With massive immigration, the desertion of women became a much greater
predicament. In fact, immigration changed the nature of desertion. During
the period of large-scale immigration, there were many more cases of husbands
deserting their wives and families after arriving at their new destinations.
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II. THE PRESENT

Lost, Hidden, Discovered: Theologies of DNA
in North American Judaism and Messianic Judaism
Sarah Imhoff and Hillary Kaell
Family Tree DNA, a commercial personal genetic testing company, advertises
its services by appealing to a Jewish past: “Your ancestors left clues in your
DNA which you can use to determine your deep ancestral origins and to link
you with others in recent times. We can compare your results with our database—the largest of its kind in the world—and tell you whether those clues
indicate possible Jewish ancestry and whether you match others who are Jewish.”1 The company subtly markets itself to both Jews and non-Jews, suggesting that DNA testing can help a person understand something fundamental
about oneself and one’s relationship to others.
In her work on Native Americans and DNA, Kim Tallbear uses the
phrase “gene talk” to refer to “the idea that essential truths about identity
inhere in sequences of DNA.”2 She shows how people use the interpretations
of DNA sequences to make legal and political claims but also to understand
themselves more deeply. In all of these processes, Tallbear notes, gene talk
often takes interpretation for fact and can even mislead. In our respective
research on Jews and Messianic Jews we have found similar kinds of gene talk,
though the political stakes are quite different than for Native Americans. Like
Tallbear, we focus less on the science itself than on how people make social
meaning out of technological possibilities.
Gene talk permeates American culture at large. From the 1970s television miniseries Roots to Henry Louis Gates’s recent PBS show Finding Your
Roots, Americans have sought out and embraced their distinctive versions
of ethnic heritage. In Roots Too, Matthew Frye Jacobson shows how white
U.S.-born Americans embraced Irish, Italian, Polish, and other European
ethnic pasts. This “ethnic revival,” a legacy of the 1960s, birthed a new way
of talking about identity—a “new syntax of nationality and belonging,”3 as
Jacobson writes. This syntax of belonging is very much still with us, and now
gene talk participates in discourses of belonging right alongside talk of food,
grandparents, art, and music.
The scholarly literature that analyzes gene talk and white ethnic revival,
however, has a tendency to overlook religion or relegate it to being merely
another marker of cultural difference. It positions gene talk as a discourse
111
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about ethnicity and place in society without noticing that it can also be about
place in a theological or cosmic narrative. The phenomena we analyze here
participate in something that looks like “ethnic revival.” That is, we might
have said that gene talk and DNA testing form a new wave—or a new tool in
the toolkit—of contemporary ethnic revival. And while this is true, it is not
the whole story. In these Jewish and Messianic cases, gene talk and its power
construct much more than just an ethnos. They participate in constructing
religious identities, and they make theological claims. Even in the case of
secular Jews, as we will see, a secularized version of a theological narrative
underwrites gene talk and its significance.
Based on research conducted on North American Judaism and Messianic
Judaism, this essay explores how gene talk operates as parallel phenomenon for
these two groups. That is, gene talk shares certain traits, yet the reasons behind
it ultimately diverge. We begin by analyzing what we mean by “gene talk,”
where it happens, and what it sounds like in each of these communities. We
then consider the implications for ideas of family, specifically how this includes
notions of “lost” relatives and “hidden” roots as well as the interaction between
gene seekers and their family members. After noting how the two sets of vocabularies and reasons for appeal seem quite similar, we conclude by clarifying how
gene talk does quite different authorizing work for Jews and Messianics.
GENE TALK AND JEWISH COMMUNAL NARRATIVES
North American Jews talk a lot about DNA. “I haven’t done a DNA test
yet,” explained a Jewish man, but I want “to test to help solve the mystery of
my great-grandfather’s family.”4 “Jews whose great-grandparents were chased
from their Russian shtetls,” announced a magazine article, “leave molecular
scars adhering to our DNA.”5 And many Jews have their DNA tested even
when they assume that they already know the results. As one woman posted
in an online group, “I got my DNA results. . . . I’m 99% Ashkenazi. No
surprise there!”6 A confirmation of Jewish heritage like this can make people
feel connected to the past, imagine closeness with ancestors, and narrate
rich stories about personal histories. When it provides a sense of rootedness
and ethnic distinctiveness, this Jewish gene talk reflects the larger trends
of white ethnic revival. But gene talk in the Jewish community also reflects
a distinctively Jewish set of ideas and history.
DNA is on the radar of many Ashkenazi Jews because of their distinctive
role in the history of science. Historically, Ashkenazim have been a relatively
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endogamous population—that is, they largely married and had children with
one another. This relative endogamy meant that they became an early interest
of geneticists. And many geneticists were Ashkenazi themselves. The result was
that Ashkenazim were overrepresented in the people studying and the people
being studied. Moreover, the prevalence of Tay Sachs and other heritable diseases, such as Gauchers, in Ashkenazi populations led to Jewish public health
campaigns promoting DNA testing of partners before marriage or planning
children. Recent testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic mutations, also
somewhat more prevalent in people with Ashkenazi ancestry, have likewise
contributed to increased awareness of genetics for North American Jews.
Even so, the deepest appeal and meaning of gene talk in Jewish communities is not the scientific facts that it offers Jews. It’s not even disease
awareness. The deepest appeal of gene talk is the narrative it helps create:
DNA functions as a trope in a narrative about the coherence of Jewish identity
and peoplehood. Jews talk about “our ancestors,” “our people’s history,” and
“our own families’ forebears” as imprinted “in our DNA.”7 A recent headline
proclaimed “Genetic Study Proves Jews Are a People.”8 After his DNA test,
a Canadian-born Jew explained that “One of the reasons I made aliyah is
because I believe I am actually from this area [Israel/Palestine], and I do feel
like I’m returning home.”9 All this gene talk suggests fundamental and scientific interconnections among Jews across history and an ancestral homeland.
These ideas of historical and religious memory living in genetic material, as
we will see, are similar to the way that Messianics engage in gene talk. But
the underlying reasons for this gene talk, which depends on theological and
religious ideas, diverge for the two groups. We argue that for Jews, gene talk
can serve as a confirmation—or, for nonreligious Jews, as a secular substitution—for the theological idea of peoplehood. Whether or not it is scientifically
accurate—and in many cases it is not—gene talk provides support for the idea
that Jews are a fundamentally connected, cohesive, and distinctive people.
When North American Jews are interested in genetics and DNA, they
often go where most Americans get their information: the Internet. As with
any topic, the Internet offers scientific rigor and clear lay interpretations of
technical material, as well as poor, utterly wrong, or misguided information. It
is not our interest here to police erroneous information about Jews and genetics. Rather, we seek to clarify what information people are encountering and
how they interact with it.
Many Jews get information about Jews and genetics from websites with
specifically Jewish content or missions. Two large Jewish religious websites,
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Chabad.com and Aish.com, both affiliated with observant forms of Judaism,
are popular locations for curious Jews. Because these websites offer the most
comprehensive online resources for many religious topics, many Jews, even the
nonobservant, find themselves getting their information from these sites.
The response to an Aish.com article titled “The Cohanim—DNA Connection” included more than twenty accounts with personal interest stories or
stories about the links between DNA and Jewish identity. One man wrote that
“I never understood what it meant to be a cohain before this article.” Several
shared the results of their own tests, such as the man who had just been DNA
tested by Family Tree DNA and had the Cohen Modal Haplotype.
Another, likely a non-Orthodox Jew, wrote that “In my temple [a word
for synagogue used by Reform Jews but not others], before the evening
prayers, there are discussions about origins,” which he connected to DNA.
Another commenter, who may or may not be Jewish, framed her response in
religious terms: “I am so thrilled to see yet again of God’s handiwork that he
has kept the priesthood line of Aaron!” Non-Jews too get information from
these sites. The same Aish article, for instance, included a comment from a
Finnish person about “Jewish roots among Finnish people”; he wondered if
DNA testing could help uncover the true history.10
MyJewishLearning.com, a religiously unaffiliated website, also features
several articles about DNA.11 They contain more scientific information and
less traditional exegesis than those on Chabad.com and Aish.com, but they
still aim to make the genetics comprehensible to nonexperts. The comment
sections for many articles—“Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Mizrahim,” “Native
Americans and Jews,” and others—overflow with commenters announcing or
puzzling through their own DNA. Here too, commenters include non-Jews
(“I am non Jewish but very interested,”12 “I’m America Indian on my father’s
side, my daughter and I have a love for Israel and want to live there one
day. Deep down we feel we are Jewish”13) and Jews (“I am from the Tribe of
Levi. . . . We Jews go back a few thousand years”14). There are far fewer participants who frame their questions or comments in terms of Torah observance,
but the relationship of genetic information to biblical history is still a major
source of conversation on nonreligious sites. On all of these Jewish content
websites, then, gene talk abounds.
Jews also go to the websites of DNA testing companies themselves to
understand “Jewish genetics” and DNA. Many of these companies have specifically designed their websites, explanations, and even tests to appeal to Jews.
23andme, Family Tree DNA, DNA Consultants, and Roots for Real all have
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specific tests marketed toward Jews. Family Tree DNA has hosted webinars, or
online seminars, specifically for Jews doing genealogical research. As these forprofit companies suggest, there is a growing and profitable industry focused
on DNA, genetics, and Jewishness. And it is in these companies’ interest to
market DNA as though it tells essential stories about personal history and
identity. If they framed DNA as merely a sequence of chemical compounds,
then far fewer people would be interested in their own DNA results.
There are also a growing number of discussion groups for Jews interested in DNA, genealogical research, and family histories. The “Tracing the
Tribe—Jewish Genealogy on Facebook” group had nearly 7,000 members
as of December 2014. The discussion groups on the website JewishGen,
which explains that it is designed to “ensure Jewish continuity” by presenting resources for genealogy, support thousands of posters. JewishGen, one
of the largest Jewish genealogy websites, is affiliated with both the Museum of
Jewish Heritage and Ancestry.com, and its “Family Tree of the Jewish People”
currently includes information on over five million individuals submitted by
more than forty-five hundred Jewish genealogists.15
As the commenter who said that the members of his temple talked about
“origins” and DNA before evening prayers suggests, gene talk takes place
offline too. While many of these conversations happen spontaneously, some
occur in settings more formal than synagogues. Since its 1981 inception, the
International Conference on Jewish Genealogy has grown significantly, and
it includes popular sessions focused on DNA. At the 2013 conference, for
instance, Family Tree DNA sponsored sessions, led by its founder Bennett
Greenspan, called “Understanding, Interpretation, and Use of DNA Results”
and “Haplogroups: What They Are and What They Mean for Jews.” Seven
other sessions also focused on DNA.
Jews from all religious affiliations as well as nonaffiliated Jews participate
in gene talk. Orthodox Jews tend to be particularly aware of DNA because of
public health campaigns promoting the awareness of and testing for genetic
diseases. A genetic testing company called Dor Yeshorim (Hebrew for “the
generation of the upright”), for instance, has become very popular among
young adult Jews considering marriage. The company screens each partner
and then tells them whether they are compatible or not; that is, whether both
partners are carriers of the same recessive gene that could lead to children with
these diseases.
But observant Jews also use gene talk in realms well beyond that of the
medical concerns for potential children. Chabad connects DNA evidence
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to religious practice, using the former as an argument for pursuing the latter. “Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Yemenite and Italian kohanim can actually trace
their backgrounds back to the Jews of the Exodus. And if modern science
has given us the tools to prove common ancestry, isn’t the next obvious step
to dedicate ourselves to our common purpose—G-d’s Torah and mitzvot?”16
They even use it as evidence for the historical moral uprightness of Jews:
“But almost 100% of all men with family tradition of priesthood do descend
from kohanim. Generation after generation of Jewish women were faithful to
their husbands and their tradition. What a proud record of fidelity. . . . This
devotion to our spouses and our G-d has always been the way of the Jew.”17
For religiously observant Jews, then, gene talk can be about continuity, as Dor
Yeshorim and its mission demonstrate. It can also be about affirming religious
practices and theological concepts, as Chabad shows.
Nonreligious Jews also participate in gene talk. Unlike the Chabad
article, they do not frame genetic connections as a reason to do mitzvot, but
these connections are nevertheless meaningful for them. One commenter on
MyJewishLearning.com identified as secular and celebrated how “DNA testing has been able to show how many genes we have are Jewish,” which he
equated with “direct blood,” though he was careful to say that he welcomed
converts too.18 Others ask explicitly how to understand their identity, given
their genetic and historical knowledge. A commenter to the historical article
“Who Are the Semites?” reprinted on MyJewishLearning.com wrote that “My
Jewish ancestors are from Lithuania, Russia and Poland. My sister sent in my
Dad’s DNA. Came back showing Sephardic connections. . . . [H]ow do I find
out my race?”19 Nonreligious Jews, then, also assume that DNA can tell them
something essential and meaningful about themselves. They imagine that
DNA holds clues to their identity and social place.
GENE TALK IN MESSIANIC JUDAISM
Messianic Judaism is a movement of congregations that incorporate aspects
of Jewish ritual into evangelical or charismatic Christian worship. Its current
form dates to the late 1960s, when young Jewish converts to Christianity,
often associated with California’s Jesus movement, joined the “Hebrew Christian” descendants of earlier converts to form congregations and then denominational associations that retained aspects of their Jewish heritage.20 Today,
estimates of the number of Messianic Jews vary widely—anywhere from
30,000 to 2.5 million—but it is clear that the movement is growing rapidly.21
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Messianic Jewish leaders view the movement as by and for people
like them, “ethnic” Jews who believe in Jesus. Jewish men are favored for
congregational and denominational leadership; “ethnic” Jews comprise the
movement’s public face as authors, musicians, Davidic dance teachers, and televangelist talk show guests or hosts. Yet upwards of 70 percent of congregants
are in fact “gentile believers” (GBs), as they are known in the movement, a fact
almost completely ignored by scholars.22 With growing numbers of GBs, congregations are also becoming increasingly diverse and include Americans of African, European, and Hispano origin as well as immigrants from across the globe.
Most congregants, gentile or Jewish, arrive from Pentecostal or charismatic churches that follow some form of premillennialist theology.23 They
believe that contemporary Jews are the genetic descendants of biblical Israelites
and are thus crucial because, first, they are of the same lineage as Jesus, and
thus their rituals and prayers most closely approximate what Jesus knew during
his incarnation on Earth. And second, Jews are understood to have a key role
to in the End Times that will presage the Messiah’s return. To be a Jew is
thus to be situated at the very center of biblical and apocalyptic narratives.
Gene talk, though largely stifled by the ethnic Jewish leadership, remains
so prevalent that GBs often encounter it shortly after their arrival. Unlike
North American Jews, however, few GBs actually test their DNA. Gene talk
is thus a space of imagined possibilities, filled with discursive weaving and
dodging: “I don’t know that I have any Jewish heritage. But maybe there is. . . .
I don’t say that I’m not but I don’t say that I am.”24 This kind of talk hints at a
complicated question: is Judaism inherited or not? Most GBs associate certain
essentialized traits with Jewishness, ranging from the physiognomic (big noses)
to the societal (community oriented, book smart).25 Yet they are circumspect
about labeling Jews a race, which they define as “scientifically” inalienable—
that is, rooted in one’s DNA. The supposed fixity of racial categorizations
belies how GBs understand their own spiritual biographies, where they discovered a “heart” for Jewishness—their own and Jesus’s—as they grew with
God following the radical self-transformation that is central in evangelicalism
(being “born again”). Yet fundamentally, GBs still believe that you cannot
convert to being a Jew as you can to a religion, such as Christianity.26
This paradox between (racial) fixity and (spiritual) discovery is a central
feature of the gentile experience in Messianic Judaism, reinforced by the movement’s leaders, who strongly discourage gentile conversions and have generally
denied the validity even of those considered halachic by Orthodox Jews.27 As
a result, most GBs attempt to distinguish bloodlines from beliefs by drawing
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a tripartite schema. Although the terminology varies, effectively it runs as
follows: the “Hebrews” (or Israelites) are a race physically descended from
Abraham and the twelve tribes, a bloodline flowing through all contemporary
Jews. Being “Jewish,” on the other hand, is to be part of a religion that has
failed to understand the Word of God. And last, “Israel” is the people of God,
which includes all believers in Jesus grafted together into a single lineage or,
in Messianic terms, one “new man” (Eph 2:15). GBs follow Messianic leaders in
rejecting the idea that anyone can or should convert to Judaism the religion,
since it would require renouncing Jesus as the Messiah, which they rightly
understand to be alien to it. Yet many of them also want to be more than
spiritually “grafted”—they want to be part of the bloodline.
One way to claim this lineage is to draw on a tradition of biblical exegesis that traces the roots of contemporary people-groups to an ancestor in the
book of Genesis. Scholars of U.S. religion have examined how, for example,
Native Americans were viewed as descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes and
African Americans were viewed as descendants of Noah’s son Ham.28 Though
GBs reiterate a number of these theories, most commonly they trace their
roots back to Abraham, thereby broadening the Jewish “line” to encompass
nearly everyone. “God said to Abraham that he’d have many descendants,”
notes Donald, a fifty-year-old white man who attends Melech Israel, a congregation in the southern United States. “I was not brought up Jewish. I don’t
know that I have any Jewish heritage at all. But I may have Jewish ancestry but
that far back, I won’t know it. And so I don’t say that I’m not but I don’t say
that I am.”29
To speak in such generalities rarely generates controversy in Messianic
congregations. The second way to trace lineage is more specific and thus is
potentially open to refutation: clues within one’s own makeup or actions
become visible proof of a particular DNA. In Messianic gene talk, someone
else, generally a stranger or distant relative, is the first to call attention to the
fact that a GB may have Jewish roots. GBs describe being told that they “look”
Jewish or that their aptitude for learning Hebrew must be genetic. Then GBs
begin to piece together other clues, such as an elderly relative who mysteriously whispered certain prayers under her breath or had an inexplicable familiarity with Jewish rituals or ideas.30 For example, Sharyla, a forty-nine-year-old
African American in the same congregation as Donald, notes that her mother’s
father, a Baptist pastor, had Hebrew books. She says, “I know a lot of Baptist
preachers who don’t study Hebrew. So I don’t know. Because they were old
books so I don’t know how long [our family] had them.”31 Gene talk always
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hints—never declaims—a key distinction between Jewish and Messianic Jewish contexts.
The most important clue, however, comes from within the believer
herself: a deep calling to the Jewish people. Donald concludes his discussion
about descent from Abraham by emphasizing that while anyone may have
this lineage, he and other GBs almost certainly do: why else would God
have called them to Messianic Judaism? Here, notions of scientific objectivity
dovetail with the pietistic heritage of evangelical Christianity, wherein believers
are expected to create and sustain intimate, emotionally immersive relationships with Jesus, God, and—in the case of premillennialists—God’s people,
the Jews. The intensity of these connections leads GBs to deduce that perhaps
they have a calling in their blood. Karyn, an African American woman in
her late fifties, is typical: “I’ve always questioned [if I might be Jewish],” she
says, “because of the love and the commitment being so deep, and even my
family, when I was going [to Messianic services], they used to tell me I was
strange. So I know that I’m not ‘the typical person’ culturally speaking.” Later,
she notes that Jewish-style worship “felt like coming home. This is the other
half that has been missing. I’m just coming in touch with my Jewish roots.”32
While “roots” could be taken metaphorically, Karyn, like many GBs, implies
an intuition perhaps borne of “genetic memory,” the DNA of their ancestors
within them.33
HIDDEN LINEAGES AND LOST RELATIVES
Both Jews and Messianic Jews use the language of discovery in gene talk.
But the two groups differ when it comes to what is unknown and might be
uncovered. When Family Tree DNA and other DNA testing companies talk
about “lost” relatives, they are not lost in the sense that they have disappeared
from the Jewish people. “If you are looking for that long-lost relative or
ancestor,” the Family Tree DNA website explains, “or if you feel that some day,
someone may use a DNA repository to look for long-lost relatives, you should
consider doing this simple DNA test. Your ancestors left clues in your DNA
which you can use to determine your deep ancestral origins and to link you with
others in recent time.”34 In some sense, these lost relatives are not properly lost
at all; rather, it is the familial connections that have been lost. Persecution and
forced migration obscure or sever connections in this language of lostness.
But they do not obscure a person’s own Jewishness from herself. She
knows she is Jewish, and so do her relatives, even when she does not know
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all the connections in her lineage. “Finding” these lost relatives and ancestors appeals because it creates connections, which add to the branches and
roots of the family tree. It adds to the tester’s knowledge of her identity
and to her story. It may create a greater sense of connection to other Jews and
to the Jewish people. But except for people outside the Jewish community
who use DNA to discover their own Jewish ancestry, it does not transform the
tester’s self-understanding.
Rather than “lost,” Messianics often talk about what is “hidden.”
This idea fundamentally redounds to the self: the true nature of one’s blood is
unknown even to oneself often because an ancestor hid the truth, which was
then forgotten over time.35 This idea derives in part from the mainstream Jewish community, where there has been a surge of popular and more scholarly
media about “hidden” or “secret” Jews, most often the “anusim” descendants
of Spanish or Portuguese Jews.36 Typical is Jewish writer Gloria Golden’s
Remnants of Crypto-Jews among Hispanic Americans, marketed with the tagline
“Hidden deep in the heart of the American Southwest among the larger Hispanic population are descendants of the Sephardim, Jews from Spain and Portugal.”37 These books began to appear frequently in the 1990s and early 2000s,
just as more gentiles were joining the Messianic movement. While these two
events are not causal, their confluence has popularized an authoritative narrative upon which GBs now draw.
Talk of anusim circulates widely among Messianics online and also provides one of the few contexts when “gene talk” is promoted by congregational
leadership. Lana, a forty-year-old woman of mixed-race ancestry, describes
how “A lot of times people hid their Jewish identity. And as time went by, as
generations went on, they didn’t tell anyone. . . . We’ve had guest speakers here
[at Melech Israel] that have said that they discovered Jewish sects in Africa and
in Asia—and all over the world—India. I mean, these people were hidden off
but they came from Spain after the Inquisition.”38
Stories of “hiddenness,” as opposed to “lostness,” mean that some GBs
can make stronger claims to Jewish lineage than others. Lana self-identifies as
a person of black, white, and Asian blood, but in her southern milieu she is
commonly seen as African American. In Messianic terms, African Americans
have the most difficulty making claims to Jewish descent that are accepted by
other congregants, although they are sometimes successful if they follow recognized typologies of the “hidden” Jew, such as when Lana hints that she may
share blood with these newly discovered sects. African immigrants are usually
more successful, assuming that they claim descent from well-known groups
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such as the Beta Israel or Lemba. GBs of East European descent also make
strong claims based on the perception that with so many Jews in these regions,
there was certainly intermarriage and hidden identities.39
The most accepted of these “racial shifters” are Hispanics and others with
a plausible anusim identity.40 Congregations in the southwestern United States
include a growing number of people in this category. Rabbi Silvio estimates
that when he arrived at Beth Yeshua, in a mid-sized southwestern city, only 10
percent of the congregants were Jews. About five years later, that number has
risen to 25 percent mainly due to the inclusion of newly discovered anusim—
including Silvio himself. He discovered his roots during his pastoral training
at a Pentecostal seminary. Embracing this definition of himself, he married the
daughter of a well-known gentile leader in Jewish evangelism and began a Messianic ministry.41 People such as Silvio are accepted into congregational leadership as Jews and are even celebrated by the largely Ashkenazi opinion makers
at the denominational level. In short, it is vitally important to leaders (and
most congregants) that Messianics, but especially public figures, claim Jewish
blood in ways that converge with acceptable discourses in mainstream Judaism, such as the anusim.42 Thus, Messianics reiterate their self-understanding
as Jews and retain a claim to legitimacy in the eyes of American Jews and the
evangelical Christians who support them as Jewish-run ministries.
The gene talk one hears in congregations is the result of a rather solitary
process of searching, most of which takes place online. Like Christian prophecy seekers, GBs carefully compile disparate pieces of information (indeed,
many GBs are already familiar with such methods of piecing together dates
and places regarding the apocalypse).43 The most popular lineage search is
built around a kind of “Hebraized name lore”: onomastics or, more precisely,
anthroponomastics, the study of personal names.44 GBs scan lists of Jewishassociated names, picking out those in their own family trees and looking for
phonological concurrences.
Take, for example, Nora, a fifty-six-year-old white woman raised in a
Methodist church. Like many GBs, she recalls always feeling “called” to Judaism. “Every Jewish person has like a spark in them,” she says, “And even if
somebody is descended from Jews and they don’t know it, they can still have
the spark.”45 She encountered gene talk at a now-defunct Messianic congregation in a large northeastern city. Shortly after, she recounts, “because I had an
ancestor whose middle name was Sevilla, the light bulb went off. That’s Seville!
That’s a city where a lot of Jewish people lived.” She began to hunt online for
clues about this mid-eighteenth century ancestor, Enis Sevilla Sloy:
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And I found that the name Sloy is sometimes a Jewish name. . . .
One of the Arabic ways of saying Solomon is Sloymon. That’s one
theory. Or Sloyal. It was a Belarusian word that means jar. And
Jewish merchants used jars like that. That’s another possibility. This
name is [also] in one of these books with Jewish surnames. And in
Krakow, Poland, there’s a name Slojman. And Krakow is a city where
Sephardic Jews settled after the expulsion.46

Nora notes that Sloy might also be Gaelic, however. As is typical, she evaluates
etymological clues according to how they match her “genetic memory”—that
“spark” she feels. Thus, she gathers multiple potential correlates that all seem
to point in one direction: the presence of Sephardi blood.
Although the process by which GBs decide what evidence to accept is
largely idiosyncratic, there are nevertheless limits as to what can be hidden
and discovered. Judy, a seventy-year-old woman from Texas who attends a
Messianic congregation in the Southwest, described it as “a quandary.” She
would dearly like to be Jewish, as one of her uncles claims. However, his evidence, culled from a website ancestry search, traces the family’s lineage back to
King Hezekiah in the eighth century BCE, one of the most prominent kings
of Judah who is also mentioned in Jesus’s genealogical line recounted in the
Gospel of Matthew. Given that the first Temple was destroyed, she reasons, it
is unlikely that he uncovered substantive genealogical records. Without ruling
it out, Judy hesitates to make such an ancient and extravagant claim.
For American Jews, gene talk and family tree building is meant to bring
families together—sometimes only conceptually, sometimes virtually, and
occasionally even physically. The motto of the International Jewish Genealogical Society is “Without the past, there is no future. Reach out.”47 When
Jews send in their DNA to Family Tree DNA for genetic testing, for example,
one of the most popular options they choose is called “Family Finder.” This
option lets the user “Discover unknown family connections” and “Connect
with living relatives.” 23andme advertises “Contact your DNA relatives across
continents or across the street” and has a popular “Relative Finder” option.48
And when they get these matches, many Jews try reaching out to their “DNA
matches.”
Genealogist Elise Friedman’s webinar, hosted by Family Tree DNA, gives
advice for contacting potential “matches” via e-mail.49 Sometimes the connections happen on social media. In the “Tracing the Tribe” Facebook group,
members often “meet” distant cousins they have seen on their “Family Finder”
result in the comments. In one comment thread, a man wrote “Hi, Sam, just
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checked my Family Finder on ftdna.com and it appears that we are possible
4th cousins.” Sam replied. In the same thread, a woman wrote to contact
another commenter after seeing her name in the thread: “Hi Sarah! Any idea
how we are related? You’re a pretty close match to me on GEDMATCH (100
cM, 5 gens).”50 Some Jews—though not all—use their DNA results to contact potential family members. And the vast majority of Jews who see “Relative Finder” and “Family Finder” results get evidence for genetic connection
beyond the family members they know. Author A. J. Jacobs decided to hold the
“biggest family reunion ever” when a fan from Israel wrote him to say that
the two were related. Using genetics and genealogy paired with family tree
websites, Jacobs identified seventy-seven million relatives and extended an
open invitation to the June 2015 family reunion.51
GBs’ gene talk, on the other hand, may create or aggravate tensions with
their family members and rarely, if ever, leads to new connections. Nearly
all GBs come to the movement as single adults or couples without children
(including grown children).52 Most see themselves as spiritual mavericks who
follow God’s calling and describe feeling different from their families, as Karyn
does above. In part, this perspective reflects the evangelical Protestant emphasis on each adult’s responsibility for his or her own faith. It also adheres to
a biblical typology: when potential followers of Jesus asked for leave to bury a
father or say goodbye to kin, they were rebuked. No one who looks back, Jesus
told them, is fit for the Kingdom of God (Luke 9:59–62).
GBs are aware that family members, especially their grown children, may
feel ambivalent about their new Messianic Judaism. By practicing Jewish-like
rituals, GBs reorient their social calendars away from Sunday church and family meals. They generally refuse to celebrate Christmas. They give up beloved
family dishes, such as Easter ham. More existentially perhaps, GBs also often
have difficulty reconciling themselves to their parents, who brought them up
in Christian churches. Some dismiss their parents’ faith altogether. Others
imply that their parents knew about their Jewish roots. Inspired by the anusim
speakers at Melech Israel, Lana decided to trace her genealogy until her mother
made her promise not to. Like most GBs, Lana construed this rather inexplicable request as hinting at a secret lineage her parents are trying to protect.
Last, some GBs gloss over difference altogether. Eva, a co-congregant of Lana’s,
denies any true theological disjuncture with her Baptist family: “But our parents, I believe they wanted the same thing [as us]. Even though—bless them
and their hearts—they knew Jesus was a Jew but they [failed to recognize it].
Their heart was still ‘People are people. We love the Lord.’”53
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RECOGNIZING GENE TALK’S RELIGIOUS ROOTS
Previous studies of Messianic Judaism have posited that gene talk arises from
two sources: GBs seek to become Jews in order to advance within the movement’s leadership, and they are caught up in the broader “white ethnic revival”
that speaks to a sense of postmodern rootlessness. Jewishness gives them an
identity.54 Yet these conclusions fail to explain why GBs spend so much time
“gene talking” without ever insisting on being accepted as Jews and thus never
benefiting directly in institutional terms. Further, it leaves unclear why GBs
from all races, not just “white ethnics,” speculate about their lineage.
Similarly, scholarship on Jews has suggested that gene talk is about either
disease, especially Tay Sachs, BRCA1, and BRCA2, or ethnic identity. But
companies such as 23andme and Family Tree DNA are legally limited in their
ability to make medical claims or offer medical interpretations of DNA results.
They comply with these legal mandates and sometimes even announce them
on their websites, so the Jews who test through them are not primarily seeking
medical advice. Furthermore, many Jews who test are already secure in their
personal Jewish history. Finding an ethnic identity to claim was not at stake for
the woman who wrote that “I got my DNA results. . . . I’m 99% Ashkenazi.
No surprise there!”55 Something else motivates these Jewish DNA testers to
engage in gene talk.
To understand its appeal to both Jews and GBs, we need to take the
religious dimension of this activity seriously. Gene talk appeals to North
American Jews for several related reasons. In addition to providing roots, history, and distinctiveness for a group of mostly white Americans, as Jacobson
and other expositors of white ethnic revival would have it, Jewish gene talk also
does crucial religious and communal authorizing work. These three reasons
for the appeal of Jewish gene talk—providing scientific support for tradition,
seeming certainty in questions of who is a Jew, and redemption of Jewish history—all point to the idea of Jewish peoplehood. This idea of peoplehood, or
even chosenness, has foundations that are religious, theological, and biblical.
And for religious Jews, it remains important in these contexts. But gene talk
can also offer a secularized version of peoplehood that emphasizes connection,
family, history, and distinctiveness while avoiding charges of chauvinism that
can plague the concept of chosenness.
This gene talk emphasizes that like the “begat” verses in Genesis 10, lineage
matters. Who your ancestors are matters a little. But what matters a lot are the
fact that you have ancestors, that family trees connect Jews together, the idea that
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Jews share DNA, and the idea that Jewishness is somehow biological. Gene talk
at once assumes and reinforces the idea that Jews are a people and that peoplehood is fundamental to Jewishness. Whether this functions as a justification for
religious tradition and practice or functions as a secularized version of a theological connection, gene talk cements the idea of Jewish community.
First, gene talk and interpretations of DNA can provide “scientific
proof ” of religious traditions. The most popular instance of this occurs around
what people call the Cohen gene, a sequence of alleles on the Y chromosome
of some men who identify themselves as cohanim. In its explanation of the
Cohen gene, the official Chabad website asks “Are these tribal affiliations
[Cohanim] just a matter of folklore and tradition? Can such claims actually
be proven?” and then answers that “Today they can, and the key is DNA testing.”56 According to Chabad’s interpretation of this DNA evidence, men can
scientifically “prove” their status as Cohanim. In this article, Chabad values
DNA tests above “just” tradition. This is quite remarkable because of Chabad’s
intense commitment to Jewish tradition.
Aish.com offers a similar question-and-answer structure for discussing
genetic findings. The article begins by introducing Karl Skorecki, the Canadian Jewish geneticist who participated in the earliest research of the Cohen
Modal Haplotype. “Dr. Skorecki considered, ‘According to tradition, this
Sephardi Cohen and I have a common ancestor. Could this line have been
maintained since Sinai, and throughout the long exile of the Jewish people?’
As a scientist, he wondered, could such a claim be tested?” Later the Aish.com
article proclaims that “The research findings support the Torah statements
that the line of Aaron will last throughout history.”57
But it is not only the Jewishly devout who tell this story of the scientific
proof of an ancient priestly line. One DNA testing company markets the possibility of identifying a person’s “ancient tribe.”58 Immediately after hearing
explicitly that presence of the “Cohen gene” in men is halachically irrelevant
and utterly inconclusive—about half of men who self-identify as cohanim
have it, and some men who do not also have it—one man said, “But I want
to have a DNA test anyway. Just to be sure.” In a 2010 lecture, secular journalist Jon Entine calls the Cohen gene “a remarkable story of genetic witness
to the traditions of Judaism and the Israelites. Absolutely amazing.”59 Entine
uses the religiously coded language of “witness,” more commonly a Christian
idiom (from Isa 43:12), for the way that genetics vindicates theological and
textual Jewish traditions. Gene talk here supports textual and ritual religious
traditions.
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Second, in addition to playing a strong supporting role in religious narratives about priestly tribes, gene talk seems to provide scientific data about
who is and who isn’t a Jew. Scientists all agree that there is no genetic sequence
common to all Jews and absent from all non-Jews. And yet, Jews still talk of
“Jewish genes.” Jewishness is “embedded in my genes, my DNA,” explained a
man who identifies as Jewish after receiving the results of his DNA test.60 An
Aish article titled “Jewish Genes” says that “There is now new and exciting
DNA evidence for common Jewish origin—not just among Cohanim, the
Priestly Class, but among Jews scattered all over the globe.”61 In the summer of
2013 the Israeli Ministry of the Interior even requested a DNA test of a potential birthright traveler in order to prove she was Jewish.62 Positioning DNA as
an arbiter of Jewishness appeals to Jews because Jewish identity is, we might
say, really messy. The Reform movement’s acceptance of patrilineal descent,
halachic standards that differ even from one another, Israeli criteria about
who qualifies for aliyah, differing conversion processes, and intermarriages
all contribute to an increasingly confusing landscape of Jewish identification.
Science, in contrast, seems to provide clear criteria. This kind of gene talk purports to provide a factual answer to the complicated question of who is a Jew.
Third, gene talk appeals to a sense of connection and continuity in
the face of recent Jewish history. Some of these projects explicitly refer to the
Holocaust. JewishGen officially calls itself “A Living Memorial to the Holocaust” and offers both a Yizkor Book of “lists of Holocaust martyrs”63 and a
Holocaust Registry. The registry relies on information supplied by professional
and amateur genealogists, including that which they have discovered through
genetic testing. “As more people add records and search the database,” the website explains, “it is our hope that this registry will help bring about reunions
with loved ones.”64 The DNA Shoah Project, whose mission is “building a
database of genetic material from Holocaust survivors and their immediate
descendants in hopes of reuniting families disrupted by the Shoah . . . and,
eventually, assist in the forensic identification of Holocaust-era remains.”65
JewishGen and the DNA Shoah Project assert that genetics can help people
rediscover ancestors, and they also suggest that DNA might help bring justice
to Jewish history.
Beyond these explicit links to the Holocaust, popular gene talk and DNA
testing marketing also allude to the ways genetics can heal past injustices of
Jewish history. Family Tree DNA, one of the largest personal DNA testing
company, has a Jewish founder and markets itself specifically to Jews. A marketing video proclaims that “Many Jewish families have been separated due to
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forced migration and persecution over the last several centuries. Now thanks
to Family Tree DNA, you may rediscover lost roots and cousins.”66 Drawing
on inquisition and Holocaust narratives of lost Jewish relatives, this suggests a
redemptive capacity of family history. Gene talk can recover and redeem Jewish connections after historical persecution worked to destroy them.
While much of the gene talk in Jewish communities may sound similar
to the gene talk in Messianic Jewish communities, it is incorrect to assume
that their reasons for doing so are identical. In order to understand GB gene
talk, one must first take theological changes into account. Since the nineteenth
century, Western Christians have begun to view Jesus’s earthly life as a major
tool for creating an intimate relationship with him. Jesus as Jew mattered.
Among evangelicals, this notion dovetailed with an equally important shift:
the premillennialist view of contemporary Jews as the “genetic” descendants
of Israel and thus as “genetically” linked to Jesus as well.
Gene talk also corresponds to how evangelicals read the bible “literally,”
meaning that for them it is an accurate rendering of historical events and of
typologies with present-day application. The Hebrew Bible, in particular, continually authenticates through lineage. In the book of Numbers, for example,
the Lord commands the Israelites to take a census, tracing each person back
to their “original” tribe. Read in light of the Gospels, this becomes even more
significant: Jesus’s own lineage is traced back to David in order to authenticate
his Messiahship. This kind of interpretive logic parallels gene talk, where the
full implication of GBs’ interior “selves”—the deep love they feel for the Jews
and their sense of belonging to the Jewish people—may be explained fully by
tracing descent.
Yet we still fall short of explaining why gene talk rather than genetic testing is appealing. The answer, we believe, relates to how gene talk is a practice,
in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms. It takes place over years, cementing congregational
members in a shared discursive tradition that reflects and contributes to the
hermeneutics that matter to them. Engaging in gene talk strengthens their
conviction not that they are Jewish (necessarily) but that lineage matters: it
matters that Jesus was a “genetic” Jew, that North American Jews are “genetic”
descendants of Israelites, that one’s spiritual growth may reflect what lies
hidden within one’s DNA. Further, gene talk that follows recognized patterns among mainstream Jews—related to the anusim, for example—is more
accepted and valued. Thus, ironically, by engaging in gene talk without doing
DNA testing, Messianics find a way to participate in the Jewish community
by contributing to its authenticating discourse.67
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In fact, actually undertaking genetic testing entails significant risk. We
don’t mean that it may reveal that GBs are not “actually” Jewish (for there are
many ways to construe genetic data). Rather, the risk is an ontological one.
Judaism-as-religion, according to Messianics, is incorrect in two fundamental
ways: because it denies the Messiah, it also ignores the radical nature of Jesus’s
claim that, first, there is no longer a difference between “Jew and Greek” and,
relatedly, Greeks (i.e., gentiles) are now grafted into the Jewish people. To dig
too hard for Jewish roots—to move talk into action—risks negating the central Gospel promise of new life and togetherness in Jesus. In short, evangelical
theology propels GBs toward claiming a Jewish identity and also problematizes
it. To focus on race as an inalienable attribute has the potential to directly
undermine the theology that undergirds Messianic Judaism and evangelical
Christianity as a whole.
Clearly, DNA means something much more than just the science behind it.
Gene talk holds great appeal for both Jews and Messianic Jews because it has the
ability to extend narratives of self and authorize certain ways of belonging. In
these contexts, gene talk is not simply another kind of discourse about ethnicity and place in society. It is also about place in a cosmological sense, operating
alongside and within religious practices and ontologies. Jews and Messianic
Jews share a fascination with DNA testing and yet differ in how and why
they engage in gene talk, differences rooted in their divergent theologies.
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Contemporary Modern Orthodox
Guidance Books on Marital Sexuality
Evyatar Marienberg
Young women and men who are about to be married in haredi [Ultra-Orthodox]
communities are encouraged to have a few meetings with a person of the same
sex, designated as a groom/bride teacher, whose role is to instruct them about
married life, the laws of menstrual impurity, and the marital act itself. This is also
the case in some parts of the Modern Orthodox/National Religious world. Some
young couples, especially those who are on the right side of this world, really
need such instruction, as indicated by this rather honest, but not unique, statement: “I am a rabbi-teacher in a Yeshiva and alumnus of a serious Yeshiva myself.
My wife is a teacher, and alumna of a prestigious yeshiva for women. I describe
our background in order to explain why we have no knowledge in this domain.”1
In addition to this oral and hopefully individualized guidance, a wide
range of specialized books and booklets are available for newlyweds (or
engaged) couples from these groups. In recent years, manuals were also written for parents to help them explain sexuality to their young children. Schools
are also slowly starting to realize that they need to deal with these issues, and
a growing number of curricula target this market. More advanced works,
aiming to help already-married Orthodox adults solve problems in their own
sexual life, are also available now. These various works present a broad view of
the ways marital sex is explained and prescribed in the contemporary Jewish
Orthodox world. My plan in this essay is to examine several Modern Orthodox works of these various kinds, published in Israel and in the United States
in the last few decades. I will not discuss publications that aim explicitly, by
their nature, style, or content, at haredi Jews and that are less likely to be of
interest for Modern Orthodox couples.
MODERN ORTHODOXY
The term “Modern Orthodoxy” is a very problematic one especially in recent
decades, when this supposedly clearly defined branch of Orthodox Judaism
grew significantly in numbers and, not incidentally, also in diversity.
Orthodox Judaism itself is hard to define. One can probably say that
generally, officially, Orthodox Jews are those Jews who believe that the Torah
135
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is divine, that it was handed from God to Moses as is, that the Talmud and
later authoritative sources are the only legitimate interpretation of the laws in
it, that modern notions should have a minimal impact on these laws, and that
one must make a great effort to follow these laws as explained by the rabbis.
These laws should shape one’s daily life.2
Some people might object to the definitions suggested above, saying
that some Orthodox Jews do not think of the Torah as literally divine or that
some Orthodox Jews believe that modern concepts can and should impact
Jewish practices. Others might say that some Conservative Jews hold that the
rabbinic laws should shape their own daily life as well. All of this is true, but
such people are on the fringes of their own respective groups (even if often
they think, or pretend, they are not). In most cases, I believe that the definitions above cover the vast majority of Orthodox Jews and eliminate the vast
majority of non-Orthodox Jews.
It has become commonplace for at least the past several decades to divide
the Orthodox world into haredi, previously referred to as Ultra Orthodoxy,
and Modern Orthodoxy. It is obvious, though, that just as the very definition
of Orthodoxy is problematic, any definition of its subgroups is also complicated. In both cases, it is probably better to speak of a certain spectrum,
situating Modern Orthodox Jews between haredi Jews and Conservative (or
in Israel, traditionalist or secular) Jews. Modern Orthodox Jews will be those
Orthodox Jews who believe in the importance of Jewish practices in daily life
but also give positive value to secular culture.
A major question today is if those on the right side of so-called Modern
Orthodoxy, known as National haredi, Hardal, Radical Religious Zionism, or
Toraniyim [Torah Oriented], should be considered Modern Orthodox at all,
considered as a type of haredi Judaism, or dealt with as a category of itself.
There is no consensus on the answer.
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SEXUALITY
There are many ways to transmit knowledge about sexuality. It can be done
visually, orally, or in written form. It can be done formally, in class, or informally, from peers, partners, family members, and newspapers as well as on the
Internet and in numerous other ways. In this essay I will focus only on formal,
written, published material in book form of two types, written by and aimed
at people located within the wide spectrum of Modern Orthodoxy: books
written for parents, trying to help them find the right way to transmit such
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information to their children, and books written for people who are about to
get married. I will not deal with haredi books, and I will not deal with oral
guidance.
BOOKS FOR PARENTS
In 2009, a little booklet of 68 pages titled Talking to Your Children about
Intimacy: A Guide for Orthodox Jewish Parents was published by Sara Diament. Diament is a Modern Orthodox woman herself. According to her
self-description, she lives in New Jersey and holds master’s degrees in Jewish
studies and health and behavior studies. The book is very clearly written “from
within,” using the language, codes, and assumptions of American Modern
Orthodox Jews. The book discusses the importance of parents talking with
their children about sexuality while of course adapting it to the child’s age,
maturity, and interest in the matter. The text is peppered with Hebrew and
Yiddish words that are commonly used in American Modern Orthodox circles
and provides some examples of how adults in this community might explain
these issues to children. The following is an example of instructions and ideas
given by Diament:
While you should never say anything that is not truthful, you need
not give complete information at all times. When my children were
very young, and they asked my husband and me how parents have
a baby, our first line of response was always, “The first thing you
do is daven [pray] to Hashem [God] to help you have a baby.” This
response was both truthful and imparted our hashkafah [religious
point of view] and was usually quite satisfactory, at least initially. I
remember that when my son was about nine, he asked me, “If nonJewish people don’t daven to Hashem how can they have a baby?”
I answered him truthfully (but not completely) that a man and a
woman could have a baby without davening to Hashem, but that
was something that Jewish people did. My son didn’t probe any further. But if he had, I would have explained that beyond davening to
Hashem, there was something that Immas and Abbas [mothers and
fathers] do together to help make the baby, and answered any further
questions that arose.3

Toward the end of her book, Diament provides an imaginary report by a
brother and sister, aged ten and eleven, of the information they learned from
their parents (father to son, mother to daughter). Diament says that letting
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children read it alone or together with their parents can help the discussion.
The text is an interesting mix of explicit content together with theology:
When Hashem [God] created Adam and Chava [Eve] the first
thing that He instructed them was, “Peru u’revu—Be fruitful and
multiply,” which in regular English means “Have children!” [Mom]
also told me that while it is true that Abba [Dad] and she davened
[prayed] to Hashem [God] to have us, that there is a special part
that parents play alongside Hashem in creating a baby. . . . Abba
explained to me that because an Abba and Imma [father and
mother] love each other, when they are alone together at night in
bed they like to be close. Sometimes, they might just hug and kiss
each other. Other times, they take their clothes off to feel very close
in a way that only Immas and Abbas do. They may also decide to
have sexual relations. Abba said that he needed to explain what that
was—because beside being a nice way of being close, it is also what
an Imma and Abba have to do to play their part in creating a baby.
He told me that when a man and a woman have relations the man
comes very close to the woman. By then, from thinking about all
the cuddling they are doing, his penis has become firmer than usual.
This makes it easier for the man to put his penis inside a special
opening in the woman’s vagina. My Abba told me not to worry—
it doesn’t hurt the lady—in fact it feels very nice. Hashem wanted
to make sure that it was something pleasurable to do so that married people would want to do it. He said that it’s one of the ways
that a husband and wife can show their love for one another, even
when they aren’t going to create a baby from it. After a man puts his
penis inside a woman’s vagina, he rubs it back and forth so he can
release from it a little bit of liquid called semen. In the semen, there
are something called sperm, though they are too small to see—you’d
need a microscope. The sperm have something like a tail so they can
travel, in a swimming kind of way, deeper into the vagina.4

In this text, children learn that God is in charge but also learn about penises,
vaginas, erections, and sperm. In fact, the actual act is explained clearly and
accurately, without any obvious censorship, though, of course, adapted to the
age of the children and described as something religiously kosher.
A few years later in 2012, another book of the same type, Talking about
Intimacy and Sexuality: A Guide for Orthodox Jewish Parents, was published by
Yocheved Debow. Debow describes herself as a Modern Orthodox Americanborn Israeli woman who wrote her doctoral dissertation on the matter.5 The
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book, 342 pages long, does not contain as much Orthodox jargon as Diament’s book and is by far more comprehensive. Whether this is a good or
bad thing depends on the reader’s expectations. Diament’s book can be read
quickly by busy parents and provides ready-made recipes on how to deal with
the issue. Reading Debow’s book demands more time, although it is written
in a very accessible way. Like Diament, Debow uses both scientific and Jewish literature and concepts, but obviously Debow’s more voluminous work
includes by far more of both. At the same time, Debow’s book at times feels
more apologetic. Very often it compares “Judaism” to a “Western Approach.”
“Judaism,” according to Debow, is spiritual, while “Non-Judaism” is materialistic and commercial and supports immediate gratification.6 In its essence,
the attitude that the book expresses is not different from Diament’s. Parents
should speak with their children, adapting, of course, to age and personality;
actual scientific terms should be used to refer to the sexual organs; lack of
explanation is not a good idea (or as Debow puts it, even a bad explanation is
better than no explanation); and when the time is appropriate and the child
is, or seems to be, interested in the matter, the basic details of the sexual act
should be explained honestly and accurately.
Debow’s work is a by-product of her involvement in creating a curriculum on the matter under the auspices of Yeshiva University, the flagship
academic institution of American Modern Orthodoxy. It was published
jointly by two respected organizations in the Modern Orthodox world: the
publishing house Ktav and Orthodox Union Press. It is hard to imagine
better credentials from a Modern Orthodox perspective. On the other hand,
this strong identification with Modern Orthodoxy, which is also very central
in the content, might push away Orthodox parents who are located more
on the right side of the Orthodox spectrum, closer to the National haredi or
haredi worlds. Diament’s booklet, although Modern Orthodox in many ways,
is less explicitly so and thus might be possibly consulted by such parents.
The two books of Diament and Debow represent a watershed in dealing with the matter in American Modern Orthodoxy. One slim, the other
comprehensive; one practical, the other more theoretical; one published independently, the other under the auspices of major institutions. Both provide
English-reading Modern Orthodox parents with specific guidance of how to
speak about the matter with their children in a manner that is in line with
the current recommendations of professional organizations while, at the same
time, being adapted to Modern Orthodox sensitivities, wishes, beliefs, and
practices. Guidance to children should be given, according to them, with
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implicit or explicit understanding that they should not engage in sexual relations or any sensual contact before marriage. In addition, the entire sexual
act is described as an act with religious meanings. No drawings of body parts
are provided.
Would an average Modern Orthodox person follow the instructions of
these two books? I do not know. The books by Diament and Debow show that
it is possible to find a way to explain the fundamentals of the sexual acts to
children while respecting core concepts of Modern Orthodoxy. On the question of whether this actually happens in the real world, I have no answer. At
the time I wrote these lines, neither of these two books had been translated to
Hebrew. As far as I know, there is no comparable work written originally
in Hebrew. Non-English-speaking Modern Orthodox parents in Israel do not
yet have a guide of this kind to help them.7
BOOKS FOR BRIDES AND GROOMS
Several dozen Modern Orthodox marital guides for young couples have been
published in Hebrew and in English, in Israel and in United States, in recent
decades. Though one can find a few works of this type from the 1970s, maybe
even from the 1960s, these works were isolated cases and did not yet constitute
a distinct genre. The real wave of Modern Orthodox publications on marital
life started around 1985 and continues today in full force.8
Most of these books are of little relevance to this study due to the fact
that they contain theoretical, theological, or ideological discussions of married life but not a significant explicit section on sexual relations. From those
books that can be categorized on the more or less Modern Orthodox spectrum
and that contain a significant section on marital sex, I consider about half a
dozen to be particularly interesting. Here, I will explore three of them.
SHLOMO AVINER’S ETZEM ME-ATZAMAI
[BONE OF MY BONES]
Shlomo Aviner is an Israeli rabbi who was born in France in 1943 and moved
to Israel in 1966. For many years he has been a leading figure in the national
religious community, especially among the settlers. He is one of the founders and leaders of the national-religious branch known, among other titles,
as “National haredi.”9 This is a group that grew out of the national-religious
movement; some might consider it to be outside of the so-called Modern
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Orthodox spectrum. Among other things, this group is characterized by what
its adherents see as stricter observance in some domains, particularly women’s
dress. It also accords a more central place to men’s study of rabbinic texts and
promotes separation from the secular world.10
Aviner is not an uncontroversial person even in his own branch of
National haredi, something which is perhaps not surprising: in radical groups,
people are considered kosher or nonkosher because of nuances that might look
insignificant to an outsider. Still, he remains a prominent figure, well known
outside of his immediate circles. He has published dozens of books and has
had weekly broadcasts and columns in various media venues affiliated with the
religious Right. He or his disciples also operate multiple websites with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of videos featuring his lectures and answers to questions in both Hebrew and French.
Aviner is extremely interested in issues related to sexuality and tzinut,
which literally means “modesty” but in reality is connected almost entirely to
the regulation of women’s dress and to relations between the sexes.11 It is thus
not surprising that he is the author of several books on these matters.
The most relevant book to our discussion is Etzem me-Atzamai [Bone
of my Bones], published in 1984 with a new edition in 2001.12 It is partially
structured as questions and answers: “What should be done when there is
incompatibility between the spouses regarding copulation?”;13 “Sometimes the
woman desires the union more than the man. Must he abide, or should
she give up?”;14 or “What should a man do if he gets aroused very fast, while
his wife gets aroused more slowly?”15 Whether the questions are ones that
Aviner was actually asked or are his own creation I do not know, though I tend
to believe that many are crafted by him as a literary tool.
On the cover of Etzem me-Atzamai one finds that it is “For Married
Couples Only,” though in the “warnings” opening of the book it is said that
brides and grooms can consult it a few days before the event. Aviner declares
that Etzem me-Atzamai is only for those who have difficulties with their sexual
life. Those who do not should not consult it. It is also only for simple people
who have to fight their evil inclination. Holy people do not need the advices
of the book.16
Aviner considers himself a champion of women’s rights and honor.17
Women are gentle and sensitive, and their husbands must continually take this
into consideration. On the other hand, because women are superior beings to
men in many aspects, they also have some serious obligations toward men. For
example, women should be “givers”: they should devote their lives to “giving”
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to their husband. If, for example, the woman is not enjoying marital relations,
this is still okay. Many women never enjoy sexual relations, says Aviner. “Many
couples are made in such a way that the women cannot reach physical enjoyment, and one must not insist on it. This is vain. It is more important for the
wife that her husband loves her and hugs her, and that his enjoyment is important for her. This is enough.”18 “The fact that you do not enjoy,” says Aviner
in response to a real or crafted question from a woman, “is not critical. There
are women who did not enjoy [sex] in their entire life, and this did not bother
them, but it was all with great love [to their husband].”19 The woman has “an
inner enjoyment from the closeness, from the love, friendship, and peace. She
does not need the physical enjoyment.” What is important, he declares, is that
she at least does not suffer.
When engaging in marital relations, lights must be off, even though it is
permissible to leave a small light on during foreplay. Talking is very important,
especially for the woman. The husband must show her warmth by talking to
her and making her happy. One is not allowed, though, to speak about unrelated issues, and Aviner even warns women that this is not the time to raise
concerns of various kinds.20 Gentle touch is also important. There is no place
the husband is forbidden to touch, although those who are particularly pious
might decide to create some limits. Aviner does not seem to be thrilled with
the possibility of the husband touching his wife’s genitalia. He rarely mentions this possibility, nor does he tell his readers about its importance if the
woman’s satisfaction is a goal. In the same vein, the idea that a woman experiences pain in her first instances of intercourse seems to him to be a given.
Considering the fact that he does not instruct his readers about foreplay, he
might indeed be right with regard to what happens in the bedrooms of those
following his guidance. To put it bluntly, for couples who follow his guidance,
the chances that the woman will reach sexual satisfaction are indeed quite low.
Aviner is aware that problems can occur. He mentions in particular male
impotence and premature ejaculation. These happen “especially for the most
modest grooms.” The couple should not feel too much guilt and should try
again later. Holy thoughts, relaxation, and reducing the excitement can solve
most problems. The bride must not expect enjoyment from the first union. In
fact, for Aviner, as we saw earlier, even if the woman never enjoys marital relations, nothing is wrong.21 With such a view, it is no surprise that Aviner does
not spend much time, if at all, on female physiological problems. The woman,
anyway, should not expect pleasure from the act. Aviner does not mention the
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option of reaching for professional help, and one can imagine that for him, as
long as the couple succeeds somehow to conceive and the husband is happy,
the situation is satisfactory.22
ELYASHIV KNOHL’S ISH VE-ISHAH AND ET DODIM
Some years after revised versions of Aviner’s book appeared, another book, Ish
ve-Ishah [Man and Woman], by Elyashiv Knohl, entered the same market.
Elyashiv Knohl, born in 1948, is a rabbi of a religious kibbutz and
was educated in some of the same rabbinic circles as Aviner. Unlike Aviner,
though, who remained on the conservative side of the national religious world
throughout his career, Knohl was for many years a senior faculty member in
charge of training students for the rabbinate in a yeshiva that was known to
be—although unquestionably Orthodox—on its progressive side.23
Knohl’s book initially appeared in 2003, with a subsequent thoroughly
revised second edition in 2005 and a third edition in 2014.24 An English edition was released in 2008.25
Many of the Modern Orthodox contemporary works on the matter speak
to both husband and wife and try to guide readers in ways that the authors
believe take into consideration women’s concerns as well. In reality, many of
these texts, and not only those by Aviner, might still seem to be, for an outsider, very problematic from a feminist or egalitarian perspective. Knohl does
it dramatically better than most others. In fact, one of the most outstanding
characteristics of his book is its commitment to an as-egalitarian-as-possible
treatment of both partners, expressed in its very language. In Hebrew, a
language with clear distinctions between feminine and masculine verbs and
nouns, writing or talking in inclusive language is extremely hard. Knohl makes
a real effort to do so in every sentence and in every term used.
Knohl’s book deals mostly with issues that are not related to our specific
interest. In its scope it is similar to countless other guides to marital life published in the Orthodox world. What makes it so essential for us is a separate
thin brochure titled Et Dodim: A Guide to Marital Relations from a Torah Perspective, which is attached to the sealed book.26
One of the central threads in Knohl’s booklet is the idea that the man
and the woman have the same obligations and rights with regard to sexual
relations. Everything should be done with mutual consent, and no side has
more rights or obligations than the other. If the Talmud and halachic [Jewish
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legal] literature say, for example, that a man “can do with his wife whatever
he desires,” it means of course with mutual consent. If the Talmud suggests
ways to enhance the chance that the newborn will be male, the Talmud did
not mean it scientifically but just as a way to encourage the enjoyment of both
partners in time past, when male children were more appreciated by some.
Needless to say, this is not the way the regulations have been presented and
prescribed for centuries. And yet, being an Orthodox rabbi writing to orthodox readers, Knohl does not present his interpretations as a break from a long
tradition but instead presents them as the “true” meaning of Jewish texts on
the matter throughout history.
Knohl devotes significant time to discussing problems that might occur,
such as premature ejaculation, male impotence, and vaginismus. He explains
that these phenomena are common, and the couple should not develop
anxiety over them or feel embarrassed. He offers some possible solutions and
explains that if after a while the couple still feels that things are not right,
they should seek professional advice. In particular at the beginning of their
relations, couples should be aware that the difficulties are normal. Unlike
most traditional guides, Knohl admits that the couple might not succeed in
having full relations in their first night together. In fact, he even says that if
this seems to them inappropriate, they do not have to try. Postponing it for a
while is acceptable.27 One should remember that at least some of the couples
whom Knohl addresses are indeed young men and women who never had
any physical contact with a member of the other sex, and some of them
did not even touch their spouse until the wedding ceremony, which happened only a few hours earlier. For them, having to go immediately “from
nothing to everything,” as some put it, can indeed be traumatic. Knohl tells
them they do not have to. His unapologetic permission is remarkable in the
Orthodox context and shows again that Knohl puts the couple’s well-being
very high.
It is hard to summarize Knohl’s work in a few words, but it is correct to
say, I believe, that the technical content in it is outstanding and would have
been appropriate and useful for probably any young person of any culture
and background who is about to begin experiencing heterosexual relations. Of
course, Knohl weaves this practical guidance with halachic considerations, but
it is clear that he puts the mutual enjoyment of the couple as the utmost priority: almost all regulations are presented as tools to achieve this goal. Obviously,
being Orthodox, if the law is clear and Knohl does not know of loopholes to
get around it, the law is the last word.
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JENNIE ROSENFELD’S AND DAVID S. RIBNER’S ET LE’EHOV
In 2011, an English booklet (ninety-two pages long) titled Et Le’Ehov:
The Newlywed’s Guide to Physical Intimacy, written by Jennie Rosenfeld and
David S. Ribner, appeared.28 A parallel Hebrew edition was published in
2013. With these two versions, the book became available in the first two
languages of the vast majority of the world’s Jews. I discuss here the original
English version, which was the one actually written by these two Americanborn immigrant-to-Israel authors.
Rosenfeld holds a Ph.D. in English, and her dissertation dealt with sexual ethics in the Modern Orthodox world. She was active for several years in
projects regarding sexual education in such communities. Ribner is a professor
of social work at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, a certified sex therapist, and an
ordained Modern Orthodox rabbi.
The book does not include a rabbinic approbation of any kind, nor does
it include any mention of consultation with a known rabbinic authority (even
though some of those mentioned in the acknowledgments are rabbis). Obviously, the fact that Ribner himself is ordained can be seen by some as giving it
some rabbinic authority. It mentions some connections with Yeshiva University, the same institution that contributed to the works of Debow described
above, and uses the vague term “Torah-Observant” to describe its intended
audience. It is hard to believe that the authors never consulted major rabbis on
issues discussed in the book, but one can understand the possible reasons why
they decided not to mention explicitly such consultations. It is probable that
some of these rabbis did not want to be openly associated with their project,
even if they agreed with its content and even supported its cause. Moreover,
the authors probably wanted to make it clear this is a book written from a
professional perspective, not a religious one, even if the intended readers and
the authors themselves are Orthodox. Last but not least, giving an approbation
from one rabbi can always mean that the book might be dismissed by those
who do not highly regard that particular rabbi. Instead, Rosenfeld and Ribner
chose to open the book with an extremely pious preface, one that should speak
to readers of all shades of Orthodoxy: “At every step in the creation of this
manual, we keenly felt the presence of the Borei Olam [Creator]. We have ventured into sensitive waters and we pray that what we have produced here does
not deviate in any way from our obligation to sanctify the Name of Heaven.”29
The book consists of an introduction, eight chapters, and appendices of
various kinds. In the introduction, the authors say that they wrote it for brides,
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grooms, and those teaching them. The authors justify the book’s existence by
stating that “This kind of information was once passed from parent to child;
our impression is that this is no longer the norm.”30
The level of detail in the book might be surprising to outsiders. And yet
it should be remembered that some of their readers might actually have little
to no knowledge about the physiology of members of the other sex and even
little understanding of their own: “For the new Kallah [bride], seeing her husband’s erect penis can be confusing. . . . When erect, the penis can become a
deep red and almost purple. . . . These changes are normal and should not be
a cause of concern.”31
Trying to serve as well as possible even such readers, the book explains
the appearance and functions of male and female genitalia, preparation for the
couple’s first sexual experience, kissing, foreplay, orgasm, and, understandably, intercourse.32 It mentions the possibility for newlyweds to postpone the
first intercourse. Rosenfeld and Ribner present it not only as acceptable but also
as common.33 Several times in the book they inform and remind readers that
other Jewish Orthodox couples have similar problems and that the advice they
may have received from pious instructors may not be something everybody else
agrees with. The question of the first night is one example. Another is with
regard to the observance of the laws of niddah [menstrual impurity]. Rosenfeld
and Ribner admit that it can have serious negative implications for the couple’s
intimacy, even though the common party line with regard to this topic is that
it enhances intimacy by giving the couple a “time-out” to do other things.34 In
the same way, Rosenfeld and Ribner acknowledge that the idea that couples
will always have desire for intimacy when the wife returns from the ritual bath,
following the niddah period, is also often detached from mundane reality.35
The core of heterosexual sexual relations, vaginal intercourse, is described
at considerable length.36 The authors explain that intercourse should not come
without any foreplay, emphasize the importance of natural or artificial lubrication, and warn that it takes some time for couples to do the “fine-tuning” that
will make it enjoyable. They explain very meticulously how penetration happens,
how each of the spouses should position himself or herself, and how one should
move. They give special attention to the missionary position, though they do not
say that it is particularly recommended. They only mention the probable fact it
is “the manner that is used most often around the world.” They also tell couples
that a wet spot on the sheets following intercourse is to be expected.
In a subsequent chapter, the authors discuss briefly what they call
“Alternate Intimacies.” Because some of these acts—for example, oral
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sex—might not be deemed perfectly kosher by all rabbis, the authors add
a warning: “Though this guide has been prefaced with the caveat that it is
not meant to serve as a halachic resource, this point deserves to be reiterated here. We have chosen to include below a wide range of sexual activities.
However, some of the actions below may not be sanctified by your individual
halachic authority (posek).”37
The book’s final sections discuss, like other books we saw, physiological
and psychological problems that may affect sexual relations. As in some other
works, the authors recommend consulting a professional if the problems persist. Two other elements that also appear at the end of the book are relatively
unusual. One of them is a rather extensive list of resources on sexuality, including books, websites, and companies that sell sex toys. The other appendix is
a sealed envelope with the following warning: “Note: This envelope contains
illustrations that are meant to accompany the text and to clarify certain points
with regard to male and female sexual anatomy and sexual positions. These
illustrations are therefore explicit, and each person should take this into
account before viewing the drawings.”
Inside the envelope, five illustrations are again preceded by the same
warning, with a further note that the illustrations have been commissioned
specifically for the book and that “they attempt to balance the necessary sensitivity with the need for clarity and accuracy.” Two of the illustrations show the
female and male genitalia, and three of them show sexual positions: missionary, woman on top, and rear entry. Indeed, they are very minimalistic. Ribner,
in an online audio interview,38 explains that some of his clients, and eventually
readers, might need such detailed depictions. After all, many of them have no
television at home, do not go to movies, and have never seen a sexual act in a
film, be it even a nonpornographic one. As a result, some of them might not
know how, for example, to position their legs.
CONCLUSION
I have explored five complex books, written by people who could be described
as part of the large spectrum of Modern Orthodoxy, with Aviner on its right
margin. Based on my study of these books and many others, I think it is fair to
say that there is currently a revolution in the way marital sexuality is presented
in some Modern Orthodox works. The changes are mostly due to the increasing impact of feminist ideas and the way academic scholarship in general, and
social sciences in particular, penetrate the internal discussion. The first two
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books we examined were written by women immersed in current scholarship
on the matter. I do not think that this is a coincidence: Modern Orthodox
women often have higher academic education than men. Obviously, not
all women are so enlightened and open. Some of the most disturbing texts on
the matter, not explored here, were written by women, such as Rachel Neriyah.
Aviner also includes in one of his books a section that he claims was written by
a woman, and its content is essentially identical to texts that are officially his.
At the same time, not all men write books that ignore modern knowledge. The
most we can say is that in some places some women bring outside scholarship
into the system. This is not different from what we know happened during
the period of Jewish Enlightenment [Haskalah], for example. Women are not
expected to devote their time to Jewish sources, their education is less controlled and restricted, and they are expected to be a bridge, mostly for financial
reasons, between the closed Jewish world and the outside.
The fourth book, by Knohl, was written by a male rabbi who does not
have formal training in the field but admits repeatedly and clearly that he has
consulted extensively others who do, including women. The fifth book was
written by a man and a women, both having academic training in the field.
On the other hand, Aviner’s book, the third on my list, lacks any of this knowledge and reflects not much more than a repetition of old rabbinic ideas cast in
modernized language. Aviner should be credited with starting the revolution
by speaking frankly on the matter and writing about it. Knohl took a further
step by taking serious consideration of the social sciences when writing his
rabbinic manual. Diament, Debow, Rosenfeld, and Ribner took yet another
step by gaining full academic training in the field and by trying to adjust the
traditional religious ideas of Modern Orthodoxy to what they know from academia, not the other way around.
NOTES
1. Puah Institute, http://puah.org.il/ViewShut.aspx?ArticleId=7552. Question asked
December 28, 2010. The context, content, and style make it clear that the couple is not
haredi.
2. A non-Jewish female undergraduate student who took a course on Judaism with me
defined Orthodoxy in this way in a paper: “While many religions allow individuals to
fit the religion into their lives, the strict followers of Jewish law show that their lives
have to be fit around Judaism. The Jewish law impacts every part of their life.” I would
like to thank B. Williard for permission to mention this definition, which I find very
pertinent.
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religious prohibitions related to sexual activity of all kinds—is not of relevance for us, as
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emmuniyyim [faith oriented].
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He rejects this claim, saying that what he writes is pure halachah [Jewish law], but the
very fact that he feels he has to distance himself from the haredi world is a good hint
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Is a Bride] (Jerusalem: Sifriyat Hava, 2002), 25. On the “National haredi” world, see,
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discuss later, as related to Knohl’s attachment to this yeshiva. The manner in which he
speaks about the editors of the Talmud is a type of thinking that was common in that
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Challah from Abba:
The Modern Jewish Father
Joshua Brown
God, slow to anger and abounding in kindness; forgiving iniquity
and transgression; yet not remitting all punishment, but visiting
the iniquity of fathers upon children, upon the third and fourth
generations.
—Numbers 14:18

Since its birth, Judaism has been concerned with the effects of one generation’s
actions upon another. In this particular verse the rabbis understand not only
that every generation is different but also that each generation is dependent
upon the ones that came before it and those that come after it:
Consider the implications of this verse by analogy with a four-level
storehouse, one level above the other; on one there is wine; on
another oil; on still another, honey; and on still another, water. If a
fire starts on any one of the levels, what is above it will extinguish
the fire. But if all four levels should have oil on them, all four will
burn down. Likewise, if children persist, generation after generation, in the wicked ways of their forefathers, punishment will be
visited upon them. But if the generations alternate, one generation
righteous and the next wicked, and so on, then “the fathers shall not
be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to
death for the fathers” (Deut 24:16). Hearing this, Moses rejoiced,
saying, “In Israel, no one is a malicious destroyer of grapevines just
because his father was a malicious destroyer of grapevines.”1

There are two assumptions made by this passage that are important to the
study of the modern Jewish father. First, the rabbis are clear that fathers are
influential in their children’s lives. The second assumption is that children
should strive to be different from their fathers in order to be righteous.
Both assumptions are telling of the issues that fathers have faced throughout
time. In this essay I look at the modern father and the many challenges he
faces as he enters his home and works to become an active parent. In particular
this essay focuses on four challenges facing fathers in the twenty-first century
as they are informed by modern psychology:
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1. The challenge of being Other in the child’s life.
2. The challenge for the father to provide basic needs for the child.
3. The challenge for the father to introduce the outside world to the
child.
4. The challenge to spend time that is of high quality but also time
parenting the child.
Some of these challenges are ancient and have continued from generation to
generation, while others are arising as unique to the modern era.
While less notable than the challenges, there are benefits that fathers
bring to their children’s lives. The latter portion of this essay will focus on
these strengths that fathers have brought to parenting throughout the generations and finally the unique role fathers could play for the future generations
of children.
CHALLENGES: THE OIL THAT BURNS
FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION
If Abraham was the father of our biblical world, then Sigmond Freud has been
the father of the psychoanalysis of the relationship between parents and their
children. Like Abraham, whether the oedipal relationship speaks to us or not,
it is the standard that all other theories are measured against and therefore will
be the primary model I address in this essay.
CHALLENGE #1: FATHER AS AN OTHER TO THE CHILD

The Oedipus complex in Freudian psychoanalysis refers to a stage of psychosexual development in childhood whereby children of both sexes regard their
father as an adversary and a competitor for the exclusive love of their mother.2
Fathers, like oil, are an entity that is infinitely separated from the family in
which they reside. This has been a major challenge for fathers to overcome
throughout all of time, and according to current psychologists it has not
receded. Moreover, as dual-earner families become the norm in our society,
men are faced with a struggle to help fill the void of what was once a full-time
stay-at-home job while being considered an other or outsider.
The father as Other impacts the family in a variety of ways. We will
explore the complex nature of this outsider status through the relationship
between the father as one excluded from the mother-child relationship:
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The pediatrician and psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott argued that
“the infant and the maternal care together form a unit.” Good
enough mothering “includes fathers, but fathers must allow me to
use the term maternal to describe the total attitude to babies and
their care. The term paternal must necessarily come a little later than
maternal.” Winnicott held that the father’s role in early infancy was
to support the mother in her state of primary maternal preoccupation, to enable her to provide a holding environment and to avoid
unnecessary impingements on the baby . . . when the infant is in the
state of absolute dependency on the maternal holding.3

As Winnicott explains, the mother and child form a unit. The father falls
outside of this unit and is not privy to the connection formed between the
child and the mother. Notice that this is a relationship focused not on time
but rather on dependency. The child is dependent upon the mother and not
the father. While it is possible for the father to hold, care for, and even feed the
baby, both society and biological factors often place the mother into the role
of primary caregiver. The father becomes the alternative to mom, or Other.
Not only is this dependency fulfilling the child’s needs, but it is also
providing the child with pleasure. “Good experience is usually associated
with need fulfillment—when it is in the presence of the mother in tune with
its needs, which usually means a mother in the act of attending to them.”4
Fathers, perhaps without even knowing that it is happening, may find themselves outside the child’s source of need fulfillment and even happiness in the
early stages of life.
But need fulfillment can come from fathers as well. Technology has
blessed us with bottles and other tools that help the father fill the biological
roles of mother. For instance, in the cases of single-parent families in which the
mother is absent, we can imagine that a child’s needs are met by a man. But
we should not be fooled into thinking that our modern postfeminist society is
as egalitarian in the home as it is in the workplace. While women have moved
into the professional world, they often do not relinquish their domestic role.
Wendy Mogel, a noted family therapist and author of The Blessing of a Skinned
Knee, spoke with me about this reality. She believes that “women today are
trying to be perfect men as well as perfect women.”5
The intent is not to point fingers at mothers but rather to illuminate the
complexities of the love triangle that exists between parents and their child.
Mothers, whether full-time parents or CEOs for corporations, continue to feel
the pressure of being primary caregivers or “perfect women,” as Mogel stated.
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The father’s challenge is to overcome the lack of space and find a balance
between his partner’s emotional need to be a “perfect” parent and his need to
be a professional father.
But this otherness raises a wide range of emotions in the child. It is not
only that the father is not the mother. We must also concern ourselves with
how the child views the father in relation to the mother. The father is a necessary Other. This other often serves as a response or alternative to the mother.
According to the French psychologist Jacques Marie Emile Lacan, “The
child’s sense of identity develops from seeing himself reflected in the other—
the mother. . . . The father is seen as another brother wishing to take the
child’s place with the mother.”6
In this case the father takes on the role of what we would term a brother.
The child relates to father as one would relate in a sibling rivalry competing
for the other parent’s attention. This is heightened even further as we consider
the sexual relationship often present among parents.
The oedipal relationship is a love triangle. Traditionally it occurs when
two people in relationship create a third object, the child, to love. For the
newcomer with needs from one and possibly both of the parents, their love for
each other can be viewed as another challenge. This challenge is particularly
problematic for fathers, as their children believe that their primary caregiver,
the mother, often abandons them to seek the father.
“In fantasy, separation is always experienced as the mother retreating to
the other room—the parental bedroom—with the second object, the father.”7
In this aspect of the oedipal theory the child becomes envious and even angry
with the father. “The father is the hated depriving object, and this requires the
father to have a capacity to be hated. The father has to accept that the central
nurturing relationship involves the mother, and that he is excluded from the
mother-infant couple.”8 And while the child is of primary concern, each member of this love triangle may feel similarly. “Essentially, the task for the mother,
father and infant involves tolerating the link between two people they desire
and which excludes them.”9
CHALLENGE #2: PROVIDING BASIC NEEDS

Fathers are not mothers, and they face a challenge in breaking into the relationship between mother and child. The second challenge that fathers face
focuses on whether it is even possible for fathers to provide basic needs for
their child. Perhaps it is only the mother who can fill the needs of her child.
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As we explore this second major challenge, we find that fathers may face
a tremendous disadvantage, as their biological necessity seems to be diminishing with the progression of modern science in the field of fertility. “Winnicott
reminded us that there is no baby without a mother.”10 One of the advances
that modern science teaches us quite clearly is that men do not need to be
present for childbearing or child rearing: “The acceptance of a whole new
mode of procreation, ranging from ‘do it yourself turkey-baster’ inventions to
sophisticated in vitro conception techniques, has contributed to the appearance that fathers are redundant beyond donating sperm.”11
Women have a freedom that is biologically absent for men. Whereas a
woman can birth to her child without a surrogate, a man must find a woman
should he want to have a child alone. But it is not the biological limitations
that provide the real challenge for fathers. Most fathers find themselves in a
relationship. The biological needs are covered by their spouse. Rather, the social
and psychological implications of not being a necessary part of the biological
creation of a child are significant as we consider challenges facing fathers. This
challenge stems from biology but is certainly made more difficult by the progressive nature of our society that often avoids gender differentiation:
From the 1960s onwards, the women’s liberation movement steered
a difficult path between, on the one hand, stressing the equality of
and importance of women, and at the same time on the other hand
seeing motherhood as a potentially disadvantageous role in the battle
for equality. There is little doubt that the new ideas on the importance of women . . . had the result that, in the second half of the
twentieth century, there was an increasing loss of confidence in
the value of the received sense of manhood and fatherhood.12

Feminism raised a question that we continue to ask and often fail to answer
today: Are men necessary for child rearing? But asking for, needing, and receiving assistance in childbirth is not a new phenomenon. Abraham and Sarah laugh
at God when they are told they will have a child. When Isaac marries Rebekah,
he seeks help in becoming a father to help Rebekah get pregnant. “Isaac
pleaded with God on behalf of his wife, because she was barren; and the LORD
responded to his plea, and his wife Rebekah conceived.”13 Seeking help in fertility is an old challenge. What is unique about this challenge for our generation is
that a woman can turn to God or to a fertility doctor without need for a man.
The question then becomes, what necessary role does the father play in
his child’s development? Within the oedipal context, the father is an Other
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often viewed as secondary. But there is more to raising a child than carrying
it to term.
Viewed in a broader context, any attempt to understand the respective
roles of mother and father has to take into account three immutable facts:
1. That the woman has the essential procreative role,
2. That the physical and psychological survival of the human infant
requires the care of one other person, and
3. That the transformation of a biological baby into a fully functioning
member of human society (i.e., socialization) involves more than
mere physical and psychological survival.14
To push the father aside because he cannot fulfill the first fact above is to
ignore a holistic perspective of child rearing. Children need another person
to help socialize them and integrate them into society. As is discussed at the
end of this chapter, fathers are ideal candidates for these needs.
CHALLENGE #3: THE CHALLENGE OF OPENING DOORS
TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD

The previous challenges may be viewed as disadvantages that men face in our
society due to their gender. Perhaps the third challenge can be considered an
opportunity available primarily to the person taking on the role of the Other.
This is the challenge of the father representing the outside world. One psychologist understands this in multiple stages: “There are three possible stages
for the father. In the first stage, known as the mirror stage, the father is not
distinct. In the second stage, the father intervenes and cuts the link between
mother and child. And in the third stage, the child wishes to be like the father
rather than to be the lover of mother.”15 Cutting the link between the mother
and the child is an important stage for the child, but it can be a difficult transition for the father. This cutting of the link is one of the key actions a father
can take as the representative of the outside world.
For Freud, “the concept of reality is bound up with the father.” But
this also allows “the father [to] appear mainly as a powerful figure to be
fought or to whom we must submit.”16 This stage of fatherhood is therefore
closest to the traditional role of the father as the patriarch of the family.
In his book Becoming the Kind Father, Calvin Sandborn, a lawyer by trade,
chronicles the struggle that this challenge presents. In telling his personal
story, Sandborn relates the long tradition in masculinity of the man as an
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outsider to the intimate nature of domestic life. In this sense, fathers are
beings of doing what is outside, such as work, politics, and fighting, and
not feeling what is inside the home, such as love, peace, and comfort. For
him, man has remained a knight in armor. “In fairy tales, the hero wears
emotional armor as well as real armor. While he slays the dragon and saves
the princess, he must always be brave. She shows emotions, but he doesn’t.
Instead, he is cool, powerful and ‘in charge.’ He’s like Davey Crockett, ‘The
King of the Wild Frontier’ . . . the man who knew no fear. . . . Many, like
Batman, Green Hornet, the Lone Ranger and Zorro, actually wear masks to
hide their faces and feelings.”17
Sandborn believes that fathers leave masks and armor for their sons to
adopt. This is his version of the burning oil present in every generation of men.
He explains in his story that it is not only through fairy tales and comic books
that this armor is transferred. It is also in very real life-changing moments that
patriarchy has denied men the opportunity to express their emotions.18
One of these moments took place when Sandborn lost his father at the
age of thirteen. He recounts the interaction among his brothers immediately
after hearing of his father’s death:
I choked like I had a bone in my throat; and for a brief moment I
cried. . . . Gasping, almost retching, I stumbled down the sidewalk
with Tom. When we got to the corner, David suddenly stopped,
took a deep breath, and looked back at me. He braced his shoulders
and spoke authoritatively, in his Marine voice, “We’re men in this
family now, boys. We have to take this like men.” He snapped the
twig in his hands in two, and threw it to the ground. . . . “We’ve got
the girls to take care of. We all have a job to do. . . . Think about
it—Dad would want you to be strong champ,” he said to me. “Don’t
worry, Tom’s the oldest now, so he’s in charge. He’ll take care of you.”
He slapped the dust off of his hands, and strode quickly back into
the house. By the time David slammed the door, I had stopped crying. I didn’t cry again—or mention my father—for 15 years.19

Sandborn refers to this moment as a Boy Code Lesson and later explains how
it turned his view of a knight in shining armor into a tin man with buried
emotions. This is the challenge of representing the outside world. It is a system
in which the father is the authority of the outward-focused image. He does not
have the freedom or even the capability to be a master of his inside, emotional
world. In Sandborn’s words, “Patriarchy has denied men the opportunity to
speak their feelings.”20
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While overcoming the biological barrier of giving birth to a child is
impossible, taking off the emotional mask of patriarchy is open to men.
Moreover, as the Other, the man has the ability to become another source of
emotional support for his child:
When the baby arrives what it needs is a carer, who for a while,
can devote themselves to the child. . . . Whoever takes on this role
should, if possible, have a state of mind encompassing several aspects
described by Winnicott as “primary parental preoccupation,” by
Bion as “reverie.” An adult in this state has unconsciously opened
themselves up to the baby in a way that enables them to be deeply
responsive to the baby’s communications.21

Men cannot choose their sex, but some psychologists believe that men can
choose to overcome the long burning oil of being emotionless. Sandborn
explains that in order to build this relationship we must overcome a patriarchal
competitive nature of win/lose mentality and replace it with a sense of love for
ourselves. In his book, which reads much like a memoir, he explains:
Too often men attack ourselves. I’m often shocked at how mean
men can be when they talk about themselves. It’s commonplace to
hear men describe themselves harshly: “I’m such a no good bastard;
Really, I’m just a stupid sonofabitch.” As a young man told me,
“I say things to myself that, if somebody else said it, I would punch
them in the face.”22

Sandborn believes that this is some of the oil that we inherit from our fathers.
Personally, I did not relate to Sandborn’s perspective until I recently observed
it in action. At a retreat for fathers and sons at a camp outside of Los Angeles
I supervised a friendly game of soccer: sons versus fathers. The game was
mildly competitive, with high fives after every goal and a sense of comraderie
among the two groups. Fathers would cheer for sons and vice versa. At one point
in the game a twelve-year-old boy was passed the ball and had the opportunity
to score. He pulled his leg back far and struck the ball with what looked like
all his might. When the ball missed the goal, the boy, standing not so far from
his father, fell down, hitting the ground with his hand. “I’m so stupid . . . such
a screw up,” he said.
Missing the goal was not a big deal, and it happened many times over the
course of the game, but for this son it was a letdown, a sign of being a loser and
not a winner. His father only a few feet away, along with the rest of the men,
did not really notice the boy’s disappointment. It is a normal reaction among
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men in a competitive setting. I was struck at both the intensity of the boy’s
reaction over a simple missed opportunity and the almost ambivalent response
of more than twenty men. It was a sign to me that men, even at a very young
age, may in fact be too harsh on thenselves.
Was this child’s disappointment really his father’s voice inside his head
saying “How could you miss that shot?” I don’t know. What is evident is that
none of the men felt the need to react to this emotional outrage of hitting the
ground with self-deprecating words. None of the fathers comforted the child
or were even shocked by his outward disappointment. Rather, we all acted
as knights in an armor that protects our vulnerabilities. It is a norm in male
behavior, as Sandborn points out. “We’re only a couple of generations removed
from King George V’s declaration that the father’s proper role is to frighten
his children. Even today, half of all Americans agree that ‘the father must be
master of his own house.’ And in this traditional patriarchy, the father-son
relationship has been one of dominance and submission, not of emotional
connection.”23
CHALLENGE #4: TRAVELING TOGETHER BUT GETTING NOWHERE

The fire in the storehouse of fatherhood reaches back through generations of
men to biblical patriarchy. It is a reality that has been studied by psychologists
and experienced by fathers and children such as Calvin Sandborn. But as the
rabbis teach in their commentary, every generation is not only like the previous one; it is also unique to its own time. We are not only burning the same
oil of biblical patriarchy. There are also new challenges that modern fathers
must face.
As I mentioned in our discussion of Abraham, one of the primary traits
of biblical fathers was their mission to be on a journey, constantly traveling.
In my discussion with Mogel, she reminded me that modern fathers are also
known to be travelers with their children. Recounting her own experience with
her father, she remembers the importance of this traveling and reflects on the
new challenges men face in the twenty-first century:
I walked to school every day with my father. We lived in Manhattan and we walked together every day and we talked about his
business. But also my father always wanted to know everything
about my life. Even today, he wants to know the ages of the children that my daughter baby-sits for while she is in college. This is
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the beauty of the Jewish man—that he wants to know about his
granddaughter’s job.
So one place fathering happens is in the car. . . . But I just went
to the car show and I was shocked. There are big screen TVs in cars
today. We saw these cars with large plasma screen televisions in them
and then everyone is plugged in so you can’t connect because you are
connected. It is an erosion of the places where parenting takes place.
The car used to be great. Driving to soccer practice or a b-day
party you would process. I don’t know what percentage now, but
these tools to shut kids up—these machines are the plug and everyone is all stopped up and isolated. And the daddy, completely the
odd man out. He is losing out the most because he doesn’t have a
unique role. He doesn’t provide something essential for the system.24

As I teach twenty-first century teenagers, I realize that the television in the car
is only the beginning of the new lover in our family triangle. Ipods, cell phones
and GPS units are distractions in our lives that often prevent conversations.
Mogel believes that these challenges affect the father in particular because
occurrences such as riding in the car are not viewed as quality time. Sandborn
adds a different perspective that is directed specifically at men trying to overcome the masked emotions of patriarchy:
When something impacted me emotionally—when the boss dumped
on me, when I had an argument with my wife, when one of the kids
disappointed me . . . I would feel upset for a moment. But then I
would immediately divert myself from the feelings. Like my brother
David, I threw myself into the job at hand. I’d work long hours. Or I
escaped into reading. Or, I’d turn off the feeling and turn on the TV.25

I empathize with Sandborn. On September 11, 2001, I arrived home just as
the World Trade Center was struck by the terrorist planes. Like the rest of the
country, I and the eleven other men in my house were in shock. For twentyfour hours our lives were at a standstill. Our world had been shaken in a way
that my generation had never felt. Other generations recalled Pearl Harbor or
President John Kennedy’s assassination. We knew immediately that 9/11 would
be our moment to remember where we were. But on day two and day three as
emotions continued to flare, I noticed the men in my life becoming agitated:
“When is sportscenter going to stop playing the news? When can I turn on
sports again and get past 9/11?” We were not insensitive; in fact, a close friend
barely survived the attack. But we did not want to experience the emotions; we
wanted to turn those emotions off by turning on meaningless entertainment.
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Technology is a new love in our lives, and men are known to be more
interested in it than women. It can be a mask that we wear to hide our emotions and further disconnect us from relationships. But men face other challenges in expressing themselves. Sandborn claims that “intimacy with oneself
prepares us for intimacy with others.”26
Moreover, he explains that men are at a linguistic disadvantage in
expressing these emotions:
Men, unlike women, lack a broad range of words to describe various emotions. This lack of emotional vocabulary is a real deficit—
it’s part of the reason that almost 80% of men have difficulty identifying what they are feeling. I knew when I was angry or feeling
something quite powerful, but I didn’t have the words for subtler
feelings such as disappointment, discouragement, insecurity, irritation or the like. . . . I would use words that either exaggerated the
feeling (“I feel like crap”) or minimized it (“It’s nothing—I’m just
tired”). As a result, I failed to experience the “disappointment”—
because I was telling myself it was something else.27

Complicating this situation for fathers in particular is that the new role of the
father expects him to be involved in the emotional side of the child’s life to a
greater degree than previous generations:
In the modern, Western, nuclear family, mothers and fathers spend
more time together than they did in the past and their roles are
much less differentiated. Women no longer need to rely entirely
on their husbands for material support or for obtaining power and
status. Likewise, men now have social permission to be actively
involved in parenting, and increasingly want to be given greater
access to their children. . . . In the Western nuclear family we expect
that fathers should be involved.28

With the changing role of women in our society, a space has been opened for
the father to be more than just the one who communicates while driving the
kid to school. Ironically, as the opportunities present themselves, the space is
filled by new competition such as television and increasingly portable media.
Adding to this concern is a long-held tradition of men’s limited emotional
vocabulary. Today, as my experience proved on 9/11, men often rely on distractions such as television to distance themselves from emotional opportunities. These opportunities may be our best tools in creating the relationships we
wish to harvest with our children.
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Mogel raises some other concerns about what prevents men from getting
to journey with their children:
What kind of parent does a Jewish father get to be. . . . I told you
about how the men withdraw. It all seems as though the fathers are
even wimpier now. I am thinking about the people I see in psychotherapy—the women are contemptuous about the men. Some of
it is projection. What legs do men have to stand on now when the
women can earn money and the emotional currency of women is
overvalued. That women can relate to the children. He gets squeezed
out and so what can he provide. And earning more money than the
mom . . . big deal. We have this ambivalence toward money as it’s
dirty and we love it, so dad becomes that to us.29

The twenty-first century parent faces many competing interests. We have
more dual-earner families, more distractions for our children, and more technology from our pockets, cars, and couches that can grab our attention. The
expectations for fathers to be involved in their children’s lives are possibly
higher than ever before. Adding to the expectations are the “old” pressures to
make money and the “old” ways of avoiding emotions by escaping to the television and sports. But it is not only society that wants dad to improve his role
with children; it is the kids themselves. A Mori poll reported in The Guardian
(April 10, 1997) showed that 20 percent of children eight to fifteen years old
could not recall sharing an activity with their father in the previous week and
that 80 percent want their father to spend more time with them.30 At a North
American Federation of Temple Youth workshop for male teens, camp director
Bobby Harris asked young men to talk about love in their relationship with
their fathers. Author Doug Barden recorded their responses:
My father doesn’t have a clue as to what is going on in my life.
My father spends more time on his computer than he does with me.
My father is a rabbi, and sometimes I feel he cares more about the congregation than he does about me.
I wish my father would sit down more and talk with me about what’s
going on.
WRAPPING UP THE CHALLENGES
The role of the father is in transition. But we are sending mixed messages. On
the one hand, our children are wondering where the father is in their lives, and
on the other, the traditional role of the mother does not fit or may not even be
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available to the father. Add this to the struggle that men face sharing emotions,
and we find that the father has an uphill battle in the family.
The picture painted by children is more complex as well. Mogel believes
that our children have become entitled, and she worries for their future.
This concern is intertwined with the challenges a father faces, as previously
discussed:
I was at a beautiful private school, and it is very progressive and
casual and there were no seats left for the kids. And the teacher
asked me if I minded sitting on the floor. So the teacher turned to
a kid named Josh and said, “Josh do you mind sitting on the floor
so Mogel can have a seat.” And Josh responded to the teacher in a
whiney voice, “No, but Lucy, you know I feel so much more relaxed
when I sit on the couch.”
And I thought every issue is in there, and I immediately flashed
to his first job interview and wondered if he will survive. His mother
has taught him that his world revolves around his comfort. So the
doting mother handicaps our kids.
We have these young men—what is it going to be like when
his wife is diagnosed with breast cancer? What is strength, maturity,
leadership? What is the unique role of the father or the shared role?
It’s so much less clear.
ME: What would you tell those parents?
DM: Oh, I beat them up [jokingly]. Don’t ask what’s wrong. He
comes home and complains about teachers and friends and being
bored. Not getting the Nintendo Wii when other kids have it. Of
course he wants the Wii; he has been brainwashed to want it. That’s
why we have Hannukah and birthdays and their own money. But
when parents are worn down by life and then worn down by the
kids’ genius by lobbying, . . . this is also a challenge of how manipulative the children are. The kids, they’re so powerful. And then the
dads—what does he feel about the situation? Let’s say he can’t afford
the Wii. He can’t provide the Wii, and that is HIS role as father.
Does he feel ashamed because the only thing he can contribute is the
Wii because no one else pays attention to me?31

In this anecdotal story, Mogel highlights all of the challenges that I have raised
for the modern father. He is a man struggling with his identity as it is associated with money. He is challenged to create a relationship with his children
that values emotions, but he may not have the language and may feel more
comfortable “buying” their love. The father also faces a complex competition
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with the mother, the primary lover of the children. Egalitarian parenting is
possible, in my opinion, but only so long as we understand that this is one
case in which fair may not be equal. A father cannot be artificially inseminated
and carry the child to term, and the father cannot feed the child from his own
body. Moreover, the mother can do these things, and even if she chooses not
to, she remains a woman attached to a long tradition of gendered roles that
pushes her to be the “perfect mother” and in today’s world the “perfect man”
as well. The position of the father seems somewhat lost, only able to react to
the many changes and powerful forces that surround his desire to find a place
in his family in which he can succeed and be a part of the team.
It is not my intent to paint a grim picture of the father. Family life is
increasingly difficult for father, mother, and child. But it is significant that
the father is such a missing person in the observed family, as it reflects one of the
main problems and difficulties in becoming a father; that is, finding a role for
him in the new family constellation.32
GOOD FATHERING IS NEEDED
Each generation of fathers faces challenges new and old. But this fatherly
fire that the rabbis mentioned may also be a light for future generations. As
discussed earlier, the role of the father, while complex and often difficult, is
important and even necessary. In this last section of this essay I will address
what fathers do to provide for their children’s needs.
Fathers are an Other to their children. They are not the mother. But this
Other plays an important role in the child’s development. In the case of most
families in which the father has not taken the place of the mother, the father
becomes an important partner for the mother:
If the mother is in this state of reverie, she needs another, usually the
father, to manage the practical external demands and to act as a protector so that, for example, the mother is not too exhausted by relatives
and friends or by her own anxieties about the baby. Father can settle
the baby to sleep, change the baby, give a bottle so that the mother
can rest and recover, encourage visitors to stay for a short while only,
and contain and help think about the mother’s and baby’s emotional
responses. The concepts of “holding in mind” and “containment” are
both vital aspects of the relationship between child and father.33

It is not only important to note that the father is a protector and guardian of
the mother and child but also that the father may have the ability to make
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the relationship between mother and child succeed. In this sense the father
becomes a manager of mother and child. He is the person able to best understand their emotions and limitations. Standing just outside the immediate
relationship between mother and child, the father may in fact have the best
perspective on what steps to take next. But there is another important factor to
keep in mind in this relationship. It is not competitive. Rather, it is symbiotic.
The mother and father are a team working to keep each other in balance and
to provide for the child.
Certainly this is good practice for relationships, but perhaps it is the role
of the father to model this behavior for the child:
The baby needs total care early on, but then steadily moves towards
separateness, a wish to be alone and then to leave. This process
means parents have, to some extent, to be left behind, discarded. For
those adults who were uncertain of themselves, or who found in the
baby an intense relationship they have had with no one else, there is
a dread of losing the child and a painful wish to hold on. . . . Fathers
have to both accept this themselves and help the mother separate
and relinquish the child.34

Whereas we discussed the challenge that emotions place before fathers, there
is a light that burns from this oil that is important for the child:
The father, by virtue of being less involved emotionally, can relieve
the situation through his access to a fresh perspective. Probably the
commonest example of this is when an infant gets into an inconsolable state and, despite her best efforts, it is just impossible for the
mother to soothe “her baby.” . . . At such times a fresh parent with
a fresh mind who, in the infant’s perception, is not part of the persecuting situation, can step into the breach to rescue the situation.
This can restore a calmer state. . . . When there is an actual father
who can act in this way, we can think of him as performing a symbolic paternal function.35

The child needs the father in order to understand that his or her relationships
are not limited to the mother but also that the mother’s needs are not met
solely by the child. This partnership of mother and father is one of the values
that Mogel believes we need to emphasize the most and one that many couples
are leaving behind:
I would like for them to start with examining their actions in the
light of the message that they send their kids of how much they
respect each other. That’s the core. We are worshiping idols, and the
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idols are our kids and their achievement. That has taken the place
of God. It is so bad for the kids because it makes them so anxious
and entitled. . . .
I want the kids to see the parents cherishing each other—to see
the mother really appreciating the father’s strengths, his physical size,
his experience in the outside world and bringing it into the inside
world. I want the girls to see the fathers finding their mothers beautiful—potent antidote to the airbrushed world we live in.
I want them to hear parents laughing together. My daughter
once said to me when she heard my husband and I laughing in our
room: “There is nothing that makes me feel more secure than to
hear that sound.” Parents don’t realize this—they think it is all about
the focus on the kid.
Mothers need to think about what is unique about their husbands. I say to couples all the time, “Why did you marry him . . .
has it really changed all that much?”
Then they are totally poetic—but when they have kids the kids
take such center stage, and I always say “the kids will be gone and if
you haven’t taken care of this relationship what is it going to be like.”36

This is a challenge, but it is also an opportunity. And I believe that it is less
complicated than overcoming years of patriarchal models or finding a way
to break into the mother-child relationship. Sometimes it can even happen
without any effort at all:
A 13-month-old baby whose mother had recently returned to work
was observed at the end of the day after he had been collected from
his grandmothers. . . . He appeared to like nothing better than lying
on a settee, apparently taking pleasure in his parents’ conversation
with each other as they went about their evening chores. This was
his preferred activity at that time of night and it had an unmistakably settling effect on him. This baby seemed able to tolerate the
awareness of his two parents having a relationship with each other
and it is this that will form the basis of an internal space.37

Internal space is an important element in children forming their identities.
What strikes me about this case in particular is that the child is passive and in
the margins of the action. This marginal role is important for the kid, and it
allows him to form an identity.
I believe that this is a light challenge, because in many situations the flame
of a relationship is what brought the child into the world. The challenge is keeping the flame lit and making sure that the child does not replace the spouse.
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The father represents a sense of power. Freud even described this as one
of the strongest needs of a child. But the father also represents a sense of independence and the outside world:
A key role for the father, which most men find they do intuitively,
is to introduce the baby to the world. It is interesting to note that
in general mothers appear to carry or sit holding their babies in
the earliest weeks face to face, whilst fathers tend to hold the baby
facing out into the world. . . . Many of the games fathers tend to
enjoy playing with their children in a mutually pleasurable way
tend to have elements of separation and return in them—a kind
of losing/finding theme, perhaps enacting the necessary separation
process.38

Fathers represent the world beyond the comforts of home to their child. They
are the platform by which many children reach out into the world and discover
themselves. This is a stark contrast to the mother, who holds her child close to
her womb. Fathers not only bring the child to the world. They also bring the
outside world into the home:
The effect of “Daddy coming home from work” can bring relief
to what can often be a stressful situation at the end of the day. . . .
The father is also seen as instrumental in turning the baby’s view
towards the outside world away from the intense intimacy of the
mother-child relationship, or as introducing the “third position”
which is essential for healthy cognitive and emotional growth and
development.39

The child needs to see that an outside world exists, and it is often the father
who brings this reality into the house. As discussed earlier, our world is leveling the roles of mother and father, and it may seem as likely that the mother is
the one “coming home from work.” I accept this with one exception. Mothers
continue to take maternity leave for a period of months. This trend is only
beginning for fathers. The first paid family leave bill was passed in California
only in 2004.40 The Family Medical Leave Act does allow for any family member to take up to twelve weeks, but this is unpaid. This often leaves mothers,
even those who work full-time, as the initial caretaker in the home and the
father as the “coming home from work” model.
Fathers are often a bridge for their children to the outside world. They
are also a bridge to the inner world of the child, giving the child a sense of
independence:
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That is, the father is a child’s primary experience of someone other
than the mother. . . . The knowledge that someone else is thinking
of and involved with the child frees the mother from her infant. It
also frees the infant from the mother. It means that the child will
have space to experience himself, can risk hating the mother, can
even risk killing her in his mind, because there is someone else there
to keep him alive.41

The child does not always need to hate the mother in order to gain from the
father. But an overly obsessive relationship with the mother is unhealthy, and
the father is the healthiest option to help children realize that they can depend
on themselves as well as others. “Mother and infant need someone else to
intervene to prevent them from remaining stuck in a merged, claustrophobic,
potentially murderous relationship.”42
Research shows that children benefit most when the mother and the
father together help the child gain a sense of independence. “We found that
while secure attachment in infancy to the mother predicted early development
of emotional understanding, if attachment to the father was also secure, the
child’s development was even further enhanced.”43
Again, the message is that of the parents as a team, working together to
help the children adjust to their new environment. In fact, a number of largescale studies have demonstrated that the greater the involvement of the father
in an infant’s early care, the more rapidly the infant develops and the more
likely the infant is to withstand stress and to be socially responsive.44
Some studies have also shown that a father can be quite successful at raising his children as the primary caregiver, the role usually taken by the mother:
Evidence for the overlap between the role of the mother and father
comes from the work of Kyle Pruett. This is a longitudinal, in-depth
study of 17 families where the primary caretaker was the father.
The findings over eight years support the view that the “nurturing
instinct” is not confined to females. Children develop extremely well
in these families, and the child, far from demonstrating deficits in
ego functions or object relatedness, seems more active, curious and
less prone to pathological separation or stranger anxiety than infants
whose primary dyadic relationship was with their mother.45

Unfortunately, we also know that not all people are good at nurturing their
children. Calvin Sandborn’s book is predicated on the anger of his father and
his father’s (and later his own) inability to be nurturing or what he terms “kind.”
In his process of self-change, Sandborn explains the steps that he took in order
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to become the “kind father” to himself. By looking at these steps, I believe that
we can understand what a kind and nurturing father might look like:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Hold myself in friendly regard.
Pay attention to what I’m feeling.
Identify that feeling with accurate words.
Articulate the feeling to myself.
Give myself permission and support to actually feel it, grieve it if
necessary.46

This emotional experience is what Sandborn lacked in a father. He writes the
book under the premise that this is what fathers should be to their children
and that when this is absent for men, they need to become this father for
themselves. I am not sure that Mogel would agree:
I just saw a family where they sing two songs and read two stories,
then they have four kisses, then the dad comes in and reads a story
and a song—it takes forty minutes every night. The parents hate it.
But they are trying to be with their kids and love them. It has gotten way out of control because the ritual has gone sour. Its much
too manicured and organized. It has become a huge power struggle.
What is the definition of a book between the parents and kids?47

Her point, I believe, is that the emotions must be authentic and not rehearsed or
scheduled. Sandborn wishes for men to go through a conversion that may not be
possible. Certainly, men have the ability to love rather than hate, and I hope we
can extend the vocabulary for men’s emotions, but some people, men or women,
are, I believe, less inclined to be extroverted in their emotional expression. Some
people will never be warm and fuzzy. If they were to try, it would be putting on
a mask of emotion, and I have to agree with Mogel: it would not work.
The final aspect of fatherhood worth mentioning for this thesis came as
quite a surprise to me. For many years I have heard spouses talk about their
husbands or fathers as though they were the “extra child” in the family. “I really
have three kids,” a mother of two children might say. To my surprise, this trait
is not only common among men, but it is a welcome trait for them to hold
within the family. Mogel explained that “A lot of the fathers I see are much
more playful than the mothers.”48 This playful nature is not a coincidence.
I already discussed the psychological significance of separation and return
games that fathers often play with their children. Now, focusing specifically on
some differences between fathers and mothers, many psychologists understand
that a reaction to the “perfect woman” mother is the “playful father.”
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According to Mogel, there are two primary types of fathers in the traditional family structure:
1. The one who comes home and makes order, trying to make rules.
Part of this is a reaction to feeling left out. One of those rules is to
pay attention to me.
2. The second type takes time to play and be sillier than the mothers.
Freud too writes about wit and humor. Sometimes the dads are more
fun and funnier. The moms say that the dad is another kid.
These playful moments should not be minimized in their importance. The
father, representing the outside world and an alternative to the mother, can
provide his child with important memories that can help forge their identity.
Mogel explained how this same theme arose as she asked women about their
most vivid memories as a child:
One woman recalled that her father was a diver, and when they spent
time at the beach he would always dive and pick up starfish for her
to keep. Another father took the kids on a hike one day, and when
they got to a stream he said, “Boy I am thirsty.” Turns out he had
hidden some soda bottles under the bank of the river. He shocked
his children when he reached down and pulled up these drinks out
of the ground for his kids. Being the playful parent is important.49

Mogel was not interviewing these women about their relationships with their
fathers. Unprompted, many of them referred to some of their strongest memories as memories with dad. Moreover, many of these memories were of dad
doing playful things with them. Dad was having fun.
This is an exciting role for fathers to play as they look for models of
fatherhood that are accessible to them, beneficial for their children, and not
stepping on the toes of the mother.
CONCLUSION
Like oil in water, fathers are an important commodity that remains separated
from its environment. As the rabbis explain, fathers can also be dangerous.
Sandborn helps us understand the angry father and the man who wears the
mask. Mogel points out that fathers are not separated always by their choice.
They have a long, uphill battle to fight. And when they choose to fight it, they
should do it with a great deal of love and respect for the child’s mother. Finally,
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fathers bring some unique qualities to a family. They are guardians. They are
Other and representative of the outside world. And they are playful, bringing
a sense of fun into the family, creating memories that often last a lifetime for
the children they help create.
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“Jewish Education Begins at Home”:
Training Parents to Raise American Jewish
Children after World War II
Joshua J. Furman
In 1954, the United Synagogue’s Commission on Jewish Education published
the first installments of Your Child and You, a pamphlet series on child-rearing
issues facing the American Jewish parent. Azriel Eisenberg, the executive vice
president of the Jewish Education Committee of New York, contributed
a volume to the series titled Talks with Parents in which he advised mothers
and fathers on the importance of Jewish education and the critical role that
parents play in their children’s development. He explained to his readers that
“your children become what they are largely because of you, their parents. You
are the most essential part of their world, for you are the first to create their
world for them. As parents you give them not only your physical characteristics but also your outlook on life, your manners, your temperament.” Even as
he encouraged parents to enroll their children in religious schools and summer
camps, Eisenberg stressed the central role that parents must play as “active
partners” in their children’s moral and spiritual growth.1
Echoing Eisenberg’s call, numerous child-rearing authorities exhorted
Jewish parents to take responsibility for their children’s Jewish upbringing
and to seek appropriate counsel toward this end, since, they argued, the act of
raising children to identify as Jewish in a predominantly non-Jewish environment was no easy task. This view, held by many in the post–World War II
American Jewish community, reflected a widespread sense of anxiety about
the quality and authenticity of Jewish life in suburban environments. As the
primary setting of Jewish family life transitioned in the 1940s and 1950s from
urban immigrant neighborhoods of first and second settlement, rich with
Jewish institutions and cultural life, to suburban neighborhoods that lacked
an established Jewish infrastructure, communal leaders worried openly about
the ability of Jewish parents to transmit Jewishness to their children in these
new settings. For their part, many parents counted on rabbis and teachers to
provide their children with Jewish role models.2
Nevertheless, Anna Bear Brevis, another author in the Your Child and
You series, concurred with Eisenberg’s view that parents could not rely on
communal institutions alone to mold their children into knowledgeable,
175
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committed Jews. In her 1954 pamphlet Jewish Education Begins at Home, Brevis, a public school principal, noted that the vast majority of American Jewish
children spent only a few hours a week engaged in formal Jewish schooling,
as compared to thirty hours a week in public school, and they lived in communities largely devoid of Jewish cultural and religious activity. Therefore, she
claimed, to ensure the successful transmission of Jewish heritage, mothers and
fathers must give their children a home environment that inculcates a love
and appreciation for Judaism. To train women toward this goal, Brevis called
for and later helped create the Institute for Jewish Mothers in her native town
of Buffalo, New York.3
Six years earlier, writing in the Conservative movement’s publication
Women’s League Outlook in 1948, parent education specialist Rose Cahan
argued that parents seeking to transmit a Jewish heritage to their children in
America must contend with additional challenges beyond those faced by all
mothers and fathers. “In a dual culture it is not easy to live a Jewish life,” she
wrote. “The Jewish way of life must be learned; it is not acquired at birth and
parents have the primary responsibility of helping their children develop positive Jewish attitudes.”4
Believers in the supreme power of nurture over nature, educators, rabbis,
and psychologists looked to American Jewish parents to play a leading role
in shaping the ethnic identity, religious practice, and moral compass of their
children. Throughout the postwar period, they dispensed child-rearing advice
to Jewish parents on a number of topics. In journals, magazines, pamphlets,
sermons, and speeches, these child-rearing mentors urged Jewish parents to
create the kind of home environment and instill the values that they believed
would ensure a child’s future happiness, loyalty to the Jewish people, and fitness for citizenship in a democratic, faith-centered United States.
This essay will examine Jewish parenting advice from the post–World
War II era on topics specific to the needs and interests of Jewish parents,
including information on how to celebrate Jewish birth rituals and festivals as
a family and suggestions on how Jewish parents and their children should navigate the December holiday season. This generation of Jewish parents’ interest
in and need for such child-rearing advice is the result of several factors unique
to this era. To a significant extent, this child-centered communal agenda
reflected wider trends in American society at large. The postwar baby boom
accelerated the pace of suburbanization as growing families sought greener
pastures on the outskirts of cities in which to raise their children. Following
fifteen years of economic deprivation and war, many Jews took advantage of
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new opportunities afforded them by the GI Bill and federal housing loans to
purchase suburban homes.5 As they took up residence in new neighborhoods
away from the urban core, Jews and other middle-class Americans created
greater physical and emotional distance between themselves and their parents.
In many cases, grandparents no longer lived in the same neighborhood or city
as their children and grandchildren. In their absence, new parents turned to
another source of comfort and counsel: the child-rearing expert, whose recommendations stemmed not from Old World traditions or customs but instead
from scientific research and psychological principles.6
Furthermore, at a time when American public culture embraced the
notion of a Judeo-Christian heritage as a moral and political weapon in
the nation’s struggle against communism and the Soviet Union, Jews could
prove their patriotic bona fides by embracing their religious traditions. Following World War II, in which Judaism earned newfound recognition and respect
as one of America’s three “fighting faiths,” public performances of religiosity
became a politically useful manner of simultaneously demonstrating faith in
both God and the United States. In this newly ascendant “tri-faith America,”
as historian Kevin Schultz has described it, Jews joined synagogues and sent
their children to Jewish schools in record numbers. They increasingly came to
understand and define Jewish identity in terms of religion, although this shift
in conception of Jewishness was not generally accompanied by an increase in
ritual observance or synagogue attendance. Sociologist Marshall Sklare, analyzing the rise of the Conservative movement in the suburbs, argued that their
synagogues functioned primarily as ethnic churches, facilitating opportunities
around the premise of religion for Jews to meet and be around other Jews.7
While contemporary observers and later scholars have critiqued the authenticity of this religious turn in American life, this historical context helps explain
the motivation behind the plethora of books and articles aimed at introducing
Jewish birth and holiday rituals to parents.8
As much as the recommendations from this cadre of experts drew upon
insights and practices from the realm of Jewish tradition, external influences
and historical circumstances also shaped the worldviews of Jewish parenting
pundits in numerous ways. Their prescriptions for raising the perfect American Jewish child borrowed heavily from the fields of psychology and pediatric
medicine and responded to the concerns and insecurities of an ethnic community adjusting to affluence and suburbanization.
While parenting advice books may appear to offer objective, timeless
recommendations grounded in scientific evidence and empirical observation,
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the genre in fact reflects contemporary social and political tensions. Childrearing advice, as a social and cultural construct, does not remain static over
time; rather, the literature evolves and adapts in response to the needs and concerns of parents and society at a particular moment in history. Given that the
task of parenting is intricately linked to the survival of a community and its
cultural traditions, a critical reading of child-rearing literature reveals the tensions and insecurities at work within that particular social group.9 Analyzing
American Jewish parenting advice in the post–World War II decades helps us
understand how American Jews have navigated between adherence to religious
and cultural traditions and interest in new medical and psychological insights,
articulated and encouraged particular notions of gender roles in the American
Jewish family, and responded to changing socioeconomic realities since 1945,
including suburbanization and embourgeoisement.
Even as American Jews enjoyed a period of unprecedented economic
and social mobility, long-standing communal fears about antisemitism, acceptance, and Jewish continuity intensified and developed in new directions in
the suburbs. To assuage these anxieties, authors of child-rearing literature
sought to train parents in the art of raising sons and daughters who would
embrace a Jewish identity in an American setting. They filled books for mothers and fathers with information about Jewish birth rituals and holidays so
that parents could observe and preserve these traditions and pass them on to
their children. They adapted the form and content of mass-market American
baby books to produce similar volumes for Jewish audiences. They armed
parents with guidance rooted in both traditional Jewish sources and modern
psychology, arguing often that these two reservoirs of wisdom flowed together
harmoniously. They argued that Jewish living was happy living, and that nothing could be so American as to live Jewishly.
USHERING THE CHILD INTO THE WORLD OF JUDAISM:
RITUAL EDUCATION FOR PARENTS
In 1950, the Women’s League of the United Synagogue of America, a group
aligned with the centrist Conservative movement, published Sadie Rose Weilerstein’s Our Baby, a scrapbook for parents to commemorate the milestones in
a newborn’s first years of life. Part record book and part explanatory volume,
Our Baby included pages on Jewish rituals such as brit milah [circumcision]
and pidyon ha-ben [redemption of the firstborn] as well as pages on which
parents could document the place and time of the child’s birth, the dates of

“Jewish Education Begins at Home”: Training Parents to Raise American Jewish Children after World War II

179

various physical development milestones, the baby’s feeding regimen and first
words, and his or her medical and dental history.
Presented in soft pastel colors, Weilerstein’s book closely resembled other
keepsake volumes of the era produced for new American parents. Some suggestions to parents on what to record, however, pertained specifically to the
baby’s earliest encounters with Judaism, such as “First Visit to the Synagogue”
and “Days for Gladness, Seasons for Joy” pages, which prompted the parent
to describe the child’s first experiences with each of the Jewish holidays in
addition to Thanksgiving. On the page titled “A Tree for Baby,” parents could
attach a certificate in recognition of the planting of a tree in Israel by the Jewish National Fund in the baby’s honor.10
The inclusion of these explicitly Jewish sections, alongside the generic
sections about the baby’s health and maturation found in similar publications
for a general audience, signifies an effort on the part of the Conservative movement to encourage American Jewish parents to value their child’s spiritual as
well as physical growth. With the inclusion of a page for a Jewish National
Fund certificate, Weilerstein and the United Synagogue also sought to persuade parents to instill an attachment to the land of Israel in their children.
Through this and other forms of Jewish parenting literature, authors and
speakers endeavored to teach mothers and fathers the knowledge and skills
they would need to create a vibrant Jewish home environment for themselves
and their children.
At the same time, the aesthetic and substantive resemblance of Our
Baby to other books of its kind authored for a broad American audience
suggests a desire, on the part of both publisher and purchaser, to render
and receive information about Jewish child rearing in a thoroughly contemporary format.11 This choice reflected a broader yearning on the part
of most American Jews to blend seamlessly into American life and culture
while simultaneously making some effort to retain Jewish distinctiveness.
This effort to reconcile modernity and tradition, to strike a balance between
acculturation and ethnic continuity, lies at the heart of American Jewish
parenting advice literature.
Alongside Our Baby, a plethora of books and articles on Jewish birth
rituals appeared beginning in the late 1940s, offering information and advice
to parents on how to navigate a baby’s induction into Judaism and Jewish
peoplehood. Authors and producers of this literature operated on two assumptions: first, that American Jewish parents in fact desired to welcome their new
son or daughter according to the principles and practices of Jewish tradition,
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and second, that they were at least partly, if not entirely, unfamiliar with what
these traditions entailed. As such, consulting a concise and comforting reference guide could relieve parents of the guilt or embarrassment of having to ask
a rabbi or relative for assistance.
Rabbi Reuben M. Katz, in the foreword to Conservative rabbi Hyman
Chanover’s 1956 book Blessed Event, noted that the arrival of a newborn baby
is a time of intense mixed emotions, simultaneous excitement and apprehension. “American-Jewish parents are no different from other parents in sharing these rather universal emotions, the qualms, confusions and moments
of ecstasy,” he wrote. “And yet American-Jewish couples do have a tradition
which provides for them a unique and socially desirable way of expressing their
sense of awe, splendor, and dependence upon God during these sacred and
memorable moments.”12
Chanover’s slim volume and others like it introduced Jewish parents to
this array of birth rituals and advised them on the process of choosing a meaningful Hebrew and English name for their newborn child.13 Parents could consult a number of books, including Chanover’s Blessed Event, Nathan Gottlieb’s
A Jewish Child Is Born (1960), and Shonie Levi and Sylvia Kaplan’s Across the
Threshold (1959), for a carefully choreographed description of the brit milah
ceremony for boys and the baby-naming synagogue ceremony for girls, along
with other rituals such as the pidyon ha-ben. These works commonly included
an English transliteration of the traditional Hebrew prayers, sometimes written entirely in capital letters with hyphens to signal syllable breaks, so that
nervous fathers could practice their pronunciation of the lines they would be
called upon to recite in public.14
Chanover also included newly composed English prayers for mother and
father to recite in anticipation of the birth of their child, entreating God that
the child should be born “sound in mind and body and with a happy nature,”
that the mother should be blessed with safety and strength during the delivery,
and that both parents should “be privileged to raise this child to be a blessing to
its loved ones, to Israel and all mankind.”15 These inclusions reflect a perception
on the part of authors and publishers that many American Jewish parents of this
era lacked fluency in Hebrew and would therefore appreciate, and likely require,
alternatives and additions to the traditional Hebrew prayers recited at childbirth rituals. Furthermore, with the addition of English prayers, producers of
child-rearing literature once again made an effort to contextualize Jewish birth
rituals in a comfortable modern format for their target audience of acculturated
Jewish parents.
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BRIT MILAH AND THE THOROUGHLY MODERN MOHEL
The circumcision ritual, or brit milah, signifies the entrance of the Jewish
male into the covenant between God and Abraham described in the book of
Genesis. Circumcision functions in Judaism as an important marker of both
ethnic and religious identity.16 Discussions of the circumcision ceremony in
these guidebooks and related sources, in addition to the step-by-step explanations of the ritual itself, frequently engaged in polemical discourse about the
crucial religious importance of the act itself and the centrality of the mohel,
or circumciser, to an authentic and valid execution of the ceremony. Commentators sought to alleviate the concerns of modern parents by presenting
circumcision as a normal and medically safe procedure that would inaugurate
the baby boy into Jewish peoplehood without risking his health or his status
in middle-class American society. At the same time, authors differed according to their ideological roots as to how modern Jewish parents should navigate
potential conflicts between Jewish customs and contemporary concerns.
Nathan Gottlieb, an Orthodox rabbi and mohel himself, devoted two
separate chapters in his A Jewish Child Is Born to discussions of the ritual’s
religious meaning and the qualities of the modern mohel. “With circumcision,” he wrote, “the child is made a Jew forever. . . . Through circumcision
the newly born are dedicated to God, to His Torah, and to the highest moral
and ethical code.”17
Gottlieb proceeded to explain why circumcision is a practice completely
in harmony with modern scientific principles but one that only a trained,
pious mohel could perform. On the one hand, he claimed, “the technique of
the modern mohel combines spiritual and surgical skill. The expert mohel is a
specialist who has advanced this procedure to the most modern medical standards.” Those who perform ritual circumcisions are capable of rendering the
brit milah a painless procedure, thanks to a familiarity with and use of modern instruments and techniques. The circumcision ceremony itself reflects an
intimate divine knowledge of pediatrics, Gottlieb argued, since by the eighth
day—the day on which the commandment should be performed, according
to Jewish law—the baby’s blood-clotting factors are more developed and the
potential health risks are greatly reduced.18
While brit milah thus accords with the latest and best medical practices,
however, Gottlieb warned his readers that a physician—even a Jewish one—
could not perform a halachic [valid according to Jewish law] circumcision
unless he was also a religiously observant Jew trained in the laws and practices
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of this ritual, capable of performing the act accordingly. “Only the physical act
of an expert mohel inspired by zeal for the Jewish religion renders a brit milah
proper,” Gottlieb cautioned. “If an ordinary physician not trained as a mohel
performs circumcision, even if a rabbi is present and reads the prayers, what
results is not milah, but only an act of surgery.” He reassured parents that even
Jewish doctors themselves prefer the services of a trained and devoted mohel
to those of a surgeon.19
Other authorities, seeking to alleviate parental fears that circumcision
might mark their sons as strange or harm them in some way, sought to remind
parents that circumcision was a common practice around the world. Rabbi
Morris Shoulson of Philadelphia, also a mohel, wrote in an essay for a volume
on the Jewish family that between two hundred million and three hundred
million people around the world lived in cultures that currently practice
circumcision and that 92 percent of American males are circumcised. Even
Prince Charles was circumcised at birth, Shoulson noted, when “the leading
mohel of London” paid a visit to Buckingham Palace.20
Like Gottlieb, Shoulson also marveled at the harmony between the
timing of the circumcision ceremony and the human body’s development.
Emphasizing the health benefits of Jewish ritual as an additional justification
for its performance, he cited studies claiming that circumcised men carried a
far lesser risk of developing penile cancer and that their wives would be less
prone to cervical cancer as a result of never coming into contact with the
foreskin.21
Several other authors from Conservative and Orthodox backgrounds
echoed Gottlieb’s insistence upon the indispensability of the mohel to an
authentic and valid ceremony.22 Authorities aligned with the more liberal
Reform movement, however, such as Rabbis Levi Olan and Floyd Fierman,
regularly assured their audiences that if a mohel could not be found or is not
preferred by the parents, a doctor could perform a ritual circumcision so long
as a rabbi or the father recited the appropriate Hebrew blessings and the baby’s
Hebrew name.23 This scenario played out in dramatic form in Covenants with
the Lord, a booklet of theatrical scripts written by members of the Temple
Beth-El Sisterhood in Great Neck, New York, and published by the Reformaffiliated National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods in 1951 for broader use.
A collection of plays about Jewish life-cycle ceremonies from a Reform
perspective, Covenants with the Lord followed three generations of the fictional
Cohen and Gold families, marking the passage of time through various rituals. In the first play, a newborn boy is circumcised in the hospital by a doctor
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despite the objections of one of the boy’s grandfathers, who insists that a
mohel perform the procedure in the sukkah, as the boy is born during the
holiday of Sukkot, when traditional Jews eat and sleep outside in temporary
huts. The grandmothers politely but firmly explain to their husbands that the
ceremony will be conducted indoors by a doctor, according to the new parents’
wishes, so that the baby not catch cold outdoors or risk infection. “Our Jewish
religion, thank God, is not a rigid one,” the first grandmother explains, while
the second adds, “True, a mohel today is just as sanitary as a doctor, but if the
children insist—what could we do? That does not mean that we can’t have a
mohel or a rabbi to recite the [ritual blessings]. That our grandson starts his life
as a Jew I took care of.”24 In the play, the grandmothers thus mediate between
their husbands’ desires to maintain tradition and their children’s desire to conform to modern standards of health care and propriety, suggesting a model of
ritual compromise for Reform Jews.
Whereas discussions of the circumcision ceremony revealed a deep current of anxiety about authenticity and ethnic status among the commentators,
their overviews of the welcoming ceremony for girls, which centered on the
announcement of the girl’s Hebrew name during synagogue services, were
much shorter and significantly less fraught. Naming ceremonies for girls in the
synagogue, like the brit milah ceremony, reinforced traditional gender roles in
the Jewish family, privileging the father’s public presence as representative of
the family and relegating the mother to the background.
“In the event your baby is a girl,” Hyman Chanover wrote, “the welcoming rites will be quite simple. They will center about naming her.” His chapter
titled “If It’s a Girl” described the mechanics of naming ceremonies for girls
in Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox services. Regardless of the denominational setting, fathers played the public role of relating the baby’s name to
the rabbi and offering blessings in these ceremonies, while mothers remained
largely invisible. Only in the Reform ceremony, according to Chanover, were
mothers granted the opportunity to participate in offering prayers of thanks.
Even in this case, however, the father retained the honor of announcing the
child’s Hebrew and English names and, through this and other declarations,
“publicly accept[ed] the responsibilities of Jewish fatherhood.”25
Across the denominational spectrum, these texts on circumcision emphasized the importance of the ritual as a symbol of the covenant between God
and the Jewish people. Authors also highlighted the consonance between
Jewish practice and scientific principles as a means of convincing wary Jewish parents of circumcision’s many benefits and of framing brit milah as both
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an ancient religious tradition and a prudent medical intervention.26 Whereas
authorities from Conservative and Orthodox backgrounds emphasized the
wisdom inherent in Jewish tradition insofar as it echoed and reinforced scientific findings, those writing from a Reform perspective praised Judaism’s
pragmatic flexibility and adaptability in response to situational considerations.
CHOOSING A NAME
The act of choosing English and Hebrew names for an American Jewish baby
provided another opportunity for parents, and those offering advice to them,
to weigh contemporary American tastes alongside Jewish practices. At the
conclusion of the brit milah ceremony for boys, or in a separate synagogue
ceremony for girls, most American Jewish parents bestow upon the baby a
Hebrew name, important for use in Jewish ritual, in addition to an English
name. According to Ashkenazi Jewish practice [roughly speaking, Jews originally from Central and Eastern Europe], the custom is to give a newborn the
name of a deceased relative, thereby carrying on that relative’s memory and
expressing a desire that the baby inherit the qualities and character traits of
his or her namesake. Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews, who trace their ancestry to
the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, North Africa, and the Middle East, name children
after living relatives, usually grandparents, for similar reasons.27
Accordingly, the practice of naming a Jewish child is tightly connected
to the transmission of ethnic and cultural identity as well as expressions of
acculturation. In a 1955 article in Commentary magazine, Rabbi Benzion
Kaganoff declared that “[f ]or Jews, first names are inevitably something more
than convenient labels for identification. . . . Among us they take on a highly
charged symbolic value.”28 Kaganoff and others writing on the subject of Jewish names suggested that a given name served multiple potential functions: a
marker of either assimilation or fealty to Jewish tradition, an indication of the
personal qualities that parents hoped their children would develop, and an
opportunity to link past and future generations of Jews by virtue of carrying
on the memory of a beloved family member.29
Rabbi Alfred Kolatch’s 1948 These Are the Names, one of only a few books
published on the subject of Jewish names before the 1970s, explored the history of Jewish naming practices from biblical times, weighed the merits and
demerits of various approaches to selecting a Hebrew name for a newborn,
and provided statistics on the most popular English and Hebrew names for children in addition to listing masculine and feminine names.30 Kolatch and other
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authors encouraged Jewish parents to select English biblical names for their
children, as opposed to those derived from French, German, and other sources.
Simon Chasen, a Hebrew-language instructor at Weequahic High School and
Rutgers University in New Jersey, noted in 1954 in the Conservative publication Women’s League Outlook that many a great American political and literary
figure dating back to colonial times carried a biblical name.31 Therefore, Chasen
argued, “if the American Jew really believes in his rightful place on the American
scene, in his inalienable rights as an American, he will not fear to bear proudly
names like Amiel, Boaz, Caleb . . . and others.”32
Shonie Levi and Sylvia Kaplan echoed this view in their 1959 book for
Jewish homemakers. Discouraging parents from selecting “so-called modern
‘equivalents,’ such as Stanley for Samuel, or Rhoda for Rebecca,” the authors
cheered the “revival today of the strong, colorful biblical names that are part
of America’s Puritan tradition.”33 That same year, in his landmark study Jews in
Suburbia, Rabbi Albert Gordon noted with pleasure that the current generation of American Jewish parents was selecting such Old Testament names for
their children with increasing frequency.34
While Gordon interpreted this development as a sign of growing ethnic pride among American Jews, Levi and Kaplan promoted the adoption
of biblical names by arguing that traditional Jewish names were intrinsically
American in both form and spirit. Returning to a theme prevalent in American
Jewish thought since at least the nineteenth century, the notion that Jewish
values from the Bible served as the inspiration for the American democratic
system, these authors extended the argument to encompass the choice of a
name. If names of Hebrew origin suited quintessential American figures such
as Abraham Lincoln and Abigail Adams, they and others suggested, then parents should not fear that the choice of such a name will subject their child to
discrimination.35 This argument, linking adherence to Judaism with American patriotism, carried additional weight in a Cold War era characterized
by increasing national acceptance of Judaism as an authentic American faith
alongside Protestantism and Catholicism.36
HOLIDAYS FOR THE HOME
In addition to informing Jewish parents about birth rituals, rabbis and other
authors of child-rearing advice also engaged in a concerted effort to educate
their audience about how to celebrate Jewish holidays at home as a family.
In May 1950, the Synagogue Council of America, which united all the main
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denominations of American Judaism, joined with Catholic and Protestant
organizations to sponsor National Family Week, an initiative to promote
family cohesiveness through religious education and worship. In a pamphlet
announcing the program, the council endeavored to convince American Jews
that religion was the best antidote for the fear and isolation brought on by
social and economic dislocation and the ever-present threat of nuclear war.
Returning to a familiar postwar theme, the Synagogue Council of America and other communal leaders advocated the adoption of Jewish rituals in
the home, as much for their own sake as for the psychological and emotional
benefits that the family would reap as a result. If the Jewish family could
be convinced to weave ritual observances into the fabric of their lives, the
authors believed, children and parents would develop happiness, camaraderie,
and emotional security; the family would rescue itself from disintegration and
despair; and Jewish continuity would be ensured.37
Dr. Evelyn Garfiel, a psychologist and the national education chairman
for the Conservative National Women’s League of the United Synagogue of
America, seconded these arguments in a 1953 article titled “The Sabbath and
Jewish Family Living” published in the organization’s magazine. As Garfiel
explained to her readers, human beings need to acquire a sense of belonging to
a group larger than themselves, and no group is more important in this respect
than the family. Accordingly, Garfiel urged her readers to take advantage of
the opportunities afforded by the Friday night Sabbath table rituals to cultivate familial fellowship. The act of joining together on a weekly basis to eat
together, worship God, and bless one’s children, she suggested, can instill “an
intense feeling of being part of a self-sufficient group” upon the entire family.38
To help parents achieve this goal, rabbis and educators produced a wealth
of how-to literature on Jewish holiday celebrations for parents in response to
what they perceived as widespread unfamiliarity with these traditions among
this particular generation of adults.39 As with those rituals surrounding birth,
authors of these holiday handbooks acknowledged that parents today “often
find themselves unable to introduce the various home ceremonials and customs that are associated with our Festivals and Holy Days because they have
long since forgotten the historic reasons for the observances, or because they
never knew them.”40
In light of this knowledge gap, many such guides aimed at multigenerational education, teaching parents so they could in turn teach and celebrate
with their children. Rabbi Albert Gordon’s 1947 How to Celebrate Hanukah at
Home, along with companion volumes on the festivals of Passover and Purim,
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included an explanation of each holiday’s origins, a program of Hebrew prayers
and English readings, recipes for special dishes associated with each holiday, and
a list of supplementary books and recordings. For children, Gordon included
activities to entice their participation in the family ritual, such as a “Passover
scavenger hunt,” Passover-themed charades, songs, and poems.41 Similarly,
Rabbi Simon Glustrom’s 1956 volume When Your Child Asks devoted a chapter to explaining how and why each Jewish holiday is celebrated. The author
offered detailed answers for parents on questions their children might be
tempted to ask about such topics as why Hanukkah is celebrated for eight days
or why Jews eat only unleavened bread during Passover.42
Rabbis, psychologists, and educators counseled Jewish parents to observe
holiday rituals and customs, both old and new, as a means of creating happy
memories and giving children and adults a sense of belonging to both the Jewish community and American society at large. In the words of psychologist
Kurt Lewin, such positive affirmations of Jewishness constituted “one of the
few effective things that Jewish parents can do for the later happiness of their
children.” Possessed with a firm feeling of “group belongingness,” Lewin and
others believed, the Jewish child would be better prepared to cope with discrimination and the pressures of modern life. Domestic religious celebrations also
offered American Jews an important opportunity to demonstrate their affinity
for the shared values and beliefs at the core of Cold War American culture.43
DISSECTING THE “DECEMBER DILEMMA”
If postwar commentators viewed Jewish holidays as an invaluable opportunity
to inculcate children and families with pride and security as Jews, then it is
no surprise that they felt an urgent need to address the “December dilemma,”
the question of whether and to what extent Jewish parents should permit their
children to participate in Christmas celebrations. In a new age of increased
interfaith cooperation, in which public displays of religiosity carried significant political weight, and an era of increased sensitivity to children’s mental
and emotional states, the issue of Jewish engagement with Christmas took on
new dimensions.44 Seeking a balance between fostering goodwill with Christians and encouraging an intensification of Jewish family holiday observance,
most rabbis delineated between public and private Christmas celebrations
in recommending to parents what their children should and should not be
allowed to do. In the process, they turned to religious, psychological, and
social considerations in weighing how American Jewish parents should act.
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Abraham Karp, a Conservative rabbi and author of the 1958 pamphlet
Our December Dilemma, urged readers to resist the urge and social pressure
to put up a Christmas tree in their home or to have their children participate
in Christmas pageants and school celebrations. Karp’s objection was rooted in
both psychological and religious grounds. Such activities, he warned, could
engender feelings of inferiority in the Jewish child, especially one who has not
been raised to appreciate his or her Jewishness and the beauty of Hanukkah
and other Jewish traditions. Moreover, Karp argued, when Jews decorate a
Christmas tree or sing carols, they misappropriate Christian religious traditions in a manner disrespectful to believing Christians.45
Morris Landes, an Orthodox rabbi from Pittsburgh, put forward similar
pleas to Jewish parents in a 1949 newspaper editorial in which he implored
them to shun Christmas celebrations to protect their children’s mental health
and insisted that Christmas was a Christian holiday. The Jewish child who
yearns to decorate a Christmas tree and receive a stocking full of gifts wants
most of all to feel a part of something greater than himself, he argued.
“To give him the tree without all the religious trimmings around it is to give
him the shadow without the substance and to do irreparable harm to him
psychologically,” Landes wrote. “To give him both Christmas and Chanukah
is to add confusion to psychic injury and to pave the way for maladjustments
later in life.”46
Like Karp, Landes turned to psychology to justify to Jewish parents why
they must not celebrate Christmas with their children. He implored his adult
readers to satisfy their children’s emotional needs (and, implicitly, their own)
through Judaism: “The child craves religion. Let him find it in Judaism. The
child seeks status, the feeling that he belongs to something. Let him belong to
the Jewish people.” This notion of attachment could not be cultivated only in
December, Landes argued, but is the result of regular engagement with Jewish
holidays throughout the year—decorating a sukkah, or outdoor hut, in the fall;
listening to the Exodus story at a Passover seder in the spring; and lighting the
Hanukkah candles in the winter.47
The desirability of interfaith relationships also played a role as rabbis
considered what Jewish parents and their children should and should not do
at Christmastime. “It is the genius and greatness of America that differing
religious groups live together in peace, harmony, and mutual respect,” Karp
wrote, appealing to a notion of American exceptionalism grounded in theological tolerance.48 In this spirit, he and other rabbis did countenance certain
interfaith activities at Christmastime, such as participating in a gift exchange
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or attending a holiday party, especially when done in a conscious spirit of
goodwill between friends and neighbors of different religions. However, he
cautioned, while this atmosphere of tolerance allows Jews to join with members of other faiths to mark national occasions, such as Independence Day and
Thanksgiving, the same set of principles grant Jews the right to celebrate their
own holidays as well.49
Given the strong pull of Christmas traditions for children, authors
encouraged Jewish parents to give their children Hanukkah celebrations that
matched the sensual and material festivity of the gentile holiday. Rose Goldstein, writing in Women’s League Outlook in 1951, advised mothers to bring
“bright lights and starry ornaments” into their home celebrations, with the use
of electric menorahs to “satisfy the urge to illumine the blackness of winter
nights.” Goldstein described the process by which she converted a string of
Christmas tree lights into a decorative assortment of paper flowers, lights, and
six-pointed Stars of David, suitable for Hanukkah display. She also recommended that families exchange gifts for the duration of the holiday, which
would add to the joy and excitement of the children, and that menorahthemed centerpieces and salads in the shape of the menorah be placed on the
dinner table.50
She and others urged Jewish parents to elevate their family Hanukkah
celebrations so as to mitigate the very temptation to participate in Christmas celebrations. Rabbi Albert Gordon explicitly reminded parents to “be
mindful of the fact that your non-Jewish neighbors take time and pains to
make Christmas an occasion of gladness. Unless you take equal pains with
the Hanukah party,” he warned, “you cannot hope to make the Festival a
thrilling experience.”51 To address the religious and psychological issues at
stake for Jewish children at Christmastime, Gordon and Goldstein called
on American Jewish parents to invigorate their family Hanukkah celebrations with the introduction of festive decorations, games, food, and gift
giving. Remaking the holiday in the image of the American Christmas, they
reasoned, was the ultimate solution to the “December dilemma.”52
CONCLUSION
On May 10, 1961, at the Park Schenley Restaurant in Pittsburgh, Lillian
Friedberg addressed a local chapter meeting of Hadassah, a Zionist women’s
organization. Friedberg, the executive director of Pittsburgh’s Jewish Community Relations Council, chose as her topic for the evening “Preparing Our
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Children for Living in Today’s World.” Living in a predominantly Christian
society, Friedberg declared, Jewish children needed a warm and comforting
family environment, a strong education, and a solid foundation in the values
of their religion, which she identified as democracy and human rights. Both
the psychologists of today and the Jewish sages of old agree, she asserted, that
the child raised in this manner is “fortified by his spiritual heritage . . . [and]
strengthened by self-acceptance” and “embarked on a normal move toward a
mature, useful and happy life.”53
Friedberg’s prescription for raising “a good American and a good Jew—
a complete person”—exemplifies the central themes and arguments of postwar American Jewish parenting advice.54 Friedberg and others offering childrearing recommendations to American Jews relied heavily on psychological
revelations about child development and mental health, a rhetorical strategy
that framed the goal of Jewish continuity in appealingly secular and scientific terms. Authors of child-rearing literature also co-opted the ideological
language of Cold War–era civic religion to convince Jewish parents that as
good Jews and good Americans, they should choose biblical names for their
children, celebrate religious holidays as a family, and take measured steps
toward interfaith goodwill efforts at Christmastime. In an era when religious
faith versus godlessness defined the gap between good and evil and between
emotional security and spiritual despair, American Jewish parenting advisers urged mothers and fathers to make religious observance a hallmark of
their family life. In sum, they offered American Jewish parents what many
of them wanted: a means for bestowing their children with some measure of
attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people in a manner that would not
prevent their full entry and acceptance into mainstream American life.
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Modern Families: Multifaceted Identities
in the Jewish Adoptive Family
Jennifer Sartori
When the ABC sitcom Modern Family debuted in 2009, it was an instant hit.
The show’s funny but sympathetic portrayal of the diversity—in both structure and composition—that characterizes “modern families” clearly struck a
chord with the American public. Among the branches of the extended family
at the heart of the show are two multiracial families, a blended family, a gay
family, and only one “traditional” nuclear family. Today’s families, the show
suggests, come in many colors, shapes, and sizes, mixing races, ethnicities,
nationalities, ages, and sexualities, yet they are all still fundamentally families.
What would a Jewish “modern family” look like? As in the familiar joke
about the Jewish community, like its non-Jewish counterpart, only more so.
American Jewish families, like the Pritchett clan, are becoming increasingly
variegated. Although communal discussions of the changes in the Jewish family often focus on the “problem” of intermarriage, American Jewish families are
becoming increasingly “multi” in other ways as well: multiracial, multicultural,
multiethnic, multinational. Identity for these families can be a complex and
dynamic dance, bringing together influences that may be complementary or
contradictory, that may blend seamlessly or be difficult to reconcile.
Adoptive families have been at the forefront of these trends. Because very
few children adopted into the American Jewish community in recent decades
were born to Jewish birth parents, the vast majority of adoptees—whether
adopted transnationally and/or transracially or from white American parents
of non-Jewish background—inherently bring with them identities that differ
from those of their new parents. How do Jewish adoptive families respond to
the issues that arise from these complexities? In particular, how do adoptees
raised in Jewish families navigate the complicated waters of identity in relation
to both their adoptive and their birth heritages? How do these two facets of
their identities interact?
To learn more about this growing population, my colleague Jayne
Guberman and I are engaged in a multipronged research study, the Adoption
& Jewish Identity Project.
We began by conducting an in-depth online survey of Jewish adoptive
parents to which close to 1,000 people responded, yielding 781 usable surveys.
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Because the survey was conducted online and spread virally, the results are
not necessarily representative of all Jewish adoptive parents. In particular, the
respondents were younger than average, yielding more accurate information
about more recent trends in adoption; whiter than average; and may be more
strongly identified Jewishly than the norm.1 However, the sample in many
ways resembles the broader American Jewish population, and we believe that
the data can yield valuable information regarding Jewish adoptive families.2
We are also conducting an ongoing effort to gather the voices of young adult
adoptees raised in Jewish families through a questionnaire, oral histories, and
other submissions. This essay is drawn largely from these two sources.
Our research has created a portrait of the dramatic changes in Jewish
adoptive families that have occurred over the past several decades, particularly
the striking increase in the number of adoptions across racial, national, and
religious lines. The majority of Jewish adoptees, we have found, regularly find
themselves navigating multiple identities. Although for some one aspect of
their identity is clearly primary and others more actively juggle the various
elements, virtually all find that different aspects of their sense of self come
to the fore in different contexts. This multifaceted sense of self is continually
evolving, moreover, with identities developing long past the classic adolescent
identity crisis.
MAJOR TRENDS IN ADOPTION
In order to comprehend the contemporary Jewish adoptive experience, it
is necessary first to understand the major trends in adoption over the past
several decades. Adoption today exists in significant contrast to fifty years
ago, in both the profile of children being adopted and ideas about adoption,
adoptive identity, and adoptive parenting.3 For much of the mid-twentieth
century, the reigning paradigm in adoption was “matching”: matching children with prospective adoptive parents so as to create families that would
seem to be biological or “natural.”4 Adoption experts believed strongly that
adoptive families would be more “authentic,” and thus more successful, if they
resembled biological ones. Attempts were made to match in a wide variety of
ways, not only by race and appearance but also by less visible criteria, such as
personality, intellectual ability, and religion. Indeed, religion was one of the
most deep-seated elements of matching, enshrined in law more often than
any other aspect.5 During this period, most formal adoptions were of white
newborns adopted by white, middle-class, heterosexual couples; children of
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color and older children were often seen as “unadoptable” and shut out of the
system, while parents of color, working-class families, and single parents, seen
as unsuitable, could not meet agencies’ strict criteria for adoptive parents.
The matching paradigm and the assumptions that underlay it fostered a
culture of secrecy, stigma, and shame in adoption. If “matching” was successful, adoptive families could “pass” as biological families. That very effort to
“pass,” however, implied that adoptive families were inferior and that adoption
was something to be ashamed of and to be shrouded in secrecy, both within
the family and in the community. All members of the adoption triad (adoptive
parents, adoptees, and birth parents) were encouraged to act essentially as if
adoption had never happened. Adoptive parents were counseled to raise their
children as if they had been born to them, and ties between children and their
birth families and birth heritages were generally cut completely.6
By the end of the twentieth century, this paradigm had largely broken
apart. The easy availability of birth control, the legalization of abortion with
Roe v. Wade in 1973, and the growing acceptance of single motherhood
caused the number of healthy white American newborns available for adoption to plummet, while demand from prospective adoptive parents continued
to increase. In response, the definition of “adoptable children” expanded to
include children from other countries, children of color, children with special
needs, and older children in foster care.
Transnational adoption, begun as a humanitarian effort in the aftermath
of World War II, emerged in earnest during the Korean War. The most prominent sending countries have varied over time but are generally poorer nations,
mostly nonwhite, and often experiencing economic or political dislocation
or natural disasters. Transnational adoption reached its peak in 2004, when
22,884 children were adopted into the United States; since then, the number
has declined precipitously, to 5,647 in 2015.7
From the beginning, many transnational adoptions were also transracial.
Domestic transracial adoption emerged later, beginning slowly in the 1960s
and alternately expanding and contracting, shaped by changing racial attitudes, legal developments, and the evolution of ideas about what makes a good
adoptive family.8 In 1996, with the goal of increasing the number of adoptions
from foster care by encouraging transracial adoption, the Interethnic Placement Provisions of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA-IEP) prohibited
agencies receiving federal funds from taking race into account in foster and
adoptive placements.9 Today, approximately 40 percent of American adoptions are transracial, including the vast majority of international adoptions
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and smaller but still substantial percentages of foster care and domestic infant
adoptions.10 The number of public adoptions from foster care—very often of
older children, many of whom are children of color—also increased considerably, as policies shifted from encouraging reunification with birth families
toward promoting adoption as a route to permanency.11
Accompanying these transformations have been sea changes in ideas
about adoption and in understanding of adoptive identity. Three interrelated
trends stand out: (1) an increasing openness both about and within adoption;
(2) a growing recognition of the role of grief and loss, both personal and cultural, in adoption; and (3) an encouragement of active engagement with birth
heritages and communities.
The secrecy that used to characterize adoption has been on the wane for
several decades. Not only is secrecy generally impossible to maintain in cases
of transracial and older child adoption, but the assault by a variety of nontraditional families on the idea of the inherent superiority of the traditional twoparent, heterosexual, biological nuclear family has also lessened the incentive
to “pass” as a biological family. Adoptive parents are now encouraged to talk
openly and regularly about adoption with their children from a young age
and are far less likely to hide the fact of their adoptions from their children and
their communities. Adoptees themselves have pushed, with varying levels of
success, for access to their original birth certificates, the sealing of which often
kept their backgrounds and origin shrouded in secrecy.12
Greater openness within adoption has paralleled greater openness about
adoption. In private domestic adoptions, the vast majority of expectant parents
now select their child’s adoptive parents, and some level of contact between
birth and adoptive families is increasingly the norm, ranging from occasional
mediated contact (for example, a yearly exchange of letters and photos through
the adoption agency) to regular direct contact (for example, phone calls, Skype
chats, and in-person visits). Adoption experts now believe that such contact,
when circumstances allow, is healthier for all members of the adoption triad.13
Adoption has also shifted from being seeing as a win-win situation for all
concerned (in which a needy child receives a comfortable home, adoptive parents—often assumed to be infertile—receive a child, and a pregnant woman
resolves a crisis and moves on with her life) to one that, while often filled with
joy and love, is also characterized by loss and grief. While adoptees indeed gain
new families, they also lose birth parents, extended family and community,
cultural heritage, access to medical history, and often their place in the racial
and/or ethnic group of their birth.14 Adoption experts now argue that grieving
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such losses is natural and that recognition of them can be a healthier response
than repressing them.
Connected to both of these trends has been a shift in emphasis toward
the importance of knowledge of personal roots, whether biological, ethnic,
or historical. The previous attitude that an adoptee who craved information
about or contact with his or her birth family and heritage was maladjusted has
largely given way to a sense that such a need is natural and deeply ingrained
in humans.15 In contrast to previous generations of adoptive parents, who
were often counseled to raise their children as if they had been born to them,
“best practices” in adoption now encourage parents to foster connections to
their children’s heritages and communities of origin. Such recommendations
are often aimed especially at those who have adopted transracially and/or
transnationally, as cultural competency and relationships with individuals of
the child’s race are seen as crucial to healthy racial and ethnic identity formation.16 These developments have brought questions of multiple and blended
identities (which previously often simmered under the surface) to the fore for
many adoptive families.
MAJOR TRENDS IN JEWISH ADOPTION
How do Jews fit into these trends? Overall, American Jews appear to adopt at
approximately twice the rate of non-Jews. In 2000, about 5 percent of Jewish
households with children had an adopted child in the home, compared to
2.5 percent of American households overall; with that 5 percent having risen
from only 3 percent in 1990, the percentage may well be even higher today.17
Not only have the numbers of Jewish adoptive families risen, but the characteristics of those families have also changed substantially. Perhaps the most
striking demographic finding of our parent survey is the pronounced increase
in adoptions across boundaries of identity, far greater than the already considerable increase in such adoptions among the American population as a whole.
Survey respondents had adopted from the 1950s through the 2000s, allowing us
to track change over time. In keeping with the “matching” paradigm, from the
1950s through the 1970s white Jewish families generally adopted white American newborns. All the children adopted in the 1950s and 1960s and 74 percent
of those adopted in the 1970s were white; 94 percent of children adopted during these three decades were adopted domestically (65 percent through private
adoptions, 29 percent through the public foster care system). These white
American newborns, moreover, not infrequently had at least one Jewish birth
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parent: of children adopted in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 36 percent had a
Jewish birth mother, and 15 percent had a Jewish birth father.18
By the early twenty-first century, the numbers had changed dramatically.19 Only a tiny percentage of adoptees were born to Jewish parents
(4 percent had a Jewish birth mother, 3 percent had a Jewish birth father),
and the numbers of transracial and transnational adoptions had skyrocketed. A full 66 percent of respondents who adopted between 2000 and 2009
did so transnationally; by striking contrast, only approximately 15 percent
of American adoptions overall in the same period were transnational.20
Similarly, the percentage of nonwhite children adopted into Jewish families
increased steadily each decade, to 65 percent in the decade 2000–2009 and a
full 76 percent between 2010 and 2012.21 Of the children adopted by survey
respondents between 2000 and 2012, 34 percent were white, 32 percent were
Asian or Asian-mixed, 17 percent were Latino or Latino-mixed, and 15 percent
were black or black-mixed.22
IDENTITY FOR JEWISH ADOPTEES
American Jewish adoptive families, then, increasingly cross lines of race, culture, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. How, if at all, does Jewish identity
make the experiences of these adoptees distinct from those of adoptees raised
in non-Jewish families? How do their racial and/or ethnic identities and their
affiliation with or knowledge of their communities and cultures of origin
impact their Jewish identities? In short, how do these adoptees negotiate the
often complex relationships between their birth and adoptive heritages?
Although these issues of identity are by no means absent for domestic
same-race adoptees, they are generally most overt for transracial and/or transnational adoptees and their families. The complexities begin in childhood,
when parents play a key role in shaping their children’s experiences of adoption
and must make important decisions about their Jewish upbringing and birth
heritage socialization. Our survey indicates that the vast majority of Jewish
parents who adopt transracially and/or transnationally have taken adoption
professionals’ advice to heart and believe that it is important to include elements of their children’s birth heritages in their lives.23 Indeed, given a list of
fifteen possible birth heritage socialization practices, most who adopted in
recent decades reported doing so in multiple ways, ranging from reading books
to eating in ethnic restaurants to studying languages and developing relationships with people from the child’s community of origin.24
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Parents, however, do not exist in a vacuum. Asked about the responses
of members of their immediate Jewish communities to their efforts to foster
identification with their children’s birth heritages and communities of origin,
the majority of survey respondents reported positive or neutral reactions. Yet a
substantial minority described disapproving or hostile responses from rabbis,
synagogue communities, or their own families, and even those who described
positive reactions sometimes hinted at considerable communal ambivalence.
These childhood experiences may have a significant influence on adoptees’
later sense of identity.
Much of the pushback described by parents appears to stem from familial
and communal concerns that exposure to a child’s culture of origin will foster
an identification that will compete with or confuse the child’s Jewish identity.
Several parents commented specifically that their rabbis and communities
communicated the distinct message that Jewish education should be primary,
to the exclusion of any instruction related to their birth heritage. As one survey
respondent reported, “[Our] rabbi, who is otherwise welcoming to my children, has discouraged pursuit of Chinese learning, as he would rather see them
identify primarily as Jews. I don’t see why they can’t pursue both.” “The Jewish
community is very supportive . . . but somewhat from a distance,” remarked
another. “They still project . . . that Jewish education takes precedence over
other choices (i.e., Hebrew over Vietnamese), which is a difficult choice, and
VERY hard to do both!!”
More commonly, parents remarked not on a specific incident or episode
but rather on a more general sense of communal disapproval of or ambivalence
about their efforts to bring their children’s birth heritages into their lives, or simply on a lack of awareness. “I get the feeling that others don’t see birth heritage as
being as important as Jewish heritage. Born of ignorance, I think,” wrote one
respondent. Some of the many additional comments were “They are wary”;
“They are clueless”; “They seem . . . puzzled and mildly interested” [ellipses
in original]; “Not a positive response in this particular suburban community”;
“They do not seem to think of it as their issue”; “They’re interested but often
at arms’ length, especially if they are uncomfortable with other cultures”; “With
interest but not necessarily enthusiasm or approval”; and “Very poorly. It’s either
Ashkenazi or the highway. I’ve had to leave my synagogue because of it.” Some
parents remarked on family concerns about “identity confusion” or “conflicted
identities,” or grandparents wanting the children to be exposed as little as possible to their birth heritages.25 “Some family members think it is a waste of time,”
wrote one parent, “since she is a Jewish kid being raised in a Jewish home.”
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Two comments in particular—both from parents who in fact described
their communities as supportive—highlight the ambivalence that often characterizes the Jewish community’s attitudes toward incorporation of another
aspect of a child’s identity. One woman with two adopted children of color
wrote that “I tried to incorporate all I could from my children’s birth heritage as long as it did not contradict Judaism. It is well accepted.” In a similar
vein, a woman who had adopted from China wrote that her community had
responded “positively—everyone loved the Chinese vegan food at the bat
mitzvah.” These parents had clearly tried their best to incorporate their children’s birth heritages into their lives in ways that felt fully compatible with
their families’ Jewish identity, and their communities had embraced their
efforts. Their comments indicate, however, that adoptive families may find
that such efforts are accepted only up to a certain point—as long as they do
not explicitly “contradict” Judaism by, for example, including nonvegan (presumably treif, or nonkosher) Chinese food.
For some adoptees and their families, such limitations may be unproblematic. Others, however, craving connection with their birth heritage as well
as their adoptive heritage, may find vegan Chinese food a superficial basis for
a strong Chinese identity and may chafe under the sense that other elements
of their birth heritage would be seen as unwelcome. When attachment to
birth heritage goes beyond vegan Chinese food, whether simply to eating more
authentic Chinese food or to wishing to explore the Catholic background of
an adoptee from Latin America, for example, communal responses are likely
to be far less enthusiastic.
Given Jewish communal concerns about continuity, such hesitation
about alternative forms of identity is perhaps not surprising. Worried about
the future of American Jewry, communal leaders—and adoptive parents themselves—may emphasize the importance of a strong and exclusive Jewish identity in the belief that it is most likely to strengthen American Jewry in the long
run. Such concerns may lead some adoptive parents to shy away from serious
engagement with birth heritage or community. Although the survey data cannot prove causality, many of the most common birth heritage socialization
practices reported by parents were relatively low-commitment activities of the
type less likely to foster deep attachment to a form of identity potentially “competing with” Jewishness, such as reading books (cited by 78 percent of parents
of children of color and 73 percent of parents of children born abroad), buying
arts and crafts (72 percent and 75 percent), and eating in ethnic restaurants
(68 percent and 70 percent). Significantly fewer parents reported many of the
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higher-commitment activities that would have a higher likelihood of cultivating
strong birth heritage identification, such as attending culture camps or classes
(cited by 30 percent of parents of children of color and 31 percent of parents
of children born abroad), studying languages (cited by 38 percent of parents of
children born abroad), and visiting the child’s birth country (cited by 31 percent
of parents of children born abroad).26
Regardless of their own and their families’ relationships to their birth
heritage, transracially adopted children not infrequently experience considerable questioning of their Jewish identity. Like all Jews of color, Jewish adoptees
of color are profoundly impacted by the deep-seated presumption—common
to American Jews and non-Jews alike—that Jews are white. This presumption can be traced not simply to the East European origin of the majority of
American Jews but also to the pervasive “whitening” of American Jews noted
by so many scholars, a process that eventually placed Jews securely on the
white side of the black-white binary historically characteristic of American race
relations.27 Because of the now widespread assumption that Jewish = white
and despite the well-documented racial and ethnic diversity within the Jewish community, Jews of color very often find the authenticity of their Jewish
identities questioned by both Jews and non-Jews, and children of color with
white parents are by no means immune. When this questioning comes from
within their own communities, it can be especially devastating. The following
are a few of the countless examples that emerge from our research:
• A young woman adopted from China writes that “When I was eight
years old, a fellow Hebrew school student asked if it was even legal
to be Asian and Jewish. This hurt deeply, though he meant no harm.
Eventually, I dropped out of Hebrew school for a number of years.”28
• A Korean adoptee writes about a childhood experience in her own
temple, where her family attended services regularly: “There was
a family in front of us—a mom, dad, and three daughters. . . .
The three girls kept turning around and staring at us. They would
whisper to each other and kept talking about the ‘Asians.’ It definitely
hurt my feelings . . . even more so because I felt like this was ‘my
temple’ and I belonged here, and if anyone didn’t belong there, it was
those girls and that family.”29
• A white mother of a multiracial son comments that “The sentiment,
‘If you’re Black, you can’t be Jewish,’ came up several times, including at [Jewish camp] and at Sunday School. Our son was treated, at
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times, as an exotic animal, when he desperately wanted to be one of
the kids. He went from being proud of being Jewish to distancing
himself from it.”30
While such questioning of their Jewish identity can itself be harmful to a
child’s emerging sense of self, even more pernicious is the outright racism
and discrimination that many experience within their Jewish communities.
One young adult Korean adoptee wrote poignantly about her experience with
racism as a child: “Most of the racism I have experienced was from within
the Jewish community. My mom pulled me from Jewish pre-school before the
second day was over, because the other kids refused to play with me. At JCC
camp, other campers would make snide comments about me being a karate
or kung-fu master, I never fit in at Hebrew school, and was an outcast in my
class for most of my middle and high school years.”31
In our parent survey, we asked parents of children of color if their children had experienced discrimination in the Jewish community. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the responses differed by race: parents of black children were
by far the most likely to say yes (28 percent), followed by parents of Latino
children (15 percent) and of Asian children (11 percent). Given that research
shows that transracially adopted children very often do not tell their parents
about the discrimination they experience, the real rates of discrimination are
likely considerably higher. And even without any explicit encounters with
racism, many adoptees of color report having felt different, exoticized, marginalized, and even outcast within their largely white synagogues, day schools,
Jewish camps, and other institutions, at a stage of life when children want
nothing more than to feel like everyone else.32
Despite these sometimes ambivalent responses from families and communities, many of the transracially adopted young adults we have interviewed
recall their Jewish identity as having been relatively uncomplicated as children.
Like many transracial adoptees, they experienced a form of “honorary white
privilege” as children; with their white, generally Ashkenazi parents serving as
a kind of protective shell, they felt comfortable as Jews within their own communities where they were known and nurtured, especially in cases in which
their parents had searched very deliberately for welcoming and inclusive congregations and institutions.
The issues of identity often become more complicated for transracial
adoptees in the teen years and into young adulthood, as they begin to experience the world outside the partial cocoon of their immediate families and
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communities. As they go out into the world on their own, they lose the honorary white privilege they experienced as children and are seen for the first time
fully as individuals of color, rather than as members of a white Jewish family.
In doing so, they often find aspects of their identity questioned by both the
Jewish community and members of their community of origin.
If transracial adoptees often find their Jewish identity questioned as
children, such questioning becomes far more frequent when they experience
the Jewish community as individuals, not as their parents’ children. Going to
Hillel, for example, many adoptees of color are met with incredulity and are
sometimes told that the Korean, African American, or Latin American student
group meets down the hall. As the white mother of a daughter adopted from
Korea reflected, “It is always assumed that she is not Jewish, and after a while
she seemed to feel that they must know something she didn’t. It just wears her
down when people always give her that ‘WOW! You’re Jewish?’ look.” Under
these circumstances, many adoptees of color find themselves having to “prove”
their Jewish identity over and over again, whether by providing detailed
information about whether and how they were converted or demonstrating their cultural competency as Jews. As a woman adopted from Colombia
commented, “I guess you could say I’m not your typical ‘Jew,’ whatever that
means. As an adult I felt I always had to give an explanation as to how I could
be Jewish. Or people would need to find a reason for how I am Jewish which
pushes me away a little from the Jewish community. . . . People tend to not
see ME when they find out I’m Jewish; all they see are my differences.” Dating
and marriage in particular can be challenging. As a Korean adoptee remarked,
“As I’ve gotten older, especially with dating, I’ve found it more difficult. People
have tried to ‘test’ me to see how Jewish I really am, which is actually quite
racist and offensive.”33
Conversely, many adult adoptees of color also find their identities questioned by their communities of origin. Echoing the assumption that Jews are
white, black, Asian, and Latino communities may question the adoptee’s Jewishness, presupposing another religious identity because he or she is of color. Often
even more powerfully, they may also challenge the adoptee’s cultural competency
vis-à-vis black, Asian, or Latino identity, which indeed often is limited because
of their upbringing. It is thus not uncommon for Jewish adoptees of color
to report feeling out of place among people of their own racial or national
background. As a Latino adoptee who began working with Latino youth writes,
“I became aware of how little I shared in common with Latino students and
my own Latino identity. It was one thing to identify as Mexican in the small
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town in Connecticut where I grew up, but here in New York, not speaking
Spanish and not being aware of Mexican or Mexican-American culture, my
Latino identity has begun to feel hollow.” Under these circumstances, many
adoptees feel that they do not fully fit into either their adoptive community
or their birth community.
Transracial adoptees’ identities continue to evolve throughout adulthood,
with many feeling that they live at the nexus of multiple identities. Some say
that they feel very comfortable with their Jewishness, especially within their
own carefully chosen community or the community in which they grew up
and feel known. Indeed, some feel most comfortable within a Jewish context, which feels more familiar than their communities of origin, where they
continue to feel marginal or even rejected. As a young woman adopted from
China wrote, “I’ve identified primarily as Jewish as it is the culture in which I
was raised. Most of my role models are Jewish—not Asian.” However, many
continue to talk about feeling that they need to “prove” their Jewish identity
repeatedly, especially when they step outside their own community and have
to demonstrate that they are “really” Jewish.
Many parents who choose a same-race domestic adoption do so assuming that they will not have to face these complicated questions of multiple
identities. Indeed, among our survey respondents, parents of same-race
adoptees were far less likely to see their children as having a birth heritage
different from their own (only 45 percent said their child had a different
birth heritage, with another 10 percent saying they were unsure, in contrast
to 91 percent of parents of transracial adoptees believing that their children
had a different birth heritage). Even those who do identify their children as
having a different birth heritage overwhelmingly do not see it as important
to bring that heritage into their lives; a full 97 percent responded that it was
either not at all important or not particularly important to do so. “Our son is
the same race as us,” wrote one respondent, “so other than different religions,
there really wasn’t anything to expose him to”; the implication was that this
mother would have considered exposing her son to other elements of a birth
heritage but not religious ones, given potential conflicts with Judaism. “[We]
have absolutely nothing to do with her ‘birth heritage,’” wrote another. “As
she is white, there is little to celebrate in the way of her heritage; she is an
American, apple pie and baseball kind of child.”
Yet for many white adoptees raised in Jewish families, identity is not so
simple. In part, their struggles stem from an often unacknowledged tendency
in the Jewish community to conceive of Jewish identity in biological terms.
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Indeed, this emphasis on “blood logic” in defining and maintaining Jewish
identity appears to have increased in recent years; as many Jews cease to “do”
much Jewishly, they fall back on genes, blood, and appearance to articulate
their sense of their own Jewishness.34 Despite valid conversions and Jewish
upbringings, many adoptees—white as well as of color—report having their
Jewish identity questioned because they were not “born Jewish.” “For years
my cousins all told me I wasn’t ‘really’ Jewish because I’m not ethnically [read:
biologically or racially] Jewish,” writes a white domestically adopted woman.
A white Orthodox woman writes that “It’s looked down [on] by the community because even though I lived my whole life as a Jew, I’m still considered
a ‘convert.’”35 And another white domestic Jewish adoptee remembers that
“When I was older, questions at camp as to whether I was a real Jew since
I was converted became more common and made me uncomfortable.”36 “Real
Jew,” “outcast,” “not Jewish enough”—the words come up over and over again
in our research and demonstrate how deep an impact thinking about Jewish
blood has on adoptees not “born into” the Jewish community.
For many white adoptees not born to Jewish birth parents, the painful
sense of biological difference from their family and the Jewish community
is expressed through a concern about not “looking Jewish.” Virtually every
transracial Jewish adoptee at some point hears the “light-hearted” comment
“Funny, you don’t look Jewish” or is told that it “looks wrong” for them
to be practicing Judaism.37 Same-race adoptees, however, are by no means
strangers to such remarks. Hair, eye color, and noses come up repeatedly in
white adoptees’ discussions of their experiences in the Jewish community.
As a white domestically adopted man comments, “Being a blond haired,
blue eyed kid at Solomon Schechter is not an easy thing for a young kid to
do. I [was] plopped into the most homogeneous soup one could imagine,
and expected to thrive. I was asked why I looked different—I wasn’t really
sure.” Similarly, a white domestically adopted woman writes, “I have a very
round ‘button’ nose. And I have been asked if my nose was a Bat Mitzvah
gift. . . . I personally always wanted to appear and look more Jewish just to
fit in.” And from the white adopted daughter of a rabbi: “Community was
hard. I didn’t look Jewish. How did this Rabbi get a little blonde girl with
a Shiksa nose?”38
Because of the American Jewish community’s emphasis on academic
achievement, learning disabilities too can be cause for a sense of biological
alienation from Jewishness. As a white domestically adopted woman remembers poignantly:
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“Jews don’t have learning disabilities,” I mistakenly thought. One
day I decided that I was not Jewish. I had been adopted by Jewish parents and it was their identity, not mine. I felt alienated and
disconnected and left the community for many years. I was tired
of hearing, “well, you don’t look Jewish,” too (what does that even
mean?!). Today I can proudly say that I may not have been born
Jewish and I may not have chosen to be Jewish, but Judaism chose
me and I proudly identify as a Jewish American.

If we understand Jewishness to be a culture as well as a religion (which, as
indicated by the 2013 Pew Research Center study “A Portrait of Jewish Americans,” a majority of American Jews do39), then even domestic same-race adoptions into Jewish families are transcultural. As such, it should not be surprising
that, like transracial or transnational adoptees, some of these adoptees feel
conscious of bringing another identity into their families and are interested in
connecting with their birth heritages. Coming from white, typically Christian
birth families, however, they may struggle to find aspects of a birth culture
with which to identify that do not seem threatening to their Jewish families
and communities. For example, unlike Chinese adoptees, who may study the
Chinese language or immerse themselves in the Chinese or Chinese American
communities, white domestic adoptees may gravitate to Christmas trees, Easter bunnies, or a cross, lacking other obvious symbols.
The rabbi’s daughter with the “Shiksa nose” quoted above grew up
deeply embedded in the Jewish community, yet she writes that “I always
‘missed’ Christmas. An odd part of me thought that I should be celebrating Christmas. A small part of me buried somewhere inside thinks I should
be Christian. I push that away. Have always thought that way since I was
a kid.”40 Another white domestically adopted woman traces her alienation
from Jewishness directly to her identity as an adoptee: “In terms of being
Jewish, to me it just never fit, it never felt right. Like I could have been raised
in any religion. I remember being young and thinking religion was like a
part of your DNA, and that since I didn’t share any with my family, maybe
I wasn’t Jewish. . . . As wonderful as it was to be raised Jewish, I wish I had
felt a connection . . . Ever.”
For the small number of today’s adoptees with at least one Jewish
birth parent, Jewish identity is, perhaps not surprisingly, generally uncomplicated—or at least no more complicated than it is for nonadoptees. The
relationship between their birth and adoptive heritages is by and large
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a nonissue. Yet the way in which these adoptees discuss the relationship
between their Jewish birth parentage and their sense of their place in the
Jewish community highlights the complexities that often arise for those not
born to Jewish birth parents.
Some adoptees know from the beginning that their birth mothers
were Jewish and comment that it was this knowledge that allowed them to
feel fully Jewish. As a white domestically adopted man reflects, “I always
identified as a ‘real’ Jew because the adoption agency my parents used only
. . . put children up for adoption [for] whom at least the birth mother is
Jewish. . . . My birth mother was Jewish so I always felt that I was really a
genuine part of the Jewish community and felt that I fit in. That helped me
when I attended Jewish day school to not feel like an outcast.”41 The implication, of course, is that this young man believes that he likely would have
felt like an outcast had he not had a Jewish birth mother. Similarly, a white
Orthodox man writes that “I was born Jewish so I didn’t have questions
and possible . . . cultural differences that other adoptees [have,] converts and
non-converts alike. Also no one looked at me different because I looked the
same as everyone else.” And a white domestically adopted woman comments
that “Knowing my maternal grandma was Jewish also helps affirm that I am
part of the tribe. I don’t feel as much as an imposter because of this. My feelings of not being worthy of this aspect of my identity shift day to day. . . .
I just know that ‘legally’ I am Jewish. This has been important to me as I
have gotten older and felt the need to validate my experience of being a Jew.
No one else has ever tested me or made me feel I had to prove myself, it
comes from within.”42
Other adoptees discover later that they were indeed “born Jewish,” and
the intense relief they often feel highlights the discomfort felt by many white
adoptees who were not born to Jewish birth parents. “Two years ago, I took
a DNA test to determine my haplogroup,” writes a thirty-five-year-old white
woman adopted by Jewish parents. “I did discover some pretty interesting
things, including the fact that I am biologically Jewish. That was always a big
question for me!”43 When Jewish adoptees search for their birth parents, it
is not uncommon for one of their first questions to be “Am I really Jewish?”
(i.e., were my birth parents Jewish?).44 If we take seriously current understandings of the importance of biological roots to adoptees, such questions should
perhaps not be unexpected, but they also point to hesitancies about Jewish
identity based on upbringing rather than birth.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the complexities of the Jewish adoptive experience, it is important
to acknowledge that many, if not most, Jewish adoptive families succeed in
crafting personal, familial, and communal identities that work for them,
even in cases where it may be impossible to fully reconcile various aspects of
identity. Here the heterogeneity of American Jewry is an asset; with so many
ways of being Jewish, adoptees and their families can search out communities and approaches to Jewishness that feel comfortable and welcoming to
them. For transracial adoptive families, this often involves actively seeking
out communities of Jews of color where the adoptee of color will not feel
himself or herself outside the norm. The Jewish people have always been
more racially and ethnically diverse than Americans commonly recognize,
and this diversity has only increased as growing numbers of individuals of
color have joined the Jewish community through conversion and/or marriage. Many multiracial Jewish adoptive families report how important it is
to them to connect with other Jews of color, often through organizations
such as the Jewish Multiracial Network and Be’chol Lashon or by specifically
seeking out congregations, schools, camps, and youth groups with a critical
mass of nonwhite members.
Challenges and complexities, moreover, can also be tremendous opportunities for growth and development, and the multifaceted nature of identity
within the Jewish adoptive family is often a source of great enrichment. Many
adoptive parents, especially of children of color, comment on how their experiences have broadened and deepened their own sense of Jewish identity. And
many adoptees draw strength and inspiration from their diverse identities.
The young adult Chinese adoptee cited above who was asked as a child if it
was “legal” to be both Chinese and Jewish has grown up to be the president
of her college Hillel and is strongly committed to issues of social and racial
justice. “Being an adopted Asian American Jew has shaped my personal
and career aspirations,” she writes. “I am a sociology major focused on race and
ethnic relations, and have always been interested in advocating for marginalized populations. I am hoping to write a senior thesis on transracial, transnational adoption and critical race theory.”45 And the family of a Korean adoptee
whose mother pulled her from Jewish preschool because of racism invested
considerable resources in raising her with strong identities as both Korean
and Jewish; she writes that despite the racism she experienced in the Jewish
community, “I really do cherish my Jewish heritage and feel that, without my
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Jewish upbringing, I would be a very different and possibly less-well adjusted
adopted person.”
If the results of the recent Pew survey tell us anything, it is that questions
of multiple and blended identities will only become more common and more
pressing in the future as Jewish families increasingly cross a variety of racial,
religious, and cultural boundaries. As they work to understand and respond
to the Jewish “Modern Family,” academic and communal observers can learn
much from the experiences of adoptive families and work hard to become
more welcoming to those who bring with them other forms of identity, rather
than seeing those identities as “competing” with Jewishness. In the next phase
of our research with the Adoption & Jewish Identity Project, we will continue
to probe these complex issues by gathering the voices of young adult adoptees
through oral histories and narrative and video testimonies, enabling us to create a much fuller picture of the Jewish adoptive experience and the evolving
meaning of Jewish identity in America.
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1. Ninety-five percent of respondents self-identified as white. Of the 3 percent who
identified as “multiracial or other,” almost half would traditionally be considered white
(having identified themselves as “Jewish,” “Ashkenazi Jew,” or “Israeli-American”) or
identified themselves as “other” because their families were multiracial, not because they
themselves were nonwhite. Fewer than 1 percent identified as black, Latino/a, or Asian.
Although estimates of the number of Jews of color in the United States vary considerably,
the percentage is surely more than 1 percent. See Dianne Tobin et al., In Every Tongue:
The Racial and Ethnic Diversity of the Jewish People (San Francisco: Institute for Jewish
& Community Research, 2005), and the websites of Be’chol Lashon (http://www.bechol
lashon.org), the Jewish Multiracial Network (http://www.jewishmultiracialnetwork.org),
and Jews in All Hues (http://www.jewsinallhues.org/).
2. For example, geographic distribution of survey respondents largely paralleled that of
the American Jewish community, as did synagogue affiliation and involvement.
3. For the history of adoption in the United States, see, among many others, Adam Pertman, Adoption Nation: How the Adoption Revolution Is Transforming America—and Our
Families (Boston: Harvard Common Press, 2011); Ellen Herman, Kinship by Design:
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problems. Others argue that it provides desperately needy children with families, rescuing them from lives of poverty and neglect in the streets, poor institutional care, or
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, illegitimacy, or disability. Debates about
transracial adoption have generally focused largely on domestic adoption. Some have
argued that the practice itself is racist, as it deprives communities of color (in particular,
African American communities) of their children and children of color of their identities;
others argue that opposition to transracial adoption is racist because it deprives children
of potential families. For more discussion of these issues, see Jane Jeong Trenka et al., eds.,
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Laura Briggs, Somebody’s Children: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational Adoption
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Care,” Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, 2008, http://adoptioninstitute.org/old
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11. In particular, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 was intended to counter
“foster care drift” by faster termination of parental rights and encouragement of adoption,
although results have been mixed. See Cris Beam, To the End of June: The Intimate Life of
American Foster Care (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2013), 43–45.
12. For an overview of debates about granting adoptees access to their original birth
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families. Of particular concern is the lack of enforceability of open adoption agreements
and how to manage disagreements about desired levels of contact. In general, however,
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Sage Publications, 2006), 175–89.
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Adopted Daughter (New York City: McGraw Hill, 1975), and Lost and Found: The Adoption
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Carissa Woodwyk, Before You Were Mine: Discovering Your Adopted Child’s Lifestory (Lima:
FaithWalk Publishing, 2007); Jean MacLeod and Sheena Macrae, eds., Adoption Parenting:
Creating a Toolbox, Building Connections (Warren: EMK Press, 2006).
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databank.org/studies/downloadFile.cfm?FileID=3129. See also Moshe Aharon Bleich,
“Attitudes of Jewish Clergy toward Adoption Issues,” (Ph.D. Diss., Yeshiva University,
2003), 5.
18. Because the number of respondents who had adopted in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s was relatively small, the three decades were collapsed to increase the reliability of
the statistical analysis. All of the children adopted in the 1950s and 1960s were born
in the United States; in the 1970s, 8 percent of the adopted children were born abroad,
reflecting the rise of transnational adoption over the period.
19. The survey was conducted between 2010 and 2012. Data were analyzed by decade
of adoption. Unless otherwise noted, results for the years 2010–2012 have been included
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20. “How Many Children Were Adopted in 2007 and 2008?,” Child Welfare Information
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Modern Families: Multifaceted Identities in the Jewish Adoptive Family

217

as especially important to healthy racial and ethnic identity formation among transracial
adoptees. From the survey, it is unfortunately impossible to know how substantive these
relationships really were and if parents of children who were young at the time of the
survey would continue to devote the time necessary to cultivate them as their children
grew up.
27. This process has now been well explored by historians, anthropologists, and critical
race theorists. To mention only a few, see especially Eric Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006);
Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks & What That Says about Race in America
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Matthew Jacobson, Whiteness of a
Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
28. Adoptee Questionnaire, online questionnaire conducted by the Adoption and Jewish
Identity Project and available to people eligible to participate.
29. Aura Lichtenberg, Oral History Pre-Interview Questionnaire, April 2015.
30. Adoption and Jewish Identity Project Adoptive Parents and Jewish Identity Survey.
31. Adoptee Questionnaire, online questionnaire conducted by the Adoption and Jewish
Identity Project.
32. See, for example, the experiences of Avery Klein-Cloud, as portrayed in Nicole
Opper’s documentary Off and Running.
33. Lichtenberg, Oral History Pre-Interview Questionnaire.
34. See Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness; Susan Glenn, “‘Funny, You Don’t Look Jewish’:
Visual Stereotypes and the Making of Modern Jewish Identity,” in Boundaries of Jewish
Identity (ed. Susan A. Glenn and Naomi B. Sokoloff; Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 2010); Lynn Davidman and Shelly Tenenbaum, “‘It’s in My Genes’: Biological
Discourse and Essentialist Views of Identity among Contemporary American Jews,”
Sociological Quarterly 48 (2007): 435–50; Susan Martha Kahn, “Are Genes Jewish?
Conceptual Ambiguities in the New Genetic Age,” in Glenn and Sokoloff, Boundaries of
Jewish Identity.
35. Adoptee Questionnaire, online questionnaire conducted by the Adoption and Jewish
Identity Project.
36. Ibid. (my emphasis).
37. A white adoptive mother of a daughter adopted from China remembers that “My old
boss told me privately of witnessing a bat mitzvah of a Korean child adopted his family—he joked about feeling ‘Something doesn’t look right.’ I wasn’t amused.” Adoption
and Jewish Identity Project, Adoptive Parents and Jewish Identity survey.
38. Adoptee Questionnaire, online questionnaire conducted by the Adoption and Jewish
Identity Project.

218

Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition

39. See Pew Research Center, “A Portrait of Jewish Americans,” http://www.pewforum
.org/files/2013/10/jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf.
40. Adoptee Questionnaire, online questionnaire conducted by the Adoption and Jewish
Identity Project.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Shelley Kapnek Rosenberg, quoted in “Jewish Adoptees,” http://jewish.adoption
.com/faith-based/jewish-adoptees.html (accessed January 2, 2008).
45. Adoptee Questionnaire, online questionnaire conducted by the Adoption and Jewish
Identity Project.

III. THE FUTURE

The Jewish Perspective in Creating Human
Embryos Using Cloning Technologies
John D. Loike
INTRODUCTION
Molecular genetics and genetic engineering are some of the most exciting areas
of modern-day biology. Since James Watson and Francis Crick deciphered
the structure of DNA, scientists have made great progress in understanding
human genetics and its role in disease processes. DNA is the universal code
of life that provides the information for all cells and organisms to function.
The human genome contains about twenty thousand genes that provide the
instructions to synthesize and produce almost one hundred thousand different
kinds of proteins that human beings need to function properly.
One of the most challenging areas of science is applying genetic technology in the hope of preventing genetic mistakes from affecting an embryo or
an individual.1 In recent years genetic technology is also being applied to other
areas of reproductive medicine, such as human fertility.
Cloning technology received international publicity in 1997 when it was
used to clone Dolly the sheep.2 The cloning of Dolly was initially hailed as the
great hope for a biomedical revolution because it offered an innovative method
to genetically alter sheep and cows to produce expensive biological proteins
in their milk.3 In addition, there was hope that cloning techniques could create perfectly matched tissues that would someday cure ailments ranging from
diabetes to Parkinson’s disease.4
However, applying cloning technologies to human beings for either reproductive purposes or to generate embryonic stem cells spurred intense ethical
debates. As this method requires the destruction of fertilized eggs, many cultures
view this process as unethical. The Catholic Church, for example, believes that
reproductive human cloning, as in vitro fertilization (IVF), is unethical for two
reasons.5 First, the destruction of human fertilized eggs is considered akin to
murder because fertilized eggs have attained the status of personhood.6 Second,
children must be conceived within a marital context by engaging in marital relations. These cultural objections to cloning technologies have impacted the rate
at which research in human cloning has progressed. For much of the last decade,
federal funding did not support research in human reproductive cloning and
even limited the generation of embryonic stem cells using this method.
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In this essay, I review the latest technological advances of cloning and its
potential applications to human disease and in particular to human reproduction. Then, I discuss, from a Jewish perspective, some challenging bioethical
issues that emerge from this technology. Finally, I present potential ways to
resolve some of these contentious issues.
WHAT IS CLONING TECHNOLOGY?
Reproductive cloning can be defined in broad terms as the identical reproduction of fragments of DNA, genes, cells, or whole organisms from a single
ancestor. The term “clone” was coined by H. J. Webber and stems from the
ancient Greek klon, which is a twig, and probably refers to the fact that a twig
can give rise to another tree identical to its parent tree. Looking for a word to
describe small sections of an organism that can be cut off and transplanted
to form a whole entity, Webber chose the word “clone” for its uniqueness and
easy pronunciation.
To clone Dolly, Ian Wilmut and his colleagues used a technology called
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).7 In SCNT, the genetic material contained in the nucleus from any cell is transferred or injected into an enucleated
egg (i.e., an egg whose nuclear DNA has been physically removed) to initiate
the creation of an embryo (see Figure 1). This reconstituted “fertilized egg” is
then allowed to develop into a blastocyst in the laboratory and is subsequently
implanted into a host animal for embryological development, similar to the
protocol used in IVF. SCNT can also be used to generate a blastocyst from
which embryonic stem cells can be obtained and maintained in the laboratory.
The clinical application of cloning (specifically SCNT) may have great
potential to enhance the welfare and health of human beings. SCNT technologies may be used to enhance our knowledge of:
• Human organ regeneration from stem cells. Each person completely
regenerates his or her own skin every seven days by triggering skin
stem cells to replicate. Everyone has witnessed that any cut can heal
itself and disappear within two weeks. The skeletal system can also
utilize its own stem cells to replenish itself every seven years. One
important future area of medicine lies in understanding how organs
and tissues of the body creates themselves out of a single stem cell and
the mechanisms by which specific organ systems are renewed throughout life. The use of patient-derived stem cells obtained via SCNT or
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cloning technology offers the possibility to replace or repair damaged
organs without the need of donor organ transplants.
• Infertility and the design of new medical solutions for infertility. Cloning
technology offers the possibility for infertile men or women to use nonsperm or nonegg cells in creating a healthy embryo. According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, about 6 percent of married
women fifteen to forty-four years of age in the United States and 18 percent of men are infertile. In many of cases of male infertility, the nuclear
genetic content obtained from skin or blood cells can be injected into an
egg to trigger fertilization and the creation of an embryo.
• Helping women with mitochondrial diseases to have healthy offspring.
In almost all cells of the body, 99.9 percent of the DNA is found
in a cellular organelle called the nucleus, and less than 0.1 percent
of the DNA is found in another organelle called the mitochondria.
Mitochondria serve many functions but is best known as providing
the cell with the chemical energy necessary to carry out all of its cellular activities. In a sense, they are the battery of the cell. Mistakes or
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mutations in mitochondrial DNA can result in profound disease states
that include muscular dystrophy, liver disease, lung disease, and, in
rare instances, even death at an early stage. Only a few women have
those types of mitochondria mutations that lead to serious clinical
symptoms. In the United States, about 12,000 women are candidates
for intervention to allow them to have healthy children free from
mutations in their mitochondria. In Great Britain, there are about
6,500 women. Cloning technology can be utilized to transfer healthy
mitochondria from a woman donor into the egg of another woman
who has mitochondrial mutations to produce a healthy child.
NEW INNOVATIONS IN SCNT TECHNOLOGY
However, the development of SCNT using human cells has proven to be an
exceedingly difficult task.8 Many unsuccessful attempts were made at trying
to generate a viable human preimplanted embryo or blastocyst via SCNT. In
fact, it took sixteen years after the report of Dolly appeared in the press for
Dr. Shoukhrat Mitalipov from the Oregon Health and Science University to
lead an international team to modify SCNT technology to generate human
blastocysts and patient-specific embryonic stem cell lines.9 This was the first
report that successfully applied SCNT to human cells and was an extension of
their previous studies using SCNT to generate embryonic stem cell lines from
nonhuman primates. Incorporating innovative technical modifications, Mitalipov and his colleagues successfully fused the nucleus obtained from a baby’s
skin cell with an enucleated egg and applied SCNT technology to generate a
human blastocyst from which they could isolate and maintain human embryonic stem cells in the laboratory.
One innovation involved obtaining the eggs from women who did not
receive high doses of hormones. Normally, IVF technology requires the physician to first hyperstimulate a woman with hormones in order to retrieve
between ten to twenty eggs. Mitalipov discovered that milder hormonal stimulation allowed the retrieval of fewer eggs (only about five eggs), but their quality was much better than those eggs obtained from traditional hyperhormonal
stimulation. The second innovation involved the use of gentler methods to
fuse the donor cell with the enucleated egg.
Mitalipov’s motivation to apply SCNT to human beings was not to clone
a human being. Rather, it was to obtain patient-derived embryonic stem cell
lines that can be used to study and potentially treat various human diseases. In

The Jewish Perspective in Creating Human Embryos Using Cloning Technologies

225

fact, his group applied their technology to successfully generate embryonic stem
cells from a patient with a genetic defect called Leigh syndrome. Leigh syndrome is a severe neurological genetic disorder that typically arises in the first
year of life. This condition is characterized by progressive loss of mental and
movement abilities (psychomotor regression) and typically results in respiratory
failure that leads to death within a couple of years. The stem cells from this
Leigh syndrome patient that were generated using SCNT will enable scientists
to understand how mutations can lead to Leigh syndrome and then to use these
cells to screen thousands of drugs in the search for a potential therapy.
Using SCNT to generate embryonic stem cells has broad applications
for studying a wide variety of other genetic diseases. Patient-derived stem
cells, generated via SCNT, can be obtained from individuals with Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease, Lou Gehrig’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease,
heart disease, and liver disease. These laboratory cultured stem cells would
be a valuable scientific asset in designing and testing treatments to manage
or cure these devastating diseases.
While Mitalipov and his colleagues claim that their technology is not
designed to clone human beings, SCNT technology does in fact have the
potential to be used to implant a human blastocyst into a woman to create a
human embryo. What is significant here, from a scientific and Jewish legal (halachic) perspective, is that SCNT allows scientists to use a variety of cell sources
aside from sperm and eggs to fuse with an egg to create a human embryo.
From a medical perspective, this technology may create an effective method for
infertile men who do not produce viable sperm to produce genetically related
healthy children. In addition, genetic defects in SCNT-generated stem cells
from patients could be corrected using gene editing technologies. In specific
situations, these genetically corrected stem cells could be an effective method of
cell replacement therapy. For example, if people have a genetic defect that limits
their blood’s capacity to clot, SCNT could be used to generate their own stem
cells. These stems cells could be reengineered to correct this mutation and then
reintroduced into these patients to reconstitute their blood-clotting capacity.10
JEWISH ETHICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH CLONING TECHNOLOGIES
Ethical considerations of any new technology usually focus on four fundamental principles of bioethics.11 The first is autonomy/respect for persons—
a person’s right to choose and control his or her own life and destiny and
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the acceptance of individual responsibility for his or her medical choices. The
second is beneficence—the moral and contractual calling to benefit a person
who seeks help. The third is nonmaleficence—avoiding intentionally created,
needless harm or injury to a person through acts of either commission or omission. The fourth is justice—allocating medical resources fairly.
While many secular bioethicists raise several of the above ethical considerations of cloning, other arguments for why cloning is unethical have been
raised. Some critics argue that it is unethical for scientists to “play God” by
engaging in technologies that alter the nature of human reproduction.12 It is
surprising how many papers written by scientists, many of whom are atheists
or not religious, use this argument to declare cloning unethical. Other scientists declare that human cloning technology is unethical because of the “yuck
factor.” Dr. Leon Kass in 1997 explained that the “yuck factor” in bioethics is
defined as an unethical technology based on an intuitive negative response or
its evil characteristic.13 In other words, one cannot argue that cloning violates
any one of the basic principles of bioethics. Rather, for unspecified and simply
intuitive reasons, this technology is deemed unethical.
In contrast, the Jewish perspective is quite different from those arguing
against human cloning. Regarding the idea that scientists should not play
God, the Jewish perspective states that God created an incomplete world
where human beings are encouraged to partner with God to improve and perfect the world.14 This directive is the basis of the commandment of circumcision. The newborn baby boy is physically and spiritually incomplete, and God
directs the parents to complete the act of creation by having the baby boy circumcised on the eighth day.15 The famous biblical commentator Rabbi Moshe
ben Nachmonides states that “God gave man power and control on earth to
do as he wishes with the animals and insects and everything which crawls on
the earth, and to build, to uproot what is planted, to quarry copper from the
mountains, etc.”16 In other words, human beings are commanded to serve as
partners in God’s creation in order to improve the human condition. Thus,
Judaism values activities that “play God” as a positive challenge when applied
to improve the human condition or when used to design a new therapy.
One must also consider that reproductive cloning has biological precedents. Many plant species and single-celled organisms such as bacteria reproduce via cloning. Higher-level species such as worms, fish, lizards, and frogs
undergo a process called parthenogenesis whereby a female can produce genetically identical offspring without engaging a male partner. Leiolepis ngovantrii, for
example, is a reptile commonly found in Vietnam that is an all-female species
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that reproduces via cloning. The female Amazonian ant Mycocepurus smithi is an
example of an insect species that reproduces via cloning. These ants have reproduced via cloning for thousands of years, resulting in the virtual disappearance
of their sexual organs. Finally, identical twins represent natural cloning occurring
in human beings. Since cloning is part of the natural process of God’s creation,
Judaism would allow its therapeutic application to human reproduction.
With regard to the “yuck factor,” there is no Jewish legal principle that
incorporates a similar concept. In fact, Judaism believes that Jewish law is
often based on logical and sound reasons. When there are medical benefits
that justify a new technology, then there is no enforceable prohibition. Thus,
there are no prohibitions against using SCNT to improve the health of an
individual.
Another ethical challenge in SCNT technology is related to the status of
personhood of a preimplanted embryo. As mentioned above, cloning technology requires the destruction of many fertilized eggs. How does Jewish law,
or halachah, view the destruction of fertilized eggs? The general consensus in
Orthodox Jewish law was expressed by the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations and the Rabbinical Council of America in 2004: personhood does
not begin at conception but rather at some point during gestation.17 While
Jewish law does not encourage unnecessary destruction of a fertilized egg, it
recognizes that fertilized eggs may be used in biomedical research in order to
develop new therapies.
A fourth ethical challenge related to cloning is how Jewish law views the
possibility of creating human embryos from more than two genetic parents.
The preferred method of human reproduction in Jewish law is that conception should occur during marital relations. Moreover, the Talmud (Niddah 30)
claims that the preferred method to produce children involves three partners:
woman, man, and God. However, in situations of infertility and disease, Jewish law permits other technologies such as IVF to allow infertile parents to
have healthy children. This is based in part on the biblical account in which
Rachel declared to our forefather, Jacob, that she would rather die than remain
infertile.18 Several biblical commentaries, such as Rashi, use this episode to
prove that Judaism views infertility as a serious medical condition.19
How does Judaism view the donation of genetic materials in creating
a child? The normal procedure to create a child is to fertilize a woman’s egg
with sperm. Using SCNT and cloning technology, it is possible to use nonsperm cells to “fertilize” an egg. In cases where the husband cannot produce
sperm, Jewish law would permit physicians to use nonsperm cells to obtain the
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nuclear material to fertilize an egg. Here is an excellent example where Jewish
law recognizes the hardships of infertility and permits any safe medical intervention to allow a couple to fulfill the commandment of human reproduction.
What is uniquely innovative in this Jewish law is that scientific consensus can serve as the basis of halachic decisions and can serve as a precedent
in addressing halachic issues, including those emerging from new reproductive biotechnologies. The basis of this law is derived from situations where
halachah must establish whether a patient is seriously or terminally ill or
has a sickness that is not serious. The halachic status of such patients is
established by expert physicians and not by rabbis. Similarly, many Jewish
legal scholars ascribe the intimate relationship of parenthood to genetics,20
because scientists in our times view the genetic donors of the child as the
legal parents of the child.
It is important to point out, however, that there are several situations
where the Jewish definition of family relationships differs from a traditional
genetic definition.
1. A child fathered by a non-Jew with a Jewish woman has a genetic
father and is considered Jewish by virtue of the fact that the mother
is Jewish. However, halachah does not grant the non-Jewish genetic
father parenthood status, and no familial halachic relationship exists
between the genetic non-Jewish father and the Jewish child. The
child must give the genetic father parental respect, but other laws
such as inheritance do not apply.
2. A Jewish man who fathers a child with a non-Jewish woman is not
granted familial status with respect to the child. Although he remains
the genetic father, the child is not Jewish according to Jewish law.
3. Any child who converts to Judaism severs most familial relationships
with respect to parenthood, fatherhood, and even sibling status.
However, in situations where the genetic materials are obtained from a Jewish
man and used to reconstitute a fertilized egg obtained from a Jewish woman,
the child would be the legal child of both parties and would be fully Jewish.
A fifth ethical concern in Jewish law is whether a child produce via cloning technologies is viewed as a mamzer.21 The Hebrew term mamzer [from
the root meaning “corrupt”] functions as a euphemism for an illicit union in the
person’s lineage—a bastard or illegitimate child. In Judaism, a mamzer cannot
marry another Jew because their children would also be considered illegitimate.
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This Jewish law is based on a verse in the Bible (Deut 23:2), which states that
“A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the LORD; even to his
tenth generation shall he not enter into the congregation of the LORD.”
The potential status of a child mamzer in reproductive medicine has been
discussed: specifically, whether a married Jewish woman can use sperm from a
nonspousal Jewish man for artificial insemination.22
In response to this issue, there are three different rabbinical opinions:
1. According to Jewish law, the child is considered a real mamzer (minority view).
2. The child is a safek [doubtful] mamzer, and all stringencies of mamzer
apply (minority view).
3. The child is not illegitimate at all (the most accepted view in Jewish
law).23
Several leading halachic scholars, including Rabbi Dr. Moshe Tendler, propose
that regarding SCNT and cloning, the child conceived is not illegitimate, because
unlike the classical case of mamzer, no forbidden marital act took place.24
In halachah, the Jewish status of a child is maternally transmitted. If the
mother is Jewish, then the child is Jewish, regardless of the religion of the father.
Cloning technologies can create complex legal issues regarding the Jewish status
of the child. For example, suppose a human embryo is created from genetic
material from one non-Jewish female and transferred into an egg obtained from
another Jewish woman. Would the child be deemed Jewish in this situation,
where two women contribute the genetic information to generate an embryo?
Interestingly, there is no clear Jewish legal precedent to this case. However, Jewish law has legal processes in resolving situations where there is no
halachic precedent. This is well documented in the following case. Suppose a
Jewish couple donates their fertilized egg to a gestational surrogate to allow the
surrogate to gestate the embryo. The religious status of the child is controversial. Some rabbis believe that the religious status of the child should follow the
religion of the woman who carries and delivers the child. Others argue that
the genetic mother should establish the religious status of the child.
Despite the fact that there is no precedent in Jewish law regarding gestational surrogacy, Jewish law provides a tenable solution. Jewish law would
recommend that the child undergo ritual conversion to ensure the he or she
has full Jewish status. Converting such a child would thus avoid a plethora of
complicated Jewish questions.
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A final alleged ethical concern regarding human cloning is that it violates
the divine gift of free will or divine providence by creating an individual who
is a genetic copy of someone else. Judaism values the unique individuality of
each and every person. No two people are alike. Will cloning violate the Jewish
principle of individuality? This ethical concern is not valid within Jewish law
for one major reason. Identical twins provide a biological situation whereby
two individuals have the same genetic makeup. Despite the fact that identical
twins possess an identical genetic code, they exhibit different behaviors, physical traits, and health issues due to the varied environmental experiences each
twin experiences. Thus Judaism, like science, recognizes that personality is
shaped by both genetics and environment and acknowledges the individuality
of identical twins or cloned individuals.
FUTURE ETHICAL CHALLENGES
As with any new biotechnology, Judaism supports its clinical application to
improve fertility or health. Thus, using mitochondrial replacement therapy
to produce a healthy child from a woman affected with mitochondrial mutations would be encouraged, provided that it is a safe procedure.25 In this
cloning situation, the nucleus of a fertilized egg is obtained from a wife who
expresses mutations in her mitochondrial DNA, and this is transferred into an
enucleated egg that is obtained from a healthy woman donor. This donor egg
would contain “healthy” mitochondria, allowing the fertilized egg to develop
into a healthy child.
There remain other situations in cloning that will require rabbinical
deliberation in the future. For example, if two men donate their genetic
materials to be transplanted into an enucleated egg, will the child be viewed
as Jewish even though there is no genetic female involved in the creation of
this child? At first glace one could speculate that the woman who gestates
this embryo may be considered the legal mother of the child; therefore, if
the gestational woman is Jewish, then the child would be considered Jewish.
However, not all rabbis would agree with this view. As mentioned above,
there is a debate in gestational surrogacy as to whether the gestation woman
or the woman who donates her egg is considered the legal mother of the
child. A final undecided issue relates to the Jewish perspective on cloning a
single woman using her own blood cells and eggs. Are there conditions in
which rabbis would deem such cloning as permissible? These are complex
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issues beyond the scope of this essay, and we await rabbinical scholars to
adjudicate these situations.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have outlined some of the ethical challenges and resolutions
regarding human cloning. Good decisions in Jewish law are predicated on
obtaining valid scientific facts. In addition, Judaism recognizes that any medical intervention can have serious side effects and provides the patient with
some autonomy to choose whether to engage in such potentially risky procedures. On the other hand, Judaism does not support unlimited autonomy.26
A patient who is suffering from an end-of-life illness is not allowed to engage
in euthanasia. Regarding the autonomous right of a woman to clone herself,
Jewish law would not support such a procedure without medical justification.
Finally, Judaism supports the principle that in research and medicine, your
actions should be guided not by what you can do but rather by what you
should do.
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Multiplying Motherhood: Gestational Surrogate
Motherhood and Jewish Law
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JEWISH LAW AND
THE JEWISH FAMILY IN A TRANSITIONAL ERA
The relationship between the Jewish family and Jewish family law is more complex that it would seem at first blush. The Jewish family is a cultural, traditional
notion defined more by culture and history than by legal guidelines. Yet, Jewish
family law is a complex and detailed system of laws and guidelines that structure
marriage, divorce, parenthood, and parent-child relationships. Jewish family law
is a practical legal system ordering the definition of Jewish families and governing marriage and divorce. In Israel, Jewish law governs marriage and divorce and
also has exclusive jurisdiction over issues of personal status and Jewish identity.1
However, in the diaspora Jewish persons abide by the state’s civil laws of marriage and divorce, which may seem to dampen the impact of Jewish family law.
Still, given the importance of the laws of personal status and their significance in
preserving Jewish continuity, Jewish family law remains relevant and is exercised
by rabbinical courts [beit din]. For instance, a Jewish woman needs a get in order
to remarry according to Jewish law even if she has a civil divorce. And, it is the
beit din that will ordinarily attempt to resolve disputes about the get.
Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) have posed many challenges
to traditional Jewish family law and challenged accepted norms. On the
one hand, using ART has garnered much support from the religious Jewish
community for helping to solve problems of infertility that can pose severe
problems for the Jewish family. Having progeny is extremely important under
Jewish law. The commandment to be fruitful and multiply is a positive commandment upon men, fulfilled by producing at least two offspring.2 Adopting
a child does not fulfill this commandment. However, reproducing through
ART—through surrogacy, in vitro fertilization (IVF), or egg donations—
will fulfill the commandment for a man as long as the male sperm is used in
reproducing the offspring. Indeed, rabbis have supported such options, certainly as a better prospect than being compelled to divorce a woman who is
unable to produce offspring or fails to fulfill the commandment.3
On the other hand, certain concrete legal and ethical dilemmas arise
when traditional Jewish law is faced with the modern reality of ART.4 Defining
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parenthood when genetics is divorced from intent and gestation, putting
into place appropriate regulations in order to maximize safety and preserve
health, and, when using gamete donors, avoiding incest and providing health
information to children are universal issues and concerns for any legal system.
Under Jewish law there are added concerns of ensuring that the child is not
considered illegitimate [mamzerut], which can have serious religious ramifications for children. Legal authorities, whether religious or civil, must determine
who and when ART can be used and when it will be funded by the state. These
dilemmas have resulted in much discussion and debate. Jewish law does not
have concrete resolutions for all the quandaries that arise, but Jewish law can
provide inspiration and insight in resolving these dilemmas.
When faced with these new legal and ethical dilemmas, traditional Jewish law struggles because the law was determined through ancient Scriptures
and decisions, and it can be difficult to use these laws to solve these modern,
technological dilemmas.5 Yet, when constructing normative frameworks for
resolving these dilemmas, it is helpful to look to Jewish law for inspiration.
Still, particularly when exact solutions are not forthcoming from Scripture,
there is also a need to keep a critical eye on the ramifications of Jewish law
solutions that may be too narrow and could result in unfair and inappropriate
consequences. Ultimately, using Jewish law to resolve legal dilemmas can allow
us to gain from the wisdom of Jewish tradition, but we should take heed to
avoid harsh and impractical applications in the context of new dilemmas not
foreseen by Talmudic law.
In this essay, I will focus on the dilemmas surrounding gestational surrogate motherhood. Gestational surrogate motherhood is a process whereby
an intended father and mother enlist, usually for payment, another women
to carry an embryo that is not genetically related to the surrogate and is usually genetically related to both the intended parents, although not necessarily.
However, for the purpose of this essay, I will assume that the intended parents
are the genetic parents, as is almost always the case under Israeli law—by
law for the intended father and in practice for the intended mother as well
(egg donations in Israel are extremely rare). Determining motherhood and the
legal permissibility of gestational surrogacy is clearly a new dilemma for Jewish
law, as the idea of a woman carrying a child who is not genetically related to
her on behalf of intended parents is not something considered in the Jewish
Talmudic tradition. However, modern-day halachic authorities and those who
study Jewish law have found that determining motherhood and opining on the
permissibility of gestational surrogacy are important for a number of reasons.6
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First, Judaism is passed to a child through the mother, and thus identifying the
mother has important practical ramifications in terms of the religious identity
of the child. Second, the status of motherhood imposes legal rights and obligations in Jewish family law in terms of custody and support and thus must be
identified. Third, surrogate motherhood raises broader ethical questions about
the permissibility of selling gestational services or babies and the potential for
exploitation of women who act as surrogates. Jewish law, with its broad ethical
precepts, can weigh in on these important ethical conversations.
In this essay I will consider three questions regarding surrogate motherhood that demand resolution: (1) Should gestational surrogacy be permitted
at all? (2) In a case where gestational surrogacy is permitted, who is the legal
mother? (3) What is the status of the woman who is not defined as the legal
mother, given her role in the complex surrogacy process? I will first describe
these three questions in depth, explaining their legal and ethical ramifications and the dilemmas they pose. I will then consider what Jewish law principles and decisions offer in resolving these dilemmas. I will focus on Jewish
law’s emphasis on procreation, discussions surrounding defining motherhood
in gestational surrogacy, and Jewish law’s precepts regarding the importance
of human dignity. I will consider practical Jewish law responses by prominent
rabbis to gestational surrogate motherhood, which often involve recognition
of multiple motherhood. I will then critique these responses, because multiple
motherhood is only recognized for purposes of stringency in conversion and
avoiding illegitimacy as opposed to affirmative recognition of the role of the
surrogate, who instead has been ignored. I argue that these stringencies can
make surrogacy difficult for intended parents without affirmatively protecting and acknowledging the status of the surrogate mother. I will then suggest
how Jewish law’s raising of the possibility of multiple motherhood can be used
to provide an ethical solution to the dilemmas that this essay addresses by
embracing multiple motherhood in a more holistic fashion.
In this essay, I offer a unique Jewish law perspective for resolving the three
dilemmas I present as central to gestational surrogate motherhood. I argue that
Jewish law perspectives on surrogate motherhood result in the naming of two
mothers: the surrogate and the egg donor/intended mother. This is either a
result of rabbincial authorities affirmatively recognizing two mothers, in practice, due to doubt as to which of the two is the legal mother or because there
is a significant mix of opinion as to who is the legal mother, and therefore both
women are considered mothers for Jewish law purposes. Recognition of two
mothers under Jewish law principles can be seen as giving dignity to multiple
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women who are engaged in the process of procreation. Recognizing multiple
mothers is progressive in nature and also conforms to traditional Jewish family law. When both the surrogate and the intended mother are recognized and
dignified with status, the entire process of surrogacy is more in line with ethical standards and makes commercialization of surrogacy less problematic. And
Jewish law can still condone contractual or court-ordered assignments of the
duties of parenthood. Therefore, recognizing the status of two women does
not foreclose the use of gestational surrogacy. Thereby, traditional Jewish family law can help resolve the dilemmas of families in transition, both facilitating
new family forms and instilling these families with ethical recognition of all
participants in a manner that promotes human dignity.
A. THE THREE DILEMMAS OF SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
1. SHOULD COMMERCIAL SURROGACY BE PERMITTED?

The first dilemma is whether to allow surrogacy at all, in particular commercial
surrogacy, which involves the payment of money to the surrogate mother as
consideration for the effort of gestating the baby. While noncommercial altruistic surrogacy is practiced, such as between family members and close friends,
it is much more widely practiced as a form of commerce, because purely
altruistic surrogates are hard to locate and usually involve family members.7
Moreover, in some countries such as Israel, commercial surrogacy is preferred
for the professional and less familial nature of the surrogacy relationship.8
There has been ongoing global tension surrounding the permissibility
of commercial surrogate motherhood.9 While it is permissible in many states,
there are others that oppose it. Surrogacy promises to fulfill the procreative
desires of couples or individuals who struggle with infertility or are in need of
a female womb to procreate. And worldwide there is a plethora of women who
are willing to act as surrogates, carrying children for money. Gestational surrogacy has been practiced for many years, and there are low levels of litigation
and high levels of satisfaction with the process.10 Despite these benefits, there
are a number of ethical reasons for which some countries oppose surrogate
motherhood. Indeed, these ethical concerns have been extremely influential
despite the practical benefits of surrogacy.
The first concern is that of commodification. The argument is that
due to the alleged unsuitability of financial transactions in the intimate services of creating a baby, surrogacy should be banned or severely regulated.11
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Creating a baby involves deeply personal and intimate processes that, some
argue, should not be sold in the market. The nature of the intimacy in surrogate motherhood can be described on a number of interrelated levels. First,
surrogate agreements involve a long-lasting and intense involvement in the
bodily integrity of the surrogate. Surrogate contracts assert control over the
lives of surrogates while they gestate; a surrogate’s body is literally being used
for someone else’s purposes in a constant and inseparable manner.12 Once a
pregnancy is initiated, surrogates are literally trapped, physically, into their
agreements and into their entangled relationship with intentional parents.
Second, from a biological perspective, gestation involves a real biological
interdependency over the course of forty weeks that affects both the fetus
and the surrogate and should not be ignored.13 The surrogate is affected
on a constant basis by the fetus growing inside her and vice versa. Finally,
this physical involvement and interrelatedness are coupled with long-lasting
emotional connections.14 Such emotional connectedness and the humanity involved in these commercial transactions can create high-level disputes
and suffering. Surrogate mothers have reported feeling devastated when
their involvement in the process is minimized. Gestating a fetus may not
lead to motherhood, but it is also not like building a cabinet. Commercializing the singular, long-term nature of the gestational process is complex.
When human life is changing hands, the nature of these transactions should
be considered to ensure that the interests of the children and the parties
involved are being protected.
Due to the intimacy involved in surrogacy, a major critique of commercializing surrogacy is that such a market inappropriately commodifies
the human body as a form of baby selling or as a form of selling gestational
services.15 As one scholar puts it, by commercializing the womb, “we potentially do harm to ourselves and to human flourishing if we treat something
integral to ourselves as a commodity, i.e., as separate and fungible.”16 Allowing ourselves and our body parts to be traded for money forces us to perceive
ourselves in terms of our own monetary worth. Surrogates thus might view
themselves and their bodies merely in terms of their saleable worth and not
for their essential value as part of humanity. Thus, commercializing intimacy
is critiqued as problematic, because selling intimacy compromises the personal
and emotional nature of that intimacy and treats female body parts not as an
end in themselves but as a means to an end. Moreover, it is argued that the
intimate nature of the surrogacy relationship warrants consideration to protect
vulnerable parties from the emotional harm that such intimate contracts can
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cause. As one scholar noted, the commissioning couple does not just enter
into a contract with the surrogate: they embark on a relationship with her.17
Human emotions, pain and suffering as well as joy, often revolve around commercial surrogate transactions and can be devastating to participants whose
expectations are not met.
Another commonly voiced concern about surrogate motherhood is that
it exploits poor women who do not have other means of earning money.18
Commentators previously predicted that these contracts would employ poor
women as an underclass for the privileged. Concerns are also expressed that
brokers take advantage of surrogates and make too much money from the
use of the surrogate’s body.19 Images of Brave New World scenarios in which
the rich hire the poor to incubate their children with much sacrifice and little
profit abound in reaction to surrogacy.20
An additional ethical objection raised is that of patriarchy. Some feminists argue that using a woman’s body in order to produce children on behalf
of a biologically related father subsumes a woman’s body for patriarchal purposes. Radical feminists argue that the consent to carry children for intended
parents is compromised by the patriarchal system in which surrogates live.21
This critique is highly intertwined with the concerns about commodification
of surrogates and their exploitation.
2. WHO IS THE LEGAL MOTHER IN SURROGACY?

Because gestational surrogate motherhood separates the two primary indicators of motherhood—birth (gestation) and genetic connection—much scholarly effort has been invested in identifying the legal mother when a child is
born of gestational surrogacy.22 Moreover, as engaging in a surrogacy contract
involves intentional contracting to create a baby for specific parents, the issue
of intent and contractual enforcement are also serious considerations.
Genetic connection is perhaps the most obvious choice for determining
motherhood. It is how fatherhood is determined in modern times and therefore provides a gender-neutral indicator of parenthood.23 Moreover, genetic
connection has always been considered an essential indicator of parenthood,
as creation of the child comes about by the mixing of sperm and egg. Therefore, it is many people’s instinct to argue that it is genetic connection that
determines parenthood. However, if genetics determines motherhood, then
women who receive egg donations would not legally be considered mothers of
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the children they birth. Despite the woman giving birth and gestating the fetus
for the entire pregnancy, the fact that the egg was not produced from her own
body would negate her legal motherhood. In order to differentiate surrogacy
from egg donations, legal standards must then rely on intent to determine
motherhood. Moreover, focusing on intent as the indicator of motherhood
would facilitate the use of traditional surrogacy in which the surrogate is also
the genetic mother. Alternately, babies born from traditional surrogacy could
be adopted by intended parents. Of course, if categorized as a full adoptive
process, the surrogate would have the ability to retract her consent to relinquishing parental rights until after the birth of the child.24
Moreover, choosing genetics over gestation as the marker of parenthood
ignores a uniquely feminine aspect of parenting: gestation.25 Essentially, as
fatherhood is defined by genetic affiliation, a focus on genetics assumes that
motherhood originates from genetics as well, despite the more complex manner in which a mother-child relationship is traditionally formed. Ignoring
gestation, a forty-week continuous process of physical nurturing and complex
interdependence, fails to recognize an involved and biologically significant
process that is uniquely feminine. This focus on gestation is not, as some
critiques have argued, due to a belief that women should gestate their own
children26 but rather recognition of the unique and valuable contribution of
gestation when it is provided.27
Attempts to point to intent as creating a legally identifiable motherhood
relationship are difficult to distinguish from simply enforcing contractual
agreements. And enforcing contractual agreements regarding motherhood
seems to belie notions that such relationships should not be bought or sold
in the marketplace.28 For instance, in the seminal case of Johnson v. Calvert,
the court determined that in the context of gestational surrogacy, natural
motherhood should be based on intent and not as a matter of contract.29 But
there is no real logical distinction between determining motherhood based on
preconception intent and determining motherhood based on a contract prepared to detail and certify such intent. The contract may not be enforceable
per se according to the court, but if parenthood is based on intent, then it is
the contract that will determine parenthood. The discomfort with contracting
for parenthood in adoption and surrogacy cannot be hidden by the language
of intent. Adoption and surrogacy are often distinguished, because while
an adoptive baby would have been born regardless of the legal transfer of the
baby, a baby born of surrogacy is conceived due to the contract. However, a

242

Mishpachah: The Jewish Family in Tradition and in Transition

baby conceived through sexual relations for the purpose of adoption would
still be subject to adoption regulations. Thus, intent alone cannot distinguish
adoption from surrogacy.
Intentional arguments for parenthood are also undermined in contexts
in which, despite agreements, biological donors or surrogate mothers function as parental figures. For instance, in the case of K. M. v. E. G., the egg
donor, who was also the partner of the intended mother, agreed not to lay
parental claims to the child in a clear and explicit agreement.30 Yet, she raised
the child with the intended mother after the children were born. Courts in
such circumstances legitimately do not want to deny the genetic mother her
attachment to the child. Ultimately, when intentions break down or when
practices do not track contractual intentions, we are still left with the biological indicators of genetics and gestation, and such affinities persist. Although
in K. M. the court attempts to differentiate between the contractual waiver
of parental rights, which is invalidated, and intent to raise the children in
a joint home, which is adopted as a crucial indicator of parenthood, this
distinction is hard to decipher. And ultimately, it is the genetic relationship added to the joint parenthood that ensued that seems to persuade the
court. Indeed, had E. G. waived parental rights and not raised the child with
K. M., it is highly doubtful that she would have succeeded in her parental
claim. Intent alone by contract is then rejected when other elements such
as actual parenting and genetics are present. Surrogacy thus creates a puzzle
without an easier answer. The bottom line is that intent, genetics, gestation, and functional care all matter in determining parental ties, and it is
difficult and perhaps artificial to separate one out as the exclusive indicator
of legal parenthood.31
However, while intellectually interesting, such puzzles do not make families. What creates families are emotional ties that are often based on genetics
or gestation but are also based on intent and functioning as a parent. Usually
it is only the intended parents who want to raise the child, and no one else
claims any rights or is tagged with obligations. But other persons may be
involved as well. Surrogate mothers, gamete donors, extended kin, grandparents, and third parties who function as parents because they believe they are or
because they have taken upon themselves the responsibility to do so may all be
involved in raising and providing for children in a variety of ways. The more
important question is how to treat these more complex familial ties that do not
conform to traditional notions of the nuclear family and two clear, biological,
exclusive parental figures.
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3. WHAT SHOULD THE STATUS OF THE SURROGATE BE IF SHE
IS NOT CONSIDERED THE MOTHER?

The third dilemma in the context of surrogate motherhood is—even presuming that the intended parents are those who will raise the child, as they almost
always do absent horror stories of intended parents who abandon handicapped
children32—what is the status of the surrogate, how should she be treated, and
what rights does she retain?
To truly consider this final dilemma, the history of surrogacy in countries
that have allowed it and the social science data need to be analyzed to determine how surrogates manage the surrogacy process. Empirical studies, which
have sought to track the realities, concerns, and overall experiences of surrogate mothers and intended parents, have coalesced around a number of basic
and important findings.33 While empirical studies have not been as numerous
as one might have predicted given the onslaught of controversy and discussion surrounding surrogacy, a reasonable stockpile of empirical data has been
compiled since 1983, when surrogacy emerged as a fertility option.34 What is
particularly striking about these empirical findings is their consistency.
On the one hand, according to empirical studies, overall levels of litigation have been low and levels of satisfaction with surrogacy high, attesting
to the overall success of surrogates in detaching themselves from the babies
they carry. The vast majority of surrogate mothers do not attest to bonding
with the babies they gestate to the extent that many predicted.35 While most
surrogates assert that parting with the baby is a difficult separation, it does
not appear to be as traumatic as expected. Indeed, given the thousands of
surrogacy contracts that are entered into each year, the lack of litigation is
remarkable.36 When asked, surrogate mothers do not generally indicate that
the babies belong to them; rather, they feel that they are providing a meaningful and valuable service for the intended parents. While this appears to be true
for both gestational and traditional surrogates (who are also genetically related
to the baby whom they care on behalf of intended parents), it seems especially
true for gestational surrogates who do not have a genetic connection to the
fetus, as they consider the baby in the womb to be someone else’s based on
genetic affiliation.37
On the other hand, the surrogates do not feel like legal strangers vis-à-vis
the intended families either. Instead of the close bond that researchers expected
surrogates to develop with the baby, the predicted emotional connection seems
to be forming between the surrogate mother and the commissioning couple.38
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Studies indicate that because pregnancy lasts nine months and prenatal care
can be intensive and involved, it is the long-term engagement between surrogate and intended parents that creates emotional bonds, reflecting the very
intimate nature of the agreement.39 Surrogates and intended parents tend to
experience the pregnancy and labor together and become emotionally and
intimately involved in each other’s daily lives and relationships. Moreover,
many describe postbirth relationships that continue between the adults, which
involve but are not necessarily focused on the baby.40
Indeed, it is this bond between the surrogate and the intended parents
that appears difficult to erase after the birth of the baby and that may cause
emotional heartache as well as logistical and legal complications.41 When
relationships are good, many surrogates express a high level of contentment
with the process postbirth. They are most satisfied with the process when
they develop a connection with intended parents whom they feel appreciate
their important contribution in helping them to create a family.42 The more
such feelings are reciprocated and the better the relations between surrogate
and intended parents, the better the surrogate tends to feel about her experience and the lower the level of distress or exploitations she reports. Empirical
studies demonstrate that when surrogates feel that the intended parents are
distant and that the level of relationship did not meet their expectations, the
surrogates are likely to express dissatisfaction and frustration with the process,
testifying to exploitation and low sense of self-worth. In the short term, many
surrogates contend that it is important to see the child born of the agreement
and to be acknowledged by the new family during and after the birth. But
overall, surrogates’ expectations appear to be that the relationship will last well
past the birth, perhaps in perpetuity.
Many surrogates express that they want to feel appreciated and thanked
for their investment in time and effort beyond receiving payment. While they
work for money, many surrogates express altruistic motives as well, and no
amount of money could fully compensate women for the level of commitment
they must make. In describing their work, surrogate narratives use concepts of
gift giving and mission to accentuate the more altruistic side of their endeavors and to de-emphasize the commercial contractual nature of their work.
Evidence suggests that surrogates want to be acknowledged for the altruistic
aspects of their actions as well as paid for the commercial aspects.43
In sum, commercial surrogates work for money but also create deep
emotional attachments with intended families. How should the law or ethics treat these complex relationships? What protections exist for surrogates
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who form these attachments? Some legal systems try to separate the attachment
from the work to the greatest extent possible by not allowing surrogates to
interact with intended parents or the babies once they are involved. Others
allow only altruistic surrogacy and expect that surrogates and intended families have ongoing familial or friend-based relationships. But can commercial
surrogates be recognized for both the commercial service they provide and the
intimate relationships that are involved?
B. JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVES
ON SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
Jewish law has unique insights to contribute to these three dilemmas.
First, Jewish law has a distinctly strong focus on procreation in relation to
other interests. Second, unlike under secular legal systems, Jewish law cannot
use intent or contract as an indicator of parenthood, which is a natural status with religious significance. Finally, Jewish law puts high emphasis on the
human dignity of each man or woman.
1. BALANCING INTERESTS: THE STRONG
RIGHT TO PROCREATE UNDER JEWISH LAW

As compared to other legal systems, Jewish law puts a very high value on procreation.44 The Jewish law commandment to be fruitful and multiply found
in the book of Genesis has been a major source of procreative energy for the
Jewish people.45 This commandment, which applies only to men because
childbearing is considered to be a danger to women’s health and thus cannot
be commanded upon her, is usually understood to be fulfilled if a man fathers
two children.46 This commandment has been particularly influential in Jewish
legal decisions. Indeed, the commandment has been used to stretch Jewish law
to embrace the use of ART.47 Since the inability to bear children is adequate
grounds to divorce one’s wife and failure to fulfill the commandment can be
considered a serious infraction of Jewish law, using ART, including surrogacy,
to reproduce the male seed has been accepted in many Jewish religious communities.48 Israel’s surrogate motherhood agreements law was one of the first
and most progressive of its kind to officially sanction and enforce surrogate
motherhood agreements.49 The commandment upon men to reproduce led
noted rabbinic leaders, such as Rabbi Nechemia Goldberg, to allow Orthodox
couples to use surrogate mothers in Israel under the Surrogate Motherhood
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Law, despite numerous important rabbinical authorities’ expressed belief that it
is the gestational, surrogate mother who is the legal mother under Jewish law.50
Thus, while other systems create a certain balance between the fear of
commodification and exploitation and the value of procreation, under Jewish
law it is logical that the balance be weighted toward procreation and allowing
surrogacy. Family life and reproduction are essential, and a judgment can be
made that the risks of exploitation and commodification can be borne and
limited through regulation for the benefit of fulfilling religious commandments and sustaining religious life.
2. SPLIT OF OPINION OVER THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF MOTHERHOOD

The leniency in allowing surrogate motherhood in order to fulfill the commandment to procreate does not cancel the need to determine legal parentage
under Jewish law. Under Jewish law, the establishment of parenthood relates
to the fulfillment of halachic obligations, issues of personal status, and civil
law. With regard to religious obligations, the issue of parentage is relevant for
matters of the father’s obligation to “be fruitful and multiply” and the obligation of the child to honor his or her parents. The personal status of the child
is relevant for determining the permissibility of certain marriages (e.g., there
are laws against incest). Parental status is also relevant for determining Jewish
status, parental obligations to children in regard to custody and support, and
issues of inheritance.51
Jewish law sources are divided on the issue of who is the legal mother:
the woman whose egg produces the baby or the woman who gestates the baby.
Some authorities consider the egg donor or genetic mother to be the legal
mother. Rabbi Shlomo Goren bases his determination on an argument in the
Talmud in which two voices argue as to the time when souls are given.52 He
concludes that the soul is given from the time of counting or numbering
the intended persons and not from the time of their creation. Therefore, at the
earliest stage possible, the time of insemination, the identity of the child is
already determined by its genetic makeup. He also argues that fatherhood and
motherhood are defined in the same manner, from the first drop of seed from
both male and female upon fertilization. Rabbi Itamar Warhaftig also asserts
that logically it is the egg donor and not the surrogate mother who should be
considered the mother.53 His logical basis for this conclusion is that it is the
genes of the genetic mother and father that will determine the characteristics
of the child and that the womb of the surrogate is nothing more than the place
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of growth. Furthermore, he argues that conceptually, if not practically as of
yet, gestation could even be done in a laboratory. In his opinion, genes are the
only essential human contribution.
Other authorities consider the gestational surrogate to be the legal
mother of the child. Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Rabbi Eliezer
Yehudah Calev are two significant authorities who have determined that the
woman who gestates the fetus is the legal mother. Rabbi Goldberg looks to
Talmudic sources to identify motherhood with birth.54 The Talmud explains
that twin brothers, who are non-Jews and subsequently convert, have no
obligations in chalizah or yibum [levirate marriage] and are not obligated to
refrain from marrying each other’s wives because upon conversion to Judaism, all prior familial relationships are legally severed according to Jewish
law. However, twins who were conceived when their parents were non-Jews
and were born to a Jewish woman (she converts while she is pregnant) are
not obligated in chalizah and yibum but are obligated not to marry each
other’s wives. Since motherhood is established upon birth, Rabbi Goldberg
argues, the obligations that are derived from lineage to their mother still
hold. If motherhood were determined by genetic input or upon conception,
the conversion of the mother would have severed her ties to her children and
their ties to each other. However, after the twins’ birth they are still considered brothers from their maternal lineage in that they are prohibited from
marrying each other’s wives.
Alternately, Rabbi Calev and others point to an aggadic interpretation
[homiletic tale] of the biblical story of Rachel and Leah.55 The allegorical
source refers to an intrauterine transfer of Dinah from the womb of Rachel
to the womb of Leah and an intrauterine transfer of Joseph from the womb
of Leah to the womb of Rachel. Subsequent references in Scripture refer to
Dinah as the daughter of Leah and to Joseph as the son of Rachel, despite the
supposed switch. Ostensibly, this tale indicates that each child has a single
mother and that the mother is the birth mother, not the genetic mother. This
analogy marks parturition rather than gestation or egg donation as the establishing variable of motherhood. While some authorities will not use allegory
in matters of determining Jewish law, many other authorities have held that
if the allegorical interpretation does not conflict with other legal sources, it is
acceptable to learn from these sources. In addition, Rabbi Ezra Bick offers a
conceptual orientation to the issue from a broad overview of Jewish law.56 He
posits that Jewish law should give special consideration to the legal status of
the surrogate as the birth mother due to the law’s sensitivity to and emphasis
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on the differences between men and women. This understanding provides a
broader philosophical background to the more legalistic determinations that
have been made.
Although establishing parenthood based on intent or contract is foreign
to Jewish law,57 contracts can be used to transfer obligations or appoint guardians.58 However, even so, for issues of conversion and inheritance motherhood
is inalienable.
Due to the conflict of opinions, both of which are based on insights by
well-regarded rabbis and differing sources, ultimately both genetic and gestational mothers are considered to be legal mothers due to doubt and uncertainty. In practice, conversion is required both for children who are born
of non-Jewish surrogates and for children who are born of non-Jewish egg
donors.59 In order to be sure that a child is Jewish and not of compromised
personal status [mamzerut],60 both women are deemed to be “mothers” for
purposes of personal status (preventing incest) and religious identity.
Indeed, Rabbi Mosh Shternbach, a prominent jurist and halachic
authority in the Ultra-Orthodox community in Jerusalem, has decreed that
in the case of gestational surrogacy, both women must be considered legal
mothers of the child.61 His argument is not just due to uncertainty whereby
both woman are considered mothers due to lack of clarity as to which of the
two women is the legal mother; it is also due to an affirmative need to recognize both women as legal mothers. He argues that women have two parts in
producing a child, providing the egg and birthing the child, and both create
the motherhood status. He says that since both women create the child, both
have the legal status of mother. Multiplying motherhood, according to Shternbach, is not a logical impossibility.
In American law, on the other hand, the idea of multiple motherhood
is frowned upon because it potentially threatens and violates the exclusive
parenthood rights of the intended mother in surrogacy.62 In the United States,
the right to conceive and to raise one’s own children has been deemed essential
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Raising one’s own child is a matter of rights to
the child, even if custody is ultimately decided according to a “best interests”
standard.63 Both parents have standing to assert their rights to custody of the
child and have rights to visitation.
But under Jewish law, parenthood is less a right than an obligation,
and thus violating parenthood rights is not a cause for concern.64 Indeed,
Michael Broyde writes that although rabbinic discussions on surrogate motherhood have centered on the definition of the legal mother for various ritual
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obligations, he argues that these ritual issues tend not to be the crucial ones to
the couple or the surrogate mother seeking such children.65
Broyde argues that when maternal identity is legally in doubt or in dispute and paternal identity is established, maternal custody should be granted
to the wife of the father regardless of who is determined to be the legal mother
under Jewish law. He offers two basic rationales for this determination. First,
the obligation to financially support children is assigned primarily to men.
Second, he explains that basic custody law holds that child custody should be
determined according to the best interests of the child. Given the reality in surrogate motherhood that the intended parents are those of greater means and
have initiated the conception of the child, Broyde argues that it would almost
always be in the child’s best interest for the intended parents to have custody.
However, while the basic principles stated by Broyde above may be substantial enough to usually lead rabbinical figures to give custody of the child
to the father, it should be pointed out that the presumptions of the Talmud
are that under certain situations the legal mother would have sole custody
of the child.66 The Talmud embraces three rules that generally govern child
custody, which are adjusted according to factual findings of best interests of
the child. First, custody of all children under the age of six is to be given to the
mother; second, custody of boys over the age of six is to be given to the father;
and third, custody of girls over the age of six is to be given to the mother.
Moreover, financial means are not the only factor in considering what custody
arrangement is in a child’s best interest.67
These three guidelines have been widely interpreted to be simply presumptions. Rather, the overarching standard for determining custody should
be the best interests of the child as determined by the beit din.68 And under
a best interests analysis that does not have to bend to parental rights, Jewish
law authorities can be creative in custodial provisions that ensure what is best
for the child.69 Broyde’s claim that the best interests of the child will always
be with the legal father and intended mother is controversial even if usually
accurate. It may be best for a child to have connections with all three biolog
ical parents, even if the primary duty of support rests with the father. Empirical studies do support that as long as tension levels are not high, multiple
caregivers can be good for children’s interests.70 Most studies refer to mothers
and fathers, but if other potential caregivers are available to give care and
such care is helpful and not causing strife, there is support indicating that
multiple caregivers beyond parents are good for children.71 Not all parents are
able to care for children, and many other kind family members or third parties
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take up significant portions of the obligations of custodial care. Here, we are
dealing only with the possibility of two mother figures with potential obligations. Given that the obligation to parent and support a child can be divided
or upheld by one of two parents and that multiplying parenthood is not a violation of exclusive rights, Jewish law seems well placed for engaging multiple
parental figures. According to Rabbi Shternbach, because both women are
legal parents, both could have the obligations of motherhood, and the child
would have rights and obligations to both mothers.
Recognizing gestation as relevant to creating motherhood as opposed to
intent or genetics is a contribution from Jewish law that is relatively rare. For
the most part, gestational surrogates are treated by legal systems as incubators
and wombs for hire.72 Recognizing the biological, involved, and significant
contribution that gestation plays in creating a child provides valuable insight
from Jewish law. The emphasis on the unique contribution of gestation in
Jewish law could serve as a solid platform for recognizing the role of surrogate
mothers and giving credence to the importance of pregnancy and childbearing, the biological domain of women.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN JEWISH LAW

Human dignity is a central tenet of Jewish law. In the beginning of the book
of Genesis we learn that man is created in God’s image.73 This is expressed
in various more specific laws, including the obligation to respect the dead, to
respect the human body, and to treasure every human life even if commandments need to be broken. Even prisoners and slaves must be treated with
dignity under Jewish law.74 Man is created in God’s image, and thus each man
must be treated with dignity and sanctity. Moreover, each man has a separate
identity and significance in and of himself.75 The Mishnah tells us that if one
man is lost, it is as if the whole world is lost, and for every man who is saved,
it is as if the whole world is saved.76 It is as if the whole world was created for
each individual man. This idea of the individual worth of each man has also
been used to derive the principle of equality between men in Jewish law.
Moreover, respecting human dignity is not just a right belonging to the
individual; it is a duty upon each individual to preserve one’s own health as
well as the lives of others.77 It is even a duty upon the individual who would
otherwise prefer to denigrate himself for money or other ends. Thus, a man
is not allowed to harm himself or his own body. In Jewish law a man cannot
actively cause his own death even if he is suffering and on his deathbed.78
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Accordingly, it is important that the surrogate, as a human, be treated
with dignity and be protected from shame, vulnerability, and heartbreak due
to the surrogacy arrangement. It is not worthy for humans to be treated as
wombs for rent or as commodities—each man must be treated as an end in
himself, not just a means of production. Just as people cannot sell themselves
into permanent servitude under Jewish law, a surrogate cannot sell her selfworth and dignity.
However, in Jewish law the idea of human dignity is not essentially tied
to commodification. Human dignity can be preserved despite commercialization. For instance, in Jewish law, baby selling is less problematic than in
other legal systems. Prohibitions against the selling of a person in Jewish law
relate to the selling of a person into servitude.79 In surrogacy arrangements,
the child is not sold into slavery, and neither is the surrogate. Ostensibly, the
prohibition against receiving money for the sale of persons is based on a fear
of control over another human being in slavery and is not a blanket prohibition against transferring a child for consideration, and renting out a womb is
not impermissible.80
Still, human dignity can be protected through regulations that recognize
status and limitations on commodification so as to prevent the woman from
being sold into servitude. She must retain sufficient autonomy over herself
and be treated with dignity. This can be accomplished through regulations
that limit the nature of surrogacy arrangements and how much control of
herself she can agree to forfeit—human dignity is a duty and a right, and
even if willing, no one can forfeit the right in a contract to refuse to live with
dignity—as well as to refuse medical treatment if unwanted, to eat and sleep
in a manner that is comfortable, or to give birth naturally instead of through
medical intervention. Surrogacy arrangements have confined a woman’s ability
to travel and have demanded that she live in hostels, eat prescribed foods, and
take prescribed medications.81 Surrogacy arrangements preclude natural birth
childbirth and even medical treatment that prioritizes the life of the fetus over
the life of the surrogate.82 Such contractual provisions or surrogacy arrangements should be regulated in order to preserve the dignity of the surrogate.
C. CRITIQUE OF THE JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVE
The religious Jewish community, even the Ultra-Orthodox community, has,
under certain circumstances, permitted surrogacy in order to allow infertile
couples to procreate and fulfill their religious obligations. The Israel Surrogate
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Agreements Law contains many provisions that attempt to incorporate aspects
of Jewish law in order to avoid problems that might arise within the religious
communities in Israel.83 In Israel, surrogate motherhood has been expressly
permitted by some of the most respected rabbinic authorities. Both the Sephardic chief rabbi, Rabbi Bakshi Doron, and Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, a rabbinical court judge and highly regarded halachic posek, have given
their approval to the law.84 Rabbi Borshtein, director of the Puah Institute of
Halachah and Reproductive Technology in Jerusalem, has stated that under his
guidance a number of women have received private permission from various
Orthodox halachic authorities, permitting the procedure and contract as it is
designated in Israeli law.85 In fact, the first couple to use the Israeli Surrogate
Contracts law was a religious couple. However, others have voiced objections
to the surrogate motherhood process due to misgivings about alienating child
rearing from the sanctity of marriage and the marital bed and out of concern
about the technology that facilitates it.86
In a private meeting with the Surrogate Agreements Approvals Committee appointed by the law, Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg explicitly
condoned the law and made no mention of the surrogate mother’s rights or
claims to the child.87 When asked by the committee who is the mother in
a case of gestational surrogacy where the intended mother has donated her
ovum, Rabbi Goldberg responded that this is a new issue and must be determined on the basis of analogies to related sources of halachah but cannot be
determined with full certainty.88 Therefore, he insisted that both mothers need
to be treated as mothers for the sake of lineage to avoid any determination of
mamzerut.89 When asked whether he would permit a woman who sought his
approval to use a surrogate mother, he answered that he would allow it if the
woman could not have a child otherwise.90 While Rabbi Zalman Nechemia
Goldberg’s conversation with the committee is the only written acceptance of
the Israeli law by a renowned authority on Jewish law, there is an understanding among the religious communities that such procedures may be permissible, depending on a couple’s specific circumstances and with direct approval
of a rabbinic authority.
Although Jewish law authorities have recognized the surrogate mother
as a legal mother, they have been willing to allow surrogacy despite the surrogate’s potential status. The obligations and concerns of lineage can be managed and dealt with in order to allow fulfillment of the command to procreate.
Motherhood status is natural and inalienable but can still be managed in the
context of potential complications. Although halachic authorities could have
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insisted on recognizing the surrogate as the legal mother and perhaps having
a formal adoption or guardianship process set up to transfer obligations, such
formalities have been overlooked in accepting the Israeli law.91
Indeed, while allowing surrogacy, Jewish law authorities have not given
much thought to what would become of these second mothers. Even if their
motherhood is somehow recognized for purposes of conversion or the ability
to marry and the status of mamzerut,92 no positive position has been taken
in order to recognize and protect these women from potential commodification or exploitation. According to significant Jewish authority, these women
are mothers of the children they bear, yet rabbis seem more concerned about
lineage, marital status, and whether or not the child is Jewish than in considering how to protect the woman who is a legal mother of the child, even
if the intended mother is also a mother. Could she have rights to custody or
visitation? Does she have a right to see the child? Could she be obliged to care
for or support the child? Must contracts ensure that her dignity and humanity are preserved? What specifically does the need to protect the surrogates’
dignity mean under Jewish law? These more human aspects of surrogacy are
not spoken of by Jewish law authorities despite the surrogate’s status as legal
mother. While part of Jewish law concerns must contend with legal status and
Jewish identity, it is disappointing that the recognition of multiple motherhood in this context has not been used to also explore the emotional impact
of surrogacy on the surrogate mother and to protect her dignity in the process.
D. GUIDELINES FOR RESOLUTION BASED
ON JEWISH LAW PRINCIPLES
As described above, Jewish law provides certain solutions for the three dilemmas of gestational surrogacy that I have posed. Jewish law would lead to the
conclusions that commercial surrogacy should be allowed but only to resolve
infertility in particular cases and only if the surrogate is property recognized
and protected. The legal mother according to Jewish law is perhaps surprisingly best understood as being both women, and multiplying motherhood
is not particularly problematic under Jewish law. Complications of having
multiple natural mothers must be dealt with in any event, and any support
and custodial obligations can in theory be divided and multiplied as well.
Finally, as all persons must be treated with dignity, the surrogate, who is also
a legal mother, should be protected and given recognition for her status and
emotional attachments with the intended family.
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However, Jewish authorities have been more concerned with preserving
a child’s status and Jewish identity than with recognizing the legal status and
dignity of the surrogate. Jewish sources, however, provide good reason to recognize and protect the surrogate and can be relied upon to create a humane
and regulated surrogacy system.
Under Jewish law, there are essentially two categories of ramifications for
legal parenthood, the first technical and the second human. The first category
concerns the status of the child and his or her Jewish identity and ability to
marry under Jewish law—mamzerut. These are basically technical concerns
due to the status of the surrogate as a mother that need to be dealt with to preserve the Jewish identity and personal status of the child. The second category
concerns more human issues regarding the relationship of the surrogate to the
child and intended family as well as her human dignity as a legal mother.
Jewish law already has recognized two mothers for the sake of personal
status and Jewish identity. Jewish families who use non-Jewish surrogates or
non-Jewish egg donors must convert their children to Judaism, according to
most halachic authorities. Converting a baby to Judaism, at least in accordance with Orthodox restrictions that monopolize conversions in Israel, is
not a simple procedure.93 Generally, the parents must promise to raise the
child in an observant Jewish environment, providing Jewish education and
exposure to Jewish practice. For secular Jews, getting through this process of
conversion can prove difficult.94 And without conversion, these babies will
not be able to marry in Israel. Even if heterosexual couples can succeed in
navigating this process, homosexual couples, frequent users of international
surrogacy, may experience more difficulties. Moreover, in order to avoid the
status of mamzer, which would also make the child unable to marry under
Jewish law, both women are considered mothers and thus cannot be related to
the other (i.e., kin cannot act as surrogates for their kin). This first category of
ramifications of multiplying motherhood creates hardship and confusion for
those using surrogacy to procreate and puts burdens on parents to protect the
personal status of the child born of surrogacy.
The second category of ramifications of the surrogate as legal mother
should also be considered under Jewish law. This second category of ramifications regards the duty and rights of the legal mother and the dignity of the
surrogate as a legal mother. As a legal mother, the surrogate may have duties
imposed upon her for the care of the child. As there are two mothers and presumably also a father, such duties would be divided among the legal parents.
As discussed above, the legal father has the primary financial duty toward
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his young children, but mothers also have duties of financial support and of
care.95 These duties can be contracted away to a willing person but not before
the child is born, because that child would not yet be in existence. Under Jewish law a contract cannot be made for a thing that is not yet in existence.96
Moreover, if the child becomes needy, such contracts would not be enforceable, as the child must be financially supported by his or her legal parents.97
With regard to custody, under Jewish law the principle of best interests
governs, although for younger children a mother is presumed to be the best
caregiver.98 Even if a surrogate is recognized as a second mother, a surrogate
would not be the sole or even primary custodial parent. Presumably, as per
the contract, the intended parents would support and raise the child as primary custodians. If a dispute arose, the intended parents would likely win
primary custody under a best interests analysis.99 This may not always be the
case, depending on the circumstances.
However, what of the possibility in Jewish law for multiple custodians?
Even if one parent receives the primary custodial obligation, contact or visitation with other parents or kin can be relevant in making custodial arrangements under a best interests standard.100 A surrogate could be given visitation
or allowed contact with a child or even be appointed as a guardian of the child.
A surrogate has a potential duty to the child and so may be recognized as a
secondary guardian or secondary custodian.
A guardian under Jewish law is usually a legal parent but can be another
kin appointed to care for and support the child.101 And a guardian need not
be the primary custodian of the child but can be another kin relation who
manages the child’s affairs.102 Often a guardian is a kin of the child in times of
crisis who has the ability to manage the assets of the child. Jewish courts prefer
kin to act as guardians as opposed to strangers.103 While authorities used to
prohibit appointing a woman, even a mother, as guardian, modern authorities
recognize women’s and mothers’ authority as guardians of their children.104
Such guardianship or custody can also be based on emotional attachments that
serve the best interests of the child.105 While such possibilities for legal status
unrelated to financial duties have not been fully developed under Jewish law
by halachic authorities, the potential exists within the Jewish law framework
for multiple guardians and custodians in complex situations, and kin relations
are given priority over legal strangers.106 Indeed, it has been said that a person
who takes upon himself to care for a child may obtain the benefit of being a
guardian to that child.107 Accordingly, a surrogate who takes upon herself the
task of gestating that child and thereby becoming a legal mother may claim a
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benefit of being a guardian to that child. Because the best interests standard
has been increasingly relevant under Jewish law and because Jewish law courts
have discretion to appoint guardians in children’s best interests, such a possibility exists.108
There is also little discussion of visitation rights under Jewish law, as custody is considered an obligation and not a right. However, Jewish courts
applying Jewish law regularly award visitation to a noncustodial parent under
a best interests standard. Custodial decisions are based on best interests and
not rights. However, if contact with multiple caregivers is deemed to be best
for children, visitation arrangements can be ordered by Jewish law courts.
And contact with multiple caring maternal figures may be good for children
depending on the situation, particularly if the parties can work in a cooperative manner. If the surrogate had already developed connections with the child
through consent of the intended parents, a court could consider awarding
visitation rights to this second mother in the best interests of the child.
However, the possibility that the surrogate could be a legal guardian
or have legal visitation rights imposed upon unwilling intended parents is
unlikely under a best interests standard, given current social norms about the
importance of two parents and the nuclear family. Most likely, as with an aunt
or other relative, the surrogate would be dependent on the consent of primary
custodians to have access to the child if she wanted it. Even without her legal
rights of custody, being explicit about her status as a secondary legal mother
can affect the nature of her relationship to the intended family and the child.
According to the empirical studies cited above, the mere recognition that surrogates are more than a disposable womb for hire and have made a serious
contribution to the creation of the baby and thus are worthy of respect and
acknowledgement would likely be sufficient to cure the sense of abandonment, frustration, and exploitation that surrogates feel. Surrogates indicate
that they expect a continued relationship with the intended family as a natural
consequence of strong relationships that developed during the surrogacy process. As a secondary kin figure to the baby, recognized according to the law as
much more than a mere incubator but as a second mother, such a relationship
becomes more acceptable and reasonable. Following the lead of Jewish law
and recognizing the significant contribution of the surrogate in a regulated and
limited way can be used to resolve the dilemma of the emotional attachments
formed during surrogacy. Unlike Western values that perceive such recognition
as a violation of parental rights, the duties involved to bring children into the
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world and raise them should not involve excluding other important figures in
a child’s life.
Of course, best interests with regard to custody governs. And if the surrogate and the intended parents are in tension regarding the surrogate’s role,
then involving the surrogate in a continued manner in the child’s life against
the objections of the father and his wife could be problematic. However,
affirmative recognition of the status of the surrogate as secondary mother or
kin under Jewish law can enable recognition and encourage good relations
between the parties.
Although her status as a second legal mother can feel threatening to
the procreating intended parents, almost like a concubine or second wife
must have been threatening to a primary wife in biblical times or perhaps in
polygamous relationships even in modern times, the duties involved under
Jewish law are to procreate and to raise the child appropriately. And as discussed above, she is unlikely to have legal rights that she could impose on the
custodial father and mother. Still, the presence of a third party in the process
is due to infertility, and the presence of the third party cannot be erased even if
it would be emotionally easier. The surrogate needs to be acknowledged, protected, and included in the process as a partner and not treated as a disposable
incubator. This is a complex family system, no doubt, but so is the surrogacy
process itself. And pretending that the surrogate does not exist as a human
partner and does not continue to exist after the child’s birth may simplify the
process for intended parents but does not give sufficient heed to the relevance
of the gestating surrogate and her dignity.
Moreover, the Jewish law principle of human dignity demands the surrogate’s recognition, protection, and inclusion. Recognition, protection, and
inclusion humanize the surrogate and make her relevant not just for personal
status and conversion issues but also as a human involved in the process of procreation. Human dignity is not respected if a person is used as a mere womb
and then discarded. Jewish law authorities should not be concerned only with
possible religious infractions and assuring personal status of the child but
should also be concerned with protecting and recognizing the surrogate and
her status as secondary mother in the process of gestational surrogacy. Contractual provisions should ensure her dignity and humanity under Jewish law.
Contractual provisions that excessively constrain her freedom, demean her, or
fail to sufficiently account for her role in the procreation by not allowing her
to even see the baby should not be tolerated.
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E. CONCLUSION
Jewish family law, like any system of family law, must recognize complex family networks in the modern era. Based on tradition, Jewish law can be used to
widen its scope to enlighten families in transition.
In this essay, I rely on Jewish law for inspiration and seek creative resolution to complex problems. I pose dilemmas that exist in modern, secular
thinking about surrogacy and then look to Jewish law principles to seek resolutions. I am not descriptively seeking to answer concrete problems in the manner of religious poskim or to describe their positions based on their religious
authority. However, I rely on the principled decisions of such authorities to ask
questions and resolve ethical tensions and dilemmas. I suggest solutions based
on Jewish law principles that can enlighten and enrich our thinking about
these dilemmas. Thereby, I look at Jewish law principles broadly and suggest
resolutions for modern families that I believe can be derived from Jewish law.
And I also criticize current narrow thinking about the relevance of Jewish
law and suggest that the inquiries and resolutions be carried further.
I acknowledge that I am attempting to bridge modern intellectual inquiries and empirical studies with traditional halachic decision making that is
made on a case-by-case basis and that such a bridge may seem irrelevant or
ephemeral. Such inquiries, however, can provide powerful insight for resolution of modern dilemmas. The line between law and ethics, as well as principle and legal decision, is not necessarily black and white. Beyond providing
concrete solutions in divorce and marriage law, Jewish law and ethics can be
a guiding force for the resolution of modern dilemmas in Jewish family law.
Jewish law can preserve its traditional precepts while still inspiring the modern
family in transition.
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